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INTRODUCTION :
Cast your mind forward a few years and the European financial 
markets could seem something like this. The share prices of Fiat, 
Peugeot and Volkswagen flash up side by side on dealing screens 
from Dublin to Athens. Computers click and instantly a deal is 
completed - ownership shifts from a Dutch dentist to a Portugese 
actuary. Italian investors pour into Spanish mutual funds, while 
Daimler Benz chooses Credit Lyonnais to lead-manage its latest D- 
mark bond issue. Germans take out British life insurance, Danes 
take out Italian mortgages, Spaniards open bank accounts in 
Belgium. Investors and speculators alike strategically buy an ECU 
interest rate future here, a promising bond with an equity warrant 
there.
Does this scenario belong with Alice in Wonderland or is this the 
shape of things to come ? A single European market for financial 
services is envisaged as a necessary consequence of the completion 
of the internal market, now defined in the Treaty of Rome as 
M...an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of goods, services and capital is ensured."^ Article 8a of the 
Treaty provides that the Community shall adopt measures with the 
aim of progressively establishing this internal market over a 
period expiring on the 31st December 1992.
The object of the single market is to remove the remaining 
barriers that exist to these four freedoms and the barriers that 
exist to greater competition and economies of scale within
1. Article 8a EEC Treaty as inserted by Article 13 of the Single 
European Act.
European business, while at the same time, for the financial
services sector, creating a common framework of prudential rules
which will underpin the stability of the financial system and
2
provide a satisfactory level of protection for consumers. If 
Europe's muddle of financial markets were truly one, it would 
rival the world's largest : the total of Europe's banking deposits 
together are one and a half times those of America and three 
quarters the size of Japan's. The market value of the shares of 
domestic companies quoted on European stock exchanges, one fifth 
of the world's total, is three fifths as big as that of shares
quoted in New York and almost half that of Tokyo. Europeans pay
three fifths as much in insurance premiums as even insurance
obsessed Americans do. The European financial market has as its 
hinterland a joint gross domestic product almost equal to that of 
America and two thirds more than that of Japan. In terms of 
population Europe has 325 million citizens, compared with 245
3
million Americans and 123 million Japanese.
If these statistics are not revealing, the results of the Cecchini
„ 4
Report on the benefits of a single financial services market 
certainly have to be acknowledged. The comparative cost approach 
utilised indicated some vast differentials in the costs of basic 
financial transactions between member states. For example, the
2. G.Fitchew, Director General DG 15 - Financial Institutions
and Company Law, "1992 - Completion of the Single Market in 
Financial Services " : Commission office London 9/9/1988.
3. Statistics drawn from The Economist 16/12/1989 : "A survey of 
Europe's Capital Markets" from p.58 .
4. P.Cecchini with M.Catinat & A.Jacquemin "The European
challenge 1992 : the benefits of a single market" (1988) 
Wildwood House, which is based on research carried out on 
behalf of the Commission and published in Volume 9 of the 
Research on the Cost of Non - Europe Series (1988),
Commission of the EC.
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cost of purchasing a commercial bank draft for 30000 ECUs in The 
Netherlands was 22 ECUs, whereas in Spain such a draft cost 120 
ECUs. Stock Exchange commission costs on equity bargains of 1440 
ECUs amounted to 9 ECUs in France and to 23 ECUs in Britain. Not 
surprisingly, the Report concluded that there were significant 
potential gains to be secured in terms of increases in consumer 
surplus and economic welfare resulting from the dynamic effect of 
economic integration, and not simply as a result of removing the 
costs of meeting some of the existing regulations. It estimated 
that these gains could be in the region of 22 billion ECUs. It 
also predicted that the removal of barriers between and within the 
markets, and of the costs linked to them, would have three 
interlocking effects i a surge in the competitivity of the sector 
itself ? a knock-on boost to all business using its increasingly 
efficient services ; and, more generally, a new and positive 
influence on the conduct of macro-economic policy in the 
Community.
Insurance, banking and the marketing of securities add up to a
sector of the economy that accounts for around 7% of European
. 5gross domestic product, a share which is growing strongly. In 
Britain alone, between 1980 and 1985, the sector experienced a 
growth rate of 7.7% per annum, employment therein increased by 18% 
and real wages increased by 31%.® The economic importance of the 
financial services sector is even greater when account is taken of 
the size of capital flows that it intermediates, the risk of
5. See T.Padoa-Schioppa (ed) "Efficiency, stability and equity" 
(1987), a report produced by a study group and presented to 
the Commission in April 1987. Subsequently published by 
Oxford University Press.
6. See C.Mayer, "The assessment : financial innovation : curse
or blessing ?" Vol.2 No.4 Oxford Rev. of Economic Policy p.i- 
xix .
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instability that is inherent in financial markets and the links 
between finance and all the other fields of economic activity. 
Indeed, one eminent economist stated that :
"It may not be an exaggeration to say that the crucial role in a
growing economy based on the division of labour is actually
played by the financial sector. The efficiency of the allocative
process and the stability of the economy are heavily dependent on
the ability of this sector to combine efficiency and stability in
7
the performance of its monetary, credit and payment functions."
In this thesis, I attempt to portray a European financial services 
sector which is undergoing something of a metamorphosis. Thus far, 
the impetus for this change has come from competitive pressures 
within the markets themselves. Now, however, the European 
Community is throwing its not inconsiderable weight behind the 
development of a more integrated and consequently, more 
streamlined marketplace, in a bid to tackle the problems of 
fragmentation and protectionism that continue to dog the markets. 
I have focused my attention on Community stock exchanges and other 
financial markets, and their participants, without commenting on 
the specific area of insurance, which would merit a separate 
analysis. My principal concern has therefore been with the 
provision of investment services, which necessarily entails a 
consideration of the increasing role played by credit institutions 
in this field.
7. T.Padoa-Schioppa "The blurring of financial frontiers : in
search of an order" a contribution to a Conference on 
Financial Conglomerates, organised by the Commission (DG 
15/A-4), held in Brussels 14-15/3/1988, at p.17-36 of the 
proceedings thereof.
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The thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first, I consider 
the recent evolution of the financial markets, which has seen the 
transformation of a formerly institutionally compartmentalised, 
geographically segmented and traditionally conservative industry 
into a sophisticated, innovative and truly global business. Such 
progress has inevitably been accompanied by an increase in the 
risks and strains exerted on the system, and has placed increased 
pressures on the supervisory structure.
The second chapter examines the reasons why the European Community 
has hitherto been unable to realise the gains offered by an 
integrated financial services market. Adopting an institutional 
approach, I relate this particular failure to the difficulties 
encountered by the Community in establishing the Internal Market 
per se. The breakthrough came with the renewed enthusiasm shown 
for European integration in the 1980s, which mood was captured in 
the Single European Act and the Commission's White Paper. The 
latter specifically targeted financial services as an area for 
liberalisation, and breathed new life into the federalist 
conception of the Community. The Court of Justice, too, has 
contributed to the winds of change blowing around the marbled 
halls of the financial Community. I analyse, in some detail, the 
Court's judgement in the 'insurance cases’, where it sought to 
define the Treaty enshrined Community freedoms to provide services 
and of establishment, as they relate to this sector.
The Court's approach has been respected and reflected in the 
specific legislative measures, adopted or proposed by the Council 
and the Commission, in the financial services field. These are 
discussed in chapter three. I critically assess the proposed 
Investment Services directive and highlight the difficulties 
encountered in preparing the legislation, due to the diversity of 
financial markets and capitalistic traditions within the
V!Ui
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Community. At this point, I consider the moves afoot among the 
various exchanges, to develop a European stock market and prepare 
themselves for the greater volume of business and competition 
anticipated as a consequence of the 1992 programme.
The fourth chapter seeks to explain the theoretical reasoning 
behind the regulation of financial markets, and uses an economic 
perspective to warn of the dangers of piecemeal regulation and of 
overregulation. I draw on American regulatory practice and 
question whether its latest 'trend', the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis, could usefully be adopted into European systems of 
regulation.
In the conclusion, I turn to the implications of the foregoing for 
the European financial services consumer, and ask whether his 
deeply entrenched habits and attitudes are likely to change in the 
aftermath of 1992. I conclude that it is the retail services 
sector which is likely to see the most changes over time and that 
a degree of consolidation and rationalisation within the industry 
is inevitable. However, it is difficult to attempt to predict the 
future evolution of this industry, because it is susceptible to 
dramatic change, due to technological advances and man's financial 
ingenuity, and because it is highly sensitive to the conditions of 
the economic environment.
-7-
CHAPTER 1 : Financial Services - a moving target ? .
The European financial services market has undergone a progressive 
transformation in the recent past, a process whose origins can be 
traced back to the economic upheavals of the early 1970s. This 
revolution has deeply affected the different financial markets, 
the types of financial instruments available and the institutions 
and intermediaries involved in the industry. It has supported 
economic growth and capital formation and has benefitted both the 
professional and non-professional investing public. They have been 
provided with a vast array of investment vehicles from which to 
choose, new ways of hedging exposures and the tactical ability to 
adjust their portfolios rapidly in response to changing economic 
conditions. What has made the present situation unprecedented is 
not the intensity and pervasiveness with which the changes have 
taken place, but, more fundamentally, the fact that they reflect a 
deep-seated modification in the behaviour of all the market 
participants in general - investors, borrowers, intermediaries, 
governments and regulatory authorities.^
Financial Innovation :
This process has become known as financial innovation, being a
description of the manner in which the financial system adapts
2itself to new conditions. Most financial change has therefore
1. See R.Pecchioli "Openness or protectionism ?", a contribution 
to a symposium on "Europe and the future of financial 
services", organised by DGs XII & XV of the Commission, 
Brussels 5-7/11/1986, at p.503-518 of the proceedings.
2. J.Forsyth "Financial innovation in Britain" an essay in M.De 
Cecco {ed) "Changing money s financial innovation in 
developed countries" (1987) Basil Blackwell Ltd., p.141-157 .
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reflected a reaction to broader economic and political
developments as well as to other factors such as technological
advances. It is not a continuous process but one that tends to
come in waves, which vary in their impact on different financial
systems. A brief study of this phenomenon will illustrate how the
European financial markets have become increasingly
internationalised and integrated into the global financial
machine. It is now virtually impossible to isolate the European
markets from their global background without ignoring some of
their most influential and shaping forces. An understanding of
this process also helps one to appreciate the difficulty and
complexity of the task facing Community and national legislators
and regulators in their efforts to legislate for, and to control,
3
this swiftly moving target.
The process of financial innovation has been fuelled by the 
interraction of several combustive elements. The principal 
catalysts however were the following :
1. Changing economic conditions :
Innovation has been to some extent provoked or promoted by 
economic factors such as accelerating and variable rates of 
inflation, fluctuating interest rates and unexpected bouts of 
massive government borrowing. These became widespread in the wake 
of the oil crises of the 1970s, when the size of the oil price 
increases and the short time span in which they were carried out, 
caused exceptional and huge financial disequilibria, both domestic
3. See generally J.Delmas-Marsalet "Determinants structurels de 
la mutation financière récente", a contribution to the 
symposium cited supra note 1 at p.13-34.
-9-
and international. This resulted in unprecedented balance of 
payments imbalances, large increases in public sector borrowing 
requirements and rises in the financial deficits of the corporate 
sector. Governments were increasingly forced to resort to 
financial markets to attract funds to satisfy their financing 
needs. In some countries, such as Italy and France, this led to 
the development of the gilt market through the issue of securities 
whose maturity, coupon, options or warrants attached represented 
substantially innovative features. In financial markets which were 
largely dominated by fixed interest long term instruments, the 
sudden leap in inflation and subsequently in interest rates 
consequent on these imbalances, led to a substantial fall in the 
value of financial assets held by investors, such as equities and 
shares in pension funds. This encouraged the expansion and 
refinement of speculative and hedging activities in money, capital 
and exchange markets.
Exchange rates were also prone to bouts of excessive volatility in 
the 1970s. By 1973, the Bretton Woods system under which world 
currency values had been closely fixed in terms of each other had 
broken down. Exchange rates were thus freed to float and find 
their own level. Previously currency values over time could have 
been predicted with reasonable accuracy, now they could not. The 
demand for reducing the uncertainty of financial flows denominated 
in different currencies led to rapid innovation in the foreign 
exchange markets and the arrival of a myriad of new types of 
exchange rate instruments to serve the needs of those involved in
4. See A.Desiata "Financial innovation and the development of a 
European financial market", another contribution to the 
symposium cited supra note 1 at p.83-97 •
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q
international financial transactions. The increased
unpredictability required businesses to cover currency risks by 
transferring them to specific institutions and in this way a 
marketplace evolved for the exchange of standardised future 
exchange rate contracts.
2. Changing customer attitudes :
(a) There have been sweeping changes in the demands of wholesale 
or corporate consumers for financial services. Large companies 
have strengthened and broadened their cash management policies. 
Corporate treasurers are now ready to look for the best terms 
available when they raise cash or place funds. The old-fashioned 
long term dependence of a company on a single bank increasingly 
resembles the more modern commercially oriented relationship with 
an investment bank due to the greater mobility and flexibility of 
borrowers.** That has been paralleled by the expansion of 
corporate arbitrage activities within and between markets and 
across the spectrum of fund raising techniques. Cost 
considerations have provided strong incentives for corporations to 
tap the financial markets directly as an alternative to 
traditional bank borrowing. This has contributed to a rise in the 
number of marketable credit instruments, such as bonds, notes and 
certificates of deposit, a tendency which has become known as 
securitisation. A corporate borrower will now be prepared to use 
a series of swap and other transactions to borrow in whichever
5. See generally, D.Ayling "The internationalisation of 
stockmarkets" (1986) Gower Publishing Co. Ltd.
6. See Mayer, cited supra in the Introduction note 6.
7. As will be illustrated in chapter 4, companies are still 
relatively reluctant to raise funds by issuing equity on the 
securities markets.
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market, currency and form gives it the greatest comparative 
advantage, and then to transform those funds into whatever 
currency, maturity and interest rate pattern best meets the needs
o
of its business. In some instances, large corporations have even 
begun to perform intermediary functions in a number of capital 
market segments and to provide other financial services themselves 
through financing subsidiaries and affiliates.
(b) Faced with the increased uncertainty and markedly more 
volatile market climate of the 1970s and early 1980s, private 
investors have become more yield and liquidity conscious which has 
had an attendant impact on their savings patterns and portfolio 
structures. Households have progressively become acquainted with 
policies of financial asset diversification and active portfolio 
management as a means of protecting their savings, earning a 
better income on them and for seeking capital gains. From 1970 to 
1984, the share of current account deposits of total liabilities 
in Britain decreased from 18.8% to 6.6% and in France from 34.8% 
to 19% , as individuals drifted away from captive savings to more
g
rewarding forms of investment. The rise in private personal 
incomes and the accumulation of financial wealth as standards of 
living increased across Western Europe, together with the changes 
in the market environment, created a demand for an increased 
variety of financial assets and a wider spectrum of retail 
financial services. Notable among the latter were asset 
management, brokerage and related advisory services. Quality of 
service, more personalised relationships with intermediaries, 89
8. See C.Goodhart "Financial innovation and monetary control"
(1986) Vol.2 No.4 Oxford Rev, of Economic Policy p.79-102 . 
Goodhart describes the term securitisation as "hideous 
jargon" !
9. Desiata supra note 4 at p.88 .
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availability of information on market trends and opportunities, 
efficiency and promptness have all become major considerations 
amongst customers in this newly enlightened climate.
{c) One of the most significant portfolio changes observed during 
the 1970s was the substantial switch by the personal investor from 
equity investment towards institutional saving. Investors have 
been giving up self-managed savings and substituting them with 
shares in portfolios managed by institutional investors such as 
pension funds, insurance policies, mutual funds and unit trusts 
(the new fast-food of investment). This has been in no small part 
due to the tax advantages of certain types of institutional 
saving. As one commentator has suggested, nowadays overall tax 
effects are as important in deciding the optimum portfolio 
structure as is the underlying market rate of return on different 
assets.1  ^ Portfolio diversification and more sophisticated asset 
management have been cited as the other principal reasons for the 
phenomenal growth of these contractual forms of savings. In 1963 
the main institutional investors owned less than 28% of UK shares, 
by 1986 this figure had risen to 65%. Over the same period, the 
stake of the direct private shareholder had slumped from 59% to 
18%.11
Institutionalisation of savings has had a profound effect on the 
financial markets. The need to produce consistently good returns 
has focused fund managers' attention on short term results which 
punish poor corporate performers and, in turn, has helped 
facilitate the growth in corporate takeover activity. The trend 10
10. D.Llewellyn "The evolution of the British financial system"
(1985) The Institute of Bankers at p.20 .
11. For these and other noteworthy statistics, see M.Reid "All 
change in the City" (1988) The Macmillan Press Ltd at p.193 .
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has stimulated increases in trading volumes in all financial
markets and has generated a fertile feeding ground for new
financial instruments and innovative trading techniques. The 
impressively expanding institutional presence is sophisticated, 
demanding and not overly loyal, either to corporate management, 
domestic markets, individual banks or to particular securities 
firms. It has vastly accelerated the process of market growth and 
dramatically altered the balance of power in financial markets.
Due to their sheer size, the portfolio behaviour of the
institutions has an allocative effect upon the economy which
cannot be disregarded. This has prompted a large volume of
criticism of short-termism, ie. the willingness of those handling
investment funds to engage in 'churnover* of shares in the quest
for maximum returns. It has even been suggested that this could
have a detrimental effect on long term research and development in
industry. Companies may be forced to increase their dividends to
satisfy the demands of powerful institutional shareholders, rather
than ploughing the additional resources back into research 
12activities. The institutions' presence on the register of 
members of so many sizeable companies has also raised questions as 
to the role they should perform as shareholders. Usually, the size 
of an individual institutions shareholding and the constraints of 
its operation would preclude it from being more than a passive 
shareholder. However, collectively, institutional shareholders 
often hold a majority or a sizeable percentage of a company's 
shares, which could give them a substantial bargaining weapon at 
company meetings. In this environment, conflicts between 
management and institutions will always be likely, as will be the 12
12. For an example of such criticisms, see M.Fagan "Call to 
counter short-termism" The Independent 26/6/1990 p.20 .
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possible disregard of smaller or minority shareholders' interests.
Reid opined that, thus far, the concerted influence of the
institutions as shareholders has been remarkable for its absence
rather than for its presence. She noted, though, that as time has
gone on, institutions have become more accustomed to exerting
discrete concerted pressure in conditions where change seemed
13essential to restore a company's fortunes.
3. Technological developments :
Undoubtedly, the process of financial innovation would have been
slowed down considerably without the concurrent explosion of the
new telecommunications and computer technology. This has made it
possible to flash information on prices, trading conditions and
companies swiftly around the globe. When such data and orders to
deal can be passed instantly, any distance, frontiers shrink in
importance - they are simply skipped by an electronic beam.
Technology cannot predict the future direction of stock prices or
interest rates but it does have an unrivalled capacity to do three
things : analyse large masses of data quickly and precisely,
handle complex interrelationships systematically and process vast
, 14
amounts of information efficiently. The cost of doing all of
this has been declining steadily. Some observers contend that the
costs of international information flows have come down by 98% in
15the last twenty years. As today's technology becomes available 
to a wider group of potential users and tomorrow's technology adds 1345
13. Supra note 11 at p.198 .
14. R.Kubarych "International regulatory harmonisation s the 
economic and financial environment" (1988) Vol.14 no.2 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 255-269 at p.267 .
15. See C.Goodhart "The economics of Big Bang" (1987) Midland 
Bank Review 6-15 .
■HBaeaBSSBSSBBHBRM
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greater capabilities, the markets and their users will become 
increasingly sophisticated.
Technology entails more than just computer hardware, although the 
power and speed of computers has been indispensable to the growth 
of securities trading. It also means software that allows machines 
to do valuable work, assists in the development of financial 
engineering and facilitates the evolution of strategies like 
programme trading. The latter is based on the almost simultaneous 
completion of transactions on different financial markets. Index 
arbitrage, for example, entails trading on identified differences 
between the current price of a stock index future and the market 
price of the underlying stocks themselves. Programme trading was 
developed on the American exchanges where it relied on the 
technological structure of the New York Stock Exchange for the 
appropriate computational capacity and split second execution 
capability.
This technological capacity will exist, and continue to be 
refined, irrespective of economic, political and regulatory 
forces. Its usage will also spread between markets, as they 
compete among themselves to attract business by offering state of 
the art facilities. The two factors of competition and technology 
are linked in that new technology offers new competitive 
opportunities, but the intensification of competitive pressures is 
likely to speed the application of new technology.1® How 
technology will evolve in the future is an open question. 
Technological revolutions, it has been suggested, do not come and 
go indefinitely, and we may well be entering a phase of 
consolidation, development and refinement rather than experiencing 16
16. See Llewellyn supra note 10 at p.43 .
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. 17a further quantum jump in information technology. However there 
remain ample opportunities for improvement of, for instance, 
payment and settlement systems, customer linkage capabilities and 
automated management systems.
4. Changes in governments' policies :
The implementation of government policies towards domestic
financial markets has been another source for much of the
liberalisation and development of these markets in recent times.
This is one area where one can point to express legal measures as
the impetus for change, as distinct from commercial or market
pressures. Nevertheless, many such measures have been prompted by
the knowledge of governments that in the absence of a reduction in
the excess burden that existing regulatory laws were felt to be
imposing, the institutions and markets which they were seeking to
regulate would simply have moved to another more conducive 
t 18environment.
It is possible, at the risk of generalising, to identify three 
considerations that have inspired government policies in recent 
years. Firstly, more emphasis has been placed on policies 
supporting a structural change towards more flexible and dynamic 
economies. Secondly, it has become widely accepted that greater 
reliance should be placed on market forces as determinants of 
prices and market conditions. Thirdly, in the light of the growing 
financial interdependence worldwide, the preservation of the 178
j
17. See Pecchioli supra note 1 at p.509 .
18. See C.Goodhart "Structural changes in the British capital 
markets" an essay in D.Currie, C.Goodhart and D.Llewellyn 
(eds) "The operation and regulation of financial markets"
(1987) The Macmillan Press Ltd., p.31-53 .
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international competitiveness of a country's financial system has 
become an important policy objective. These considerations imply 
that government action should aim at promoting the efficiency of 
financial markets by fostering innovation, reducing structural 
rigidities and granting the necessary scope for the working of 
competitive forces.
Obviously government approaches will differ depending on the
strengths and weaknesses of national markets. However, the
initiatives that have been taken can be classified according to
whether they were aimed at the liberalisation of international
capital movements, the opening up of domestic markets to foreign
financial institutions, the removal of constraints on financial
diversification, the strengthening of price competition or the
. 19authorisation of innovative financial techniques.
So far as international capital movements are concerned, the most
important deregulatory move has been the lifting of foreign
exchange controls whether it was done unilaterally or in response
to European Community initiatives in the field (see chapter 3).
So long as exchange controls are preserved, authorities may
continue to maintain the existence of protected, cartelised, high
cost financial markets and institutions because dissatisfied
. 20domestic customers cannot easily transfer their business abroad. 
Once these controls are lifted, the pressures on all countries to 
adapt to best practice, or find that their own markets and 
national financial institutions will wither, are intense. In this 1920
19. This classification is adopted from R.Dale's Introduction to
R.Dale (ed) "Financial deregulation : the proceedings of a 
conference held by the David Hume Institute in May 1986"
(1986) Woodhead-Faulkner Ltd, p.ix-xiii .
20. C.Goodhart supra note 18 at p.36 •
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context, it is relevant to note that following the end of British
exchange controls in 1979, it was estimated that between then an d
1985, Britain's annual flow of investment abroad multiplied from. 21
one billion to eighteen billion pounds. Similar flights of funds
abroad were feared in France and Italy when their progressive. 22 
moves to relax their exchange controls culminated m  1988. In
addition, the removal of tax disincentives and other restrictions
to international portfolio investment have played a part in
stimulating capital flows. Perhaps the most significant
development here was the abolition during 1984 in both Germany and
France of certain withholding taxes which discouraged the movement
of funds abroad. Notable also, was the relaxation, carried out b y
the Reagan administration, of restrictions on the making of
foreign investments by American pension funds.
The growth in capital movements has been accompanied by the rapid 
cross border expansion of financial institutions. This has been 
encouraged by the relaxation of controls on the entry of foreign 
institutions into national securities markets, such as occurred as 
part of London's Big Bang and in the deregulation of the Parisian 
Bourse. Stock market participation in the latter, was opened to 
outsiders generally, by allowing the incorporation of stockbrokers 
and permitting the purchase of shares in them by other 
institutions. By September 1989, two-thirds of France's sixty 
stock exchange firms had thus opened .their capital to 
participation by outsiders, a quarter of them to foreign firms 21
21. Stock Exchange Quarterly, London (1987) Spring at p.15 .
22. The French relaxation progressed with the décrets of 
29/11/1984 - no.84-1046, 27/11/1986 - no.86-1211, 21/5/1987 - 
no.87-338 and culminated with the arrêté of the 1/6/1988. In 
Italy, the process started with the legge del Présidente 
della Repubblica of 26/9/1986 n.599, and culminated with the 
decreto del Présidente della Repubblica of 31/3/1988 n.148.
-19-
« 23from, inter alia, Britain, Germany, Japan and America. Such
relaxation has extended to Tokyo's notoriously protectionist Stock
Exchange, which is now gradually admitting foreign firms into
membership in exchange for the admission of Japanese securities
. 24firms to European markets.
The diversification of banks into non-bank financial services is 
another notable institutional feature. Faced with shrinking 
margins in their corporate lending market and the drift from 
captive savings by retail customers, banks have been forced to 
move away from their traditional intermediary role. They have 
found new areas of business, such as underwriting new market 
issues and making markets in the instruments used for lending and 
borrowing by their former corporate clients. In addition, they 
have increasingly involved themselves in securities markets 
activities. The interpenetration of the banks in other financial 
services sectors can be seen in the rash of takeover and merger 
activity among European financial institutions in recent times. 
Examples include the purchase by Deutsche Bank of the British 
merchant bank Morgan Grenfell in 1989 and the efforts of Credit 
Lyonnais to cover the Continent in branches by stealthily 
acquiring small or medium sized banks around the Community. It is 
also reflected in the emergence of the financial conglomerate, 
which operates as a 'one-stop shop* where a financial services 
consumer can avail of all his services needs within the one 
organisation. 234
23. See The Economist, cited supra in the Introduction note 3 .
24. Take, for example, the admission of James Capel Pacific Ltd., 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd Securities (Japan) Ltd. and Credit 
Lyonnais Securities AG to the Tokyo market. Reported in 
Business Week International, The Irish Times 10/3/1990 •
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Constraints on price competition are progressively being removed.
In general, protective price fixing arrangements within national
markets are being eroded by the intensity of competition between
previously distinct sectors of the financial services industry.
The abolition of fixed commissions on stock exchange business was
a feature of the reforms of the Amsterdam, London and Paris stock
markets. In the aftermath of London's reforms, the volume of
equity trading almost doubled and commission rates were cut for
institutional deals but rose slightly on individual transactions.
The resulting price wars between the larger securities houses,
while jostling for market position, have severely squeezed the
margins of other stockbrokers and a degree of fallout amongst them
is seen as inevitable. A similar adjustment of rates was
predicted for the Parisian market, following the abandonment of
fixed commissions in July 1989. However, initially, a consensus
seemed to have developed, aimed at avoiding "wild" price
competition because of its perceived detrimental effects on
26profitability and and on the quality of services. Nevertheless,
the market has already had one notable victim. The stockbroker
Tuffier et Associes, one of the country's largest independent
brokers, filed for bankruptcy in July 1990 after reporting heavy
27operating losses.
Stamp duties levied on securities trading have also been reduced, 
capped or abolished altogether in the increasingly competitive 
environment. In this light, the continued existence in Germany of 2567
25. See B.Riley "A time of turmoil for the private stockbroker" 
Financial Times 28-29/7/1990 .
26. See "La Bourse de Paris deux ans apres son Big Bang" (1989) 
14 4e trimestre Index : Rev. Economique de la Banque Indosuez 
12-23 .
27. See W.Dawkins "Tuffier faces bankruptcy after Paris 
stockmarket volumes fall” Financial Times 18/7/1990 p.l .
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the stock exchange turnover tax, which is levied on all trading on
the stock market except that between recognised credit
institutions, seems even more anomalous. It has been described as
28no less than "an indirect subsidy to the London Stock Exchange" 
and pressure is mounting in support of its removal, both to 
encourage a greater volume of securities trading on the German 
exchanges and, in particular, to increase the competitivity of 
Frankfurt among European exchanges.
Finally, the trend towards liberalisation is likely to be
maintained as regards the authorisation by national authorities of
innovative financial instruments and techniques. Competition
between financial centres ensures that innovations accepted in one
major country are soon adopted elsewhere. A clear example is in
the sphere of financial futures trading. In April 1989, London's
LIFFE introduced a three month Deutsche mark interest rate
contract. The following May, MATIF the French futures market
launched virtually the same contract and Germany's new futures
exchange, the DTB, plans to offer its own D-mark bond contract 
29late in 1990. Regulators are often compelled to follow the 
markets in respect of the development of new, widely practised 
techniques. They are therefore obliged to restrict their official 
intervention to the establishment of safeguards, such as 
additional capital requirements, rather than to order outright 
prohibition. 289
28. M.Hauck, former president of Frankfurt's Stock Exchange, 
quoted in Business magazine, May 1990 at p.119 .
29. Respectively : LIFFE-London International Futures Exchange,
MATIF-Marche a terme International de France and DTB-Deutsche 
Terminbörse.
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The differing impact of innovation :
Though a global phenomenon, financial innovation has affected 
different countries in different ways and at different times. This 
sector is one where legal and economic factors are inextricably 
intertwined. Each of the innovatory developments referred to in 
the immediately preceding section involving government policy, 
entailed the preparation and adoption of new legislation, whether 
it was to enable banks to become members of stock exchanges, to 
remove exchange controls or to abolish turnover taxes. Lawyers 
assisted in drafting these measures, they are called upon to 
interpret them in court and they are relied upon to assist firms 
in circumventing or manipulating the wording of the legislation, 
in order to facilitate further innovation. However, the other 
catalytic factors have usually been the product of economic 
conditions or of progress in technological knowhow. In these 
fields, lawyers are obliged to follow innovation, to spectate 
rather than to stage-manage it. The role here for the lawyer is to 
contain innovation, to recognise limits beyond which it should not 
extend, whether to avoid infringing rules protecting consumers, or 
regulatory standards established to secure the stability of the 
financial system. Thus, in attempting to explain the differing 
impact of innovation, one needs to look beyond the legal system to 
traditions within national business and financial environments.
For example, it has been suggested that financial innovation in 
Italy has only been a partial process, which has left areas that 
have shown high innovative drive elsewhere almost unaffected* 
These would include, for example, the fund raising techniques of
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the enterprise and banking sectors.30 312The statistic that the law 
that introduced investment funds into Italy took twenty-two years 
to be enacted, after it was first discussed in Parliament, might 
be thought to be an indictment of the Italian legislative system 
in this sense. However, this tardiness would be more appropriately 
attributed to the vagaries of the Italian political system, rather 
than to those of the legal system, H-J Dudler took an even firmer 
view of the extent of innovation in Germany. He suggested that 
general economic conditions, institutional arrangements and public 
attitudes seemed to have prevented new waves of innovation from 
reaching the financial markets in Germany. This opinion dates 
from 1985 and is, in my opinion, slowly being discredited by the 
efforts of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (the sleeping giant of the 
European markets), to assert its role in the international 
financial marketplace. These moves have seen the extension of 
trading hours on the exchange from two to three hours a day and 
the opening, in January 1990, of the DTB, the new futures and 
options exchange. They illustrate just how far the markets have to 
go, to catch up with London and Paris for instance, but they 
should be seen as indications of the growing acceptance of 
financial innovation in the traditionally conservative German 
markets.
30. See C.Caranza and C.Cottarelli "Financial innovation in Italy 
: a lop sided process", an essay in "Changing money..." supra 
note 2 p.172-211 at p.172 .
31. See H-J Dudler "Financial innovation in Germany" an essay in 
"Changing money..." supra note 2 p.158-171 at p.160 .
32. See for example, A.Schwarzmann "Frankfurt races to secure 
hold in global markets" The Independent 26/1/1990, or
R.Waters "Foreigners force changes" Financial Times 
supplement on West Germany 19/6/1990 .
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Dudler further observed that contemporary interest in the topic of
innovation appeared to owe its specific flavour to the pervasive
reasoning with which the leading economists of the English
speaking world had been able to translate their countries '
national financial experiences into an intellectually fascinating
subject for general debate ! In addition, he indicated that the
popularisation of new financial products could be partly
attributed to the "unique imaginative productivity of the
financial services industry in Anglo-American countries and the
particular appeal which financial luxury and 'pet' products can
acquire in formerly puritan societies, where the public has become
33accustomed to indulging in unabashed financial greed...". The
greed is good sentiment, which emerged from the American financial
markets in the 1980s, certainly did not hinder the innovation
process. It ensured that those markets and also the post Big Bang
London markets, were at the forefront of innovation in this 
34period. There were, however, other factors which contributed to 
the pre-eminence of these markets. These included the highly 
developed nature and relative importance to their economies of the 
markets themselves and their traditionally internationally 
oriented profile. The respective governments and monetary 
authorities had traditionally supported moves to expand and 
develop the markets and, in Britain at least, the old, relatively 
light regulatory regime encouraged innovation. Over time, the 
markets had attracted to them, a sizeable pool of highly skilled 
financial services professionals who were well placed to harness 34
33. Supra note 31 at p.159 .
34. This spirit was perhaps exemplified by Ivan Boesky, the
American financier/arbitrageur, who was recently released 
from imprisonment following an insider trading conviction. He 
was recalled in the Financial Times of 17/11/1986 as once 
saying: "Greed is all right by the way. You can be greedy
and still feel good about yourself." I
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the advances in technology in the push towards more sophisticated 
and competitive practices.
In contrast, in Germany, the Bonn government has only relatively 
recently abandoned its indifference to the importance of the 
financial sector. Its focus had traditionally been on
manufacturing industry, which is not altogether surprising, given 
its historical post-war revival. As late as 1987, one senior 
government official proclaimed that "the industrial sector 
produces the goods". There is also the Bundesbank's traditional 
concern for the sanctity of the Deutsche-mark and its resistance 
to new instruments that appear likely to weaken its control over 
the money supply. The Bundesbank's independence from political 
interference is legislatively assured and it has been able to 
underpin the stability of the D-Mark without fear or favour of the 
federal government in Bonn. Authority over the geographically 
fragmented secondary trading markets is divided between regional 
authorities, and there are strong symbiotic links between the 
universal banks and business. Hostile takeovers are virtually 
unknown in the corporate sector. Risk averse individuals have 
tended to shun what few equities there were, preferring bonds or 
savings with the banks. In this climate, it is not surprising that 
the demand for and consequently the supply of, innovative 
financial services and products has been markedly different to 
that experienced elsewhere.
Comment :
In summary, under the combined impact of the heretofore mentioned 
developments, competition amongst financial intermediaries has 
intensified sharply and the range of competitive influences has 
widened dramatically. Reduced market segmentation and the 
institutions' greater involvement in non-traditional service areas
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have heightened the transmission of competitive impulses from
market to market and from country to country. As a side effect,
the risk has increased that tensions developing in a given market
segment can spread quickly to a wide range of institutions
operating domestically and across frontiers. The combination of
financial interpenetration and of modern technological and
telecommunications facilities has made individual markets
intrinsically more vulnerable to shocks originating elsewhere in
35the financial system. Indeed, since the global stock market
'crash' of October 1987, questions have been asked about the pace
of change and whether the processes of innovation and global
3 6integration have gone too far.
It is thus unfortunate that the recent trend within the European 
markets has been to try to reorganise and rationalise domestic 
markets from an outdated view of the modern financial system which 
envisages the domestic market remaining the core of the system 
with the European and international markets revolving around it. 
Such a viewpoint overlooks the processes of innovation and change 
which have made such divisions somewhat illusory. Blind pursuit of 
national policies can only heighten the dangers of a market 
breakdown at an international level. Attempts have been and are 
being made by the markets themselves to encourage greater co­
operation between them, but, as will be seen hereafter, these 
efforts have been rather half-hearted and have had limited success 
thusfar. It is in this context that the European Community has, by 
virtue of the 1992 programme, been offered an opportunity to 356
35. For a comment on stock market volatility, see M.Brasier "Eat 
your heart out ! Mars bars markets are still with us" The 
Guardian 5/2/1990 .
36. See for example, R.Dale "Financial deregulation after the 
crash" (1988) 158 Royal Bank of Scotland Review 3-17 .
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address the Community financial markets as a whole in the course 
of the creation of a single financial services market. It is clear 
that the further opening up of these markets envisaged as part of 
the programme can only encourage the financial innovation process, 
as technique and technician should find it easier to move between 
Community markets. Whether it will unite national regulatory 
authorities in an attempt to bolster the security and 
competitiveness of the European marketplace is an open question.
In the next chapters I shall discuss why this matter has not been 
tackled comprehensively by the Community before now and I shall 
take a closer look at some of the measures which have been taken 
by it, with a view to creating a genuine European financial 
market.
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CHAPTER 2 : The institutional approach to completion of the Single 
European Market .
1. The Commission and the Council :
In its 1983 Communication on financial integration, the Commission 
noted that "the specifically financial dimension of European 
construction is at present underdeveloped and fragmentary...and 
contrasts with hard-earned achievements in other fields of 
Community integration...A European financial market is as 
necessary as ever : its failure to apppear is hampering the 
reinforcement of the common market and preventing the Community 
economy from efficiently tapping available savings."^
The financial services sector is now clearly seen as an integral 
part of the common market envisaged by the Treaty and amplified by 
the 1992 programme. This was not always the case. Traditionally, 
it was regarded separately because of its special association with 
the free movement of capital. Indeed, Article 61(2) of the Treaty 
explicitly provides that the liberalisation of banking and 
insurance services connected with movements of capital should be 
effected in step with the progressive liberalisation of the 
movement of capital. This has hindered the development of the 
European financial market in the past as discussions on the 
freeing of capital movements came to a standstill in the mid- 
1960s. However, the failure hitherto to liberalise capital 
movements, and financial services in general, should be viewed as 
part of the greater failure of the Community to progress with the 
creation of the common market itself. This can be attributed to 1
1. COM (83) 207 final of 18/4/1983 .
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the philosophical, economic and political difficulties encountered 
by the European Community in its recent history.
Community sclerosis :
Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome envisaged, from the outset, the
establishment of a common market and the approximation of the laws
of member states to the extent required for the proper functioning
of that market. By 1968, a customs union was in place with no
customs duties within the Community and a common customs tariff,
administered by the Commission, applying to imports from non
member states. The development of closer economic relations
between the member states stimulated growth and accelerated the
increase in living standards throughout the Community. Between
1958 and 1972 the economies of the six member states grew much
faster than that of America. Britain, which was much more
prosperous than any of the six when they started, had been
overtaken by all except Italy when she, Ireland and Denmark joined 
. 2the Community in 1973. Following the oil crisis in 1973 and the 
subsequent recessions, progress in Europe slowed down and 
practically ground to a halt. The protectionist armoury of the 
member states grew stealthily during this period. National
provisions regulating the production and marketing of goods could 
be, and were in fact used, in order to prevent access to national 
markets by goods originating from other member states. In this 
way, non-tariff barriers, based on technical and safety 
specifications, succeeded in fragmenting the so called common 
market into twelve separate markets. 2
2. See E.Wistrich, "After 1992 : the United States of Europe 
(1989) Routledge at p.3 .
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In response to the economic crises, instead of uniting to
safeguard their futures, each country pursued its own protective
policies and this lead to serious monetary disorders with
incessant exchange rate fluctuations. The effect was to inhibit
intra Community trade as exporters were denied stable markets for
their products. Between 1973 and 1981, industrial output in the
Community rose by only 8% compared with 16% in America and 26% in
Japan. Employment in the Community actually fell by three million
in the 1973-1980 period, although in America it increased by
fifteen million. A report commissioned by the European Parliament,
3the Albert-Ball Report , which highlighted these statistics, 
concluded that Europe had been sacrificing its future prosperity 
by spending money on current consumption, instead of modernising 
and investing for growth. To overcome such problems, individual 
countries tried to find national solutions. Yet, as at least 50% 
of external trade was with each other, the economies of the member 
countries had become increasingly interdependent. It was clear 
that uncoordinated action was bound to fail. A good example of 
this was provided in France between 1981 and 1983, when the 
Socialist government, at the start of President Mitterand's first 
term of office, tried to pursue a Keynesian policy of public 
spending to counter the recession. The resulting inflation and 
balance of payments difficulties compelled the government to 
rapidly abandon its independent course and reverse its policies, 
which were threatening to force it out of the European Monetary 
System. 3
3. M.Albert & R.Ball, "Towards European recovery in the 1980s” 
Working Documents, European Parliament 1983-1984 Luxembourg 
31/8/1983 .
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By this time, the Community had settled down into one more 
international organisation in which diplomats and bureaucrats 
haggled over technicalities, with the sole interest of protecting 
their own national interests. In this environment, financial 
services was just another sector where, despite the increasingly 
international profile of the industry, member states sought to 
protect their own markets from external competition and were 
content to preserve high-cost, cartelised practices within those 
markets.
The Ideology of the Treaty of Rome :
The problems facing the Community were not just economic however. 
Community policy and legislation were stuck in a rut created by 
the underlying ideology of the Treaty of Rome, which was based on 
a functionalist theory of European integration. The framers of the 
Treaty clearly had in mind something more than economic 
integration - the elaborate institutional structure, the principle 
of qualified majority voting, the absence of a withdrawal clause 
and the numerous common policies provided for therein, were the 
essentials for a greater degree of European integration. Thus, the 
Treaties of Rome and Paris have been described as the concrete 
emanation of the functionalist theory of European unification.^ 
The functionalist approach, of which Robert Schumann and Jean 
Monnet were keen and politically effective proponents, started 
from the premise that nation states had to be deprived of their 
sovereignty gradually and by stealth, as they would never part 
with it willingly. This could be accomplished by proceeding in 4
4. V.Curzon-Price, "Three Models of European Integration", an 
essay in R.Dahrendorf (ed) "Whose Europe ? Competing Visions 
for 1992" (1989) Institute of Economic Affairs pp.23-38 at
p.26 •
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small functional steps : firstly, persuade sovereign states to co­
operate with one another over a trivial technical issue (like 
harmonising road signs), or, make them see the wisdom of pooling 
resources in a particular economic sector {eg. coal and steel). 
Secondly, if they agreed to let these technical, sectoral matters 
be managed from the centre by a semi-independent authority, then 
all one needed to do was to gradually build up a portfolio of such 
agreements. As nation states got used to the approach, more 
ambitious projects could be attempted, with an emphasis on 
technical matters as far as possible. Technicians would be able to 
agree on technical solutions whereas politicians could never be 
relied upon to do so.
However General de Gaulle, for one, was not about to be deceived. 
He saw, in Monnet's design, a danger that French sovereignty would 
be destroyed by irresponsible European bureaucrats. He thus 
insisted on the primacy of the Council as the real decision taker 
and on the principle of unanimity of decisions. His stubbornness 
reached its apogee in 1965, when he pursued his 'empty chair' 
policy. This ultimately resulted in the Luxembourg Accord which 
was to hinder Community decision making for the next twenty years.
The Community nevertheless had to live out the functionalist 
fantasy in practice. Its institutions, its scope and its 
philosophy reflected this centralising principle - anything which 
could conceivably be managed from the centre should be, as it 
would somehow be existential proof that national sovereignty was 
withering away. Thus the 1970s, in particular, marked the era of 
absurdities, as Community and member state officials toiled to 5
5. Ibid at p.27 .
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harmonise every technical standard detail for specific product 
types and services. This prompted Lord Diplock to say :
"... sometimes one has the impression that there are directives 
which deal with harmonisation for harmonisation's sake alone. It 
seems as if some conscientious civil servant in Brussels, not 
having enough to do, takes into his head, or is perhaps persuaded 
by some lobby...that there is some branch of the law which it 
would be fun to alter, and having started on that course it is 
difficult getting him to turn back."**
Member states resisted this approach, and even where no major 
political or economic interest was at stake, national
administrations would insist that their standard should be adopted 
at a Community level. The trouble with this unwieldy approach to 
integration was that it posited harmonisation as a starting point. 
It was felt that a complete harmonisation of social, institutional 
and legal parameters would enable free trade in goods, services, 
capital and labour to also be fair trade. The principle of 
unanimity reduced any political will the member states may have 
had to zero, and thus negotiation became a tedious, lengthy 
process of bargaining between them. Harmonisation attempts 
necessarily implied a search for uniformity and an interference in 
the regulatory capacity of the member states. The effect of this 
system was to retard progress and damage the credibility of the 
Community in the eyes of its member states.
A New Dawn ? :
It was left to the Court of Justice to open up new perspectives 
for the Community institutions. In its celebrated Cassis de Dijon 6
6. Lord Diplock, 22/11/1977, House of Lords Official Report 
Vol.387 No.9 p.822 .
-34-
. . 7judgement in 1979, the Court considered the problems posed by 
the maintenance in force of different national standards and 
technical requirements. It ruled that goods produced and placed on 
the market in the country of origin, in accordance with the 
requirements in force in that country, cannot be barred as imports 
by other member states simply on the grounds that they do not 
conform to similar technical or commercial requirements in the 
importing country. Therefore, national regulations could only take 
precedence over the fundamental principle of free movement of 
goods, in so far as those regulations were necessary, in order to 
satisfy mandatory national requirements, such as the protection of 
the public health. This reasoning suggested that the removal of 
barriers to free movement could be achieved, even in the absence 
of harmonisation measures, and the Commission was to adopt it as 
the keystone of its new strategy towards legislating for the 
internal market.
It was clear by the beginning of the 1980s, that the plan to 
construct a fully integrated market had run out of steam and fresh
a
initiatives needed to be taken. In June 1981 the Commission
raised the alarm by presenting a communication on the state of the
g
internal market to the European Council. The heads of state and 
government at their subsequent meeting echoed the alarm sounded by 
the Commission but proposed no concrete measures.7 8910 In November
7. Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwattung fur 
Branntwein (1979) ECR 649.
8. For a full account of the new momentum of the 1980s, see
H.Schmitt von Sydow "The basic strategies of the Commission's 
White Paper", an essay in Bieber,Dehousse,Pinder,Weiler (eds) 
"1992 : One European market ?" (1988) Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft pp.79-108 .
9. COM (81) 313 of 17/6/1981 .
10. Bulletin EC 6-1981, point 1.1.6 .
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1982, the Commission delivered a second communication on 
relaunching the internal market.^ At its summit meeting in 
Copenhagen in December of that year, the European Council 
instructed the Council of Ministers to decide, before the end of 
March 1983, on the priority measures proposed by the Commission to 
reinforce the internal market. The Council itself at this stage 
began to meet in a new formation for dealing with matters relating 
to the internal market. The European Parliament gave its support 
to the renewed drive, passing a resolution on the internal market 
in March 1984, based on an in-depth report by Moreau and Von 
Wogau. The new Commission, with Jacques Delors at the helm, took 
office in January 1985. A week after its arrival, the new 
President went to the Parliament and announced the Commission's 
intention to ask the European Council to pledge itself to the 
completion of a fully unified internal market by 1992. Thus it was 
that at its meeting in March 1985, the European Council called 
upon the Commission to draw up a detailed programme with a 
specific timetable for the achievement of a single large market by 
1992.1 23 14
This was the cue for the Commission to publish, in May 1985, its 
White Paper listing approximately three hundred proposed measures 
(the final figure was in fact 282), the adoption of which was seen 
as necessary for the completion of a fully integrated internal 
market by 1992.^  The White Paper was endorsed by the heads of 
state and government at the Milan summit in June 1985. This summit
11. COM (82) 735 of 12/11/1982 .
12. Doc. 1-32/84 of 26/3/1984 .
13. Bulletin EC 3-1985, point 1.2.3 .
14. "Completing the Internal Market" - White Paper from the
Commission to the European Council 14/6/1985. COM (85) 310
final.
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also agreed to hold an inter-governmental conference, to decide 
upon a number of amendments to the Treaty of Rome. These were 
intended to facilitate the achievement of the single market, and 
to overcome some of the difficulties encountered in Community 
decision making, as a result of the procedures originally laid 
down in the Treaty.
The Commission in its White Paper heralded its "new approach" to 
harmonisation of national measures. A distinction was drawn 
between the new strategy, which concerns the choice between 
harmonisation and the principle of mutual recognition, and the new 
approach, which concerns the possible methods of harmonisation. 
The new strategy answers the question whether there is a need for 
harmonisation, the new approach the question how harmonisation can 
best be achieved. The Commission acknowledged that the objectives 
of national legislation, such as the protection of public health, 
were more often than not identical. It followed that rules 
developed to achieve these objectives came down to the same thing 
and so should normally be accorded recognition in all member 
states. Thus it stated :
" The general thrust of the Commission's approach in this area 
will be to move away from the concept of harmonisation towards 
that of mutual recognition and equivalence."
In this light, harmonisation would only be pursued where it was 
considered absolutely necessary as a basic minimum as, for 
example, in the establishment of prudential rules for banks. 
Conceived for the free movement of goods (as first used by the 
Court in the Cassis case), the Commission extended the use of this 
mutual recognition approach to the services sector and, in 
particular, to financial services. Here, it foresaw a minimal 
coordination of rules as the basis for mutual recognition by 
member states of what each did to safeguard the interests of the
-37-
public. Therefore, m  principle, the Community was breaking with 
its centralising past, according to which a single Euro norm had 
to be agreed upon before trade and services could be allowed to 
flow freely. From now on, member states would only need to agree 
on essential requirements in broad terms, leaving the individual 
countries free to decide on how to satisfy them.1*’ The 
acknowledgement of the importance of financial services, and the 
proposal to use the mutual recognition technique in legislation 
relating thereto, marked a turning point for the prospects of 
securing an integrated European financial market.
The product of the aforementioned inter-governmental conference
was the Single European Act, which was signed in 1985, and finally
17came into force on the first of July 1987. It amended the Treaty 
by increasing the scope of measures that could be adopted by a 
qualified majority rather than by unanimity, including measures 
for the approximation of national provisions which would be 
essential to the 1992 programme (Article 18 SEA, which was 
inserted as Article 100a of the Treaty). This endorsed the 
commitment to a unified market, since two thirds of the White 
Paper proposals could now be adopted by majority vote. This 
crucial amendment meant that it was no longer possible for a 
member state to block proposals by a veto when it felt its vital 
interests were threatened. The Single Act also gave an increased 
role in decision making to the European Parliament, in an attempt 
to reduce the so-called democratic deficit. Although it is only a 
review function, it strengthens the Parliament's position in the 
institutional structure of the Community, by virtue of the
15
15. Ibid at Paragraph 102 . See Chapter 3 for further detail of 
the specific strategy adopted for financial services.
16. See Curzon-Price, supra note 4 at p.31.
17. Single European Act : OJ L169 29/6/1987.
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pressure it allows it to exert on the institutions with the
, . . .. 18 legislative power.
The White Paper was strategically drafted so as to be as
attractive to the member states as possible. Its proposals did not
involve any transfers of new competences to the Community or make
increased demands on the Community budget. In addition, it did not
demand harmonisation of controversial political issues such as
19educational or fiscal policies. This made the endorsement of its 
proposals much easier. It was with the seductive objective of the 
achievement of a unified market glittering on the horizon, that 
the member states agreed to abandon the Luxembourg accord and 
extend majority voting in the Single Act. The Council also amended 
its own procedure, to allow a simple majority in the Council to 
call for a qualified majority vote. This can be interpreted as a 
sign that the member state governments did, in fact, intend to 
resort to voting more often. However, several clauses were 
inserted into the Single Act to ensure that Community rules to be 
adopted by majority vote would not be made enforceable against a 
member states' wishes. These allowed for the grant of temporary 
derogations or the application of national rules on the grounds of 
major need. The possibility to opt out was meant to ease the 
adoption of harmonisation measures, by giving member states the 
guarantee that these would not imply a renunciation of societal 
values which they deemed important. These clauses do not make the 
ideal of majority voting illusory however, because such exemptions 
are likely to be strictly monitored by both the Commission and the 
Court of Justice. It has also been argued that market unity is
18. See R.Dehousse "1992 and beyond : the institutional dimension 
of the internal market programme1* (1989) 1 Legal Issues of 
European Integration 109-136 .
19. Ibid at p.114.
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less likely to be impaired by occasional derogations, than by the
perpetuation of a fragmentation due to the failure of most
20harmonisation attempts.
A European Federation ? :
The White Paper and the Single European Act have potentially much
wider implications than those relating to the 1992 programme. The
21Padoa-Schioppa report declared that :
"The White Paper marks the transition from a monolithic conception
of the Community's integration process in which national
legislation and powers are replaced by Community powers, to a
pluralistic, pragmatic and federalistic conception in which
national legislation will not be replaced but framed in a way
that respects Community requirements."
This new direction is consistent with two essentially federalistic
principles, namely the principle of subsidiarity on the one hand
and a respect for other people's differences on the other.
Federalism in this sense, is a means of reconciling a minimum of
. 22unity with a maximum of diversity. The principle of subsidiarity
requires that the higher level of government should only take on
functions that deliver public goods that cannot be effectively
23provided by a lower level of government. Federalism thus 
emphasises the need to keep the centre weak and the periphery 
strong, and implies a belief in the ability of lower level 
institutions to solve most problems - otherwise it would not be
20. See J.Weiler "The White Paper and the application of 
Community law" in "1992 : One European Market ?" supra note 
8 p.337-358 .
21. Cited supra in the Introduction note 5, at p.76 .
22. Curzon-Price, supra note 4 at p.24 .
23. Supra note 21 •
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able to accomodate diversity. In the Community context, this would 
imply that Community action should be limited to fields where it 
is absolutely necessary for market integration, or where it can 
reach better results than the member states.
The subsidiarity principle is applied in two aspects of the
approach adopted by the Commission in the White Paper. Firstly,
the Commission prefers to work through directives, which leave the
method and form of implementation of the legislation to the
24decision of member states. The directive thus makes it possible 
to combine the requirements of unity in terms of ends and 
diversity in terms of means. Article 100a of the Treaty, which 
relates to the approximation of laws, provides only for the 
adoption of 'measures' by the Council, thus leaving the choice of 
Community legislative tool to the Commission in the first 
instance. However, the inter-governmental conference which 
produced the Single Act explicitly invited the Commission to give 
precedence to the use of directives. It has been argued that this 
rationale for the use of directives should not apply where the 
content of harmonisation measures is already governed by the 
principle of subsidiarity. If post White Paper Community measures 
are to be restricted to essential minimum requirements, then, ex 
hypothesi, these objectives are so central that they can be 
regarded as forming the end of Community action, which should be 
given full effect by the use of regulations. Since regulations 
do not have to be transposed into national
24. Article 189 of the EEC Treaty provides that :
"A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each member state to which it is addressed, 
but shall leave to the national authorities the form and 
methods."
25. See Dehousse, supra note 18 at p.132 •
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law, this solution would have significant advantages, especially 
in light of the increased burden of transposition imposed on 
member states by the internal market programme. Thusfar, however, 
an increased use of the regulation does not seem to have been 
contemplated by the Community institutions. In any event, the 
directives to be discussed in chapter three in the financial 
services field, have been based on Articles 54 and 57, which do 
not allow for the possibility of using regulations.
The second application of subsidiarity is where the Commission 
decides that the use of a centralised form of harmonisation is 
still required. In spite of its new strategy in favour of mutual 
recognition, harmonised rules and standardised products may still 
be necessary for industry to obtain economies of scale and 
compatibility in a homogenous market. The new approach stipulates 
that the Council should limit itself to defining the essential 
objectives and requirements, and should off load technical and 
executive matters. These issues are, wherever possible, to be left 
to non-governmental standardisation bodies preferably at a Europe 
wide level such as the Comité Européen de la Normalisation (CEN), 
who are better placed to perform such a task. This reference to 
standards technique had first been used in the so called 'Low 
Voltage' directive in 1973, and had been recommended by the
26
i .
26. Article 189 of the Treaty provides that :
"A regulation shall have general application, it shall be 
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member 
states."
27. OJ L77 26/3/1973. See C.Joerges "The new approach to
technical harmonisation and the interests of consumers.." in 
"1992 ; One European Market ?" supra note 8 p.175-226 .
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Council even before the White Paper was finalised. This is an
efficient method of lightening the work load of the Community
legislator and a prime example of the application of the
subsidiarity principle. However, its effectiveness has been
questioned due to the concerns expressed in relation to the
29delegation of powers by the Community legislator. There were at 
least ninety proposals requiring such a traditional harmonisation 
in the White Paper itself. A not dissimilar approach has been 
utilised in the second Banking directive (see chapter 3). Here, 
the Council has largely adopted the solvency ratios recommended by 
the Cooke Committee in Basle, rather than attempting to set its 
own competing standards. It has therefore chosen to follow the 
advice given by banking specialists, who had conducted a specific 
international review of banking policy and practice in the area in 
question.
So a new dawn may be breaking for the prospects of finally 
achieving an integrated European market. But what pressures 
prompted this new "renaissance'* ? Hoffman points out that, in 
1984, disenchantment with Keynesian policies, the wave of economic 
liberalism spreading from Reagan's America, the recognition by 
French and Spanish Socialists of the superiority of the market 
over a command economy, of the futility of nationalisations and of 
the virtues of competition, all combined to create the right 
climate for a European revival. The main goal was
competitiveness of Europe in a world in which the number of
28
28. Council resolution of 7/5/1985, OJ C136/2 4/6/85, together 
with the Council's conclusions on standardisation of 
16/7/1984 which are annexed thereto : See also Dehousse, 
supra note 18 at p.125 .
29. See Joerges and Dehousse, supra notes 27 and 18 respectively.
30. S.Hoffmann, "The European Community and 1992" (1989) Vol.68 
No.4 Foreign Affairs p.27-47 .
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industrial and commercial players had multiplied. The stake was 
what Helmut Schmidt had once called the struggle for the world 
product, rather than for traditional power.^ The political will 
needed to harness this spirit was also in place. President 
Mitterand, after the fiasco of his first economic and social 
policy, was determined to use the six months of his presidency of 
the European Council in 1984 to make spectacular progress. The 
German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, could only view with favour a plan 
that would, on the whole, benefit West Germany's strong industrial 
sector. The British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, as an 
apostle of deregulation, had no reason to resist, and was also 
eager to prove that Britain was not the saboteur of the Community 
it had often seemed, and continues to seem, to be. The Single Act 
was thus presented to the British Parliament as a Treaty that 
would make it possible to bring to Western Europe all the benefits 
of deregulation, whilst preserving, through the requirement of 
unanimity for certain measures, national sovereignty in areas 
essential to Britain such as taxation. Above all, the new 
President of the Commission was Jacques Delors, the former French 
Minister for Finance. His commitment to a united Europe was very 
strong, and he acknowledged that economic integration would have 
to precede social harmonisation and that deregulation had to take 
priority. However, savage capitalism is not his ideal, his belief 
is that cooperation must temper competition and that harmonisation 
must complement the destruction of barriers.
In July 1988, during a speech made to the European Parliament, 
Jacques Delors declared his conviction that as a consequence of 
the Single Act, within ten years 80% of economic legislation - and 
maybe even social and fiscal legislation as well - would be of a 31
31. Ibid at p.33 .
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f
Community origin. Delors's vision for the new Europe is of a
European Parliament with greater powers, a more energetic
supervision of Community decisions by national parliaments, more
powers of enforcement for the Commission and greater independence
for its members. His logic is ultimately that of the construction
of a federal state, albeit one that would only deal with issues
the member states could not resolve themselves. The strident Mrs
Thatcher has rejected such a vision of a United States of Europe.
Her views, as expressed in a speech in Bruges in September 1988,
offer a vision of a European Community based on willing and active
cooperation between independent and sovereign states. She clearly
shares De Gaulle's view that independence and national sovereignty
must not be compromised or shared. It has been suggested, that
this similarity in outlook could stem from the dominance which
both leaders gained whilst in power in their respective 
33countries. Wistrich suggests that an appropriate explanation
could be that advanced by the scientist Sir John Boyd Orr, who,
noting the reluctance of some statesmen to delegate sovereignty,
suggested in 1940 that "the psychologist should try to find reason
for this prejudice...It is probable that the leaders identify the
state with themselves and feel that the loss of sovereign power
34would be a loss of their personal power." 324
32. See Hoffmann, supra note 30 at p.41 .
33. See E.Wistrich supra note 2 at p.16. He also makes 
a spirited criticism of the Bruges speech at pp 12-16.
34. J.Boyd Orr in his essay "Federalism and Science", a
contribution to in M.Channing-Pearce (ed): "Federal Union"
(1940) London.
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2. The Court of Justice :
As full economic and monetary union looms larger on the European 
horizon, it is clear that the steps taken in the 1980s by the 
European Community and its member states have greatly increased 
the likelihood of the achievement of the Single Market, if not by 
1993, by the end of the decade. This possibility has been assisted 
by the Court of Justice, which has endeavoured to give a broad 
textural interpretation to the Treaty and its application in the 
cases that have come before it. The cathartic effect of the Cassis 
de Dijon decision has already been noted. Until recently, there 
were virtually no judgements of the Court specifically concerned 
with the field of financial services. Thi3 was especially so, if 
one ignored exchange control, and confined discussion of the 
competition rules of the Treaty to the bare statement that the 
Court has unequivocally held that they apply to the banking and 
insurance fields.
35In the Zuchner case, the Court refused to accept that banking
services were of such a special nature or of such general
economic interest that the rules of Articles 85 and 86 should not
36be applied thereto. In the VDS case, the Court held that in the 
absence of any express derogation to that effect, the Community 
competition system applied without restriction to the insurance 
industry. In addition, this case suggested that where an agreement 
appears to relate only to the national market, if it nonetheless 
affects branches in that market of companies based in other member 
states, who could otherwise offer a more competitive service, it 356
35. Case 172/80 Zuchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank (1981) ECR 2021.
36. Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer , judgement of 
27/1/1987 .
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may then be capable of affecting trade between member states 
within the meaning of Article 85(1). It will be interesting to see 
how the Court applies this reasoning in future competition cases 
in this sector. Usher raises another issue with regard to the 
application of the competition rules to financial services, namely
37
the status of inter-bank agreements relating to interest rates.
It had been suggested by the Commission that such agreements could
be considered as monetary policy instruments of the member states
and thus excluded from the ambit of the competition provisions.
However, in the aftermath of the Zuchner judgement, ex
Commissioner Peter Sutherland was reported as having stated that:
"The osmosis which sometimes exists between supervisory
authorities and those they supervise blurs a distinction between
38genuine monetary policy and cartels."
This interraction between monetary policy and banking activity 
regulation is reflected in the second Banking directive which 
entrusts host member states with complete responsibility for 
measures resulting from the implementation of their monetary 
policies.
The Court finally received an opportunity to address the financial
services sector directly in its judgement in the so called
39"insurance cases"/ which were decided in December 1986. Here, 
the Court grappled with the interpretation of the right of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services in the 
Community, in the context of the provision of financial services.
d 3789
37. J.Usher "Financial Services in EEC Law" (1988) 37 ICLQ p.144- 
154 at p.150 .
38. Agence Europe No. 4543, 6 May 1987 at p.9 .
39. Cases 220/83 Commission v France , 252/83 Commission v 
Denmark , 205/84 Commission v Germany and 206/84 Commission v 
Ireland . (1987) 2 CMLR 69 .
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The approach adopted by the Court has been reflected in subsequent
legislation proposed by the Commission. The significance of the
judgement lies in the fact that it sets out the present state of
Community law on the matter. Therefore, one will have to rely upon
the terms of the judgement for guidance in the absence of specific
40Community harmonisation measures. In addition, certain of the 
Community measures proposed or adopted, the Investment Services 
directive is one example, are content to refer the addressee 
solely to the relevant Treaty provisions, in certain 
circumstances. This will also indirectly lead to a review of the 
decision, which comprehensively interpreted the provisions in 
question. Thus, the relevance of the decision will be maintained 
even when Community measures are put in place. The judgement is 
also notable because, though dealing with insurance, it is largely 
applicable to the financial services field as a whole, and because 
it was the first substantial case on these Treaty freedoms to be 
decided after the landmark Cassis de Dijon decision.
The law as understood prior to the decision was briefly as 
follows. The Treaty, in this context, distinguishes between 
establishment and services as being two ways of supplying services 
into member states other than the state of residence. The right of 
establishment (Articles 52-59 of the Treaty) refers to the right 
of Community nationals, both individuals and legal persons, based 
in one member state to set up in another. In Commission v 
France,40 1 a case involving French taxation laws, this right of 
establishment was interpreted so as to entitle any person wanting 
to set up an establishment in another country, to make use of all
40. See J-W.Eberling "The proposed second banking coordination 
directive" (1990) Vol.15 No.l ELR 60-68 .
41. Case 270/83 Commission v France (1987) 1 CMLR 401 .
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forms of establishment mentioned in Article 52(1) ie. a branch, 
subsidiary or agency. This interpretation of the right barred 
discriminatory French tax regulations which made access to one 
form of establishment more expensive than to the other. This 
suggests that a state may not deny to foreigners the right to make 
use of all forms of establishment provided for in Article 52, 
even if it does so with regard to its own nationals.
In contrast, the freedom to provide services (Articles 59-67 of
the Treaty) entitles the provider to offer services from base to
someone in another member state, in the course of which he may, if
necessary, temporarily pursue his activity in the state where the
service is provided. In its declaratory judgement in the Van
42Binsbergen case, the Court interpreted the requirement of 
Article 59 that restrictions on the freedom of services be 
abolished, as entailing the abolition of discrimination against 
the person providing the service by reason of his nationality or 
of the fact that he is established in a member state other than 
that in which the service is provided. Thus the difference drawn 
between establishment and services could be seen to be one of 
location and degree, not of kind, indeed the services provided may 
well be identical. The existence of this indistinct, grey area 
traditionally led to an avoidance of drawing a clear dividing line 
between the two, but the Court attempted to do so in the insurance 
cases.
42. Case 33/74 Van 
Metaalnijverheid
Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging 
(1974) ECR 1299 .
voor de
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The Insurance Cases :
These were a series of cases brought by the Commission under
Article 169 of the Treaty. They asked the Court to rule on the
compatability with Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty, of national
requirements that would-be providers of insurance services be
established and authorised to do business in the destination
state. In each of the cases, Ireland objected that the Commission
was in effect asking the Court to do the Council's job : the
subject matter of the draft second directive concerning non-life
direct insurance, which was under discussion at the time, was
precisely the scope of this freedom to provide insurance services.
The Court observed that the Commission could take action under
Article 169 if it considered that a member state was failing to
fulfil a Treaty obligation, even if a proposed Community measure
43would, if adopted, put an end to the infringement. It is 
therefore clear that the Commission will have a right of action 
under Article 169, even where negotiations on single market 
measures which may impact on the proceedings in question are 
taking place.
The German case was the most interesting of the cases,
particularly in the light of the ruling given previously by the
44German court of last instance in the Schleicher case. There, the 
accused was a German insurance broker who had placed business for 
a German resident with a London based insurer. He was prosecuted 
on foot of a law prohibiting German insurance brokers from 
arranging insurance for German residents with insurers established 
in another member state. The court of last instance upheld his 43
43. Paragraph 7 of the judgement, supra note 39 .
44. Judgement of the Kammergericht , Berlin 22 April 1983 •
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conviction and refused to refer any questions of Community law to 
Luxembourg on the grounds that, in its view, the German provisions 
were fully compatible with Community law.
The Commission challenged the compatibility of this restriction 
with Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty. It also argued that the 
restrictions on intermediaries could not be justified since the 
German law did not prevent German residents from dealing directly 
with foreign insurance companies. The Commission and Germany 
disagreed as to whether an intermediary was acting on behalf of 
the policyholder or the insurer respectively. This raises the 
significant question of the role of financial intermediaries in 
general, as more and more financial services business is conducted 
through intermediaries and by remote and electronic means rather
than in the flesh. The Court held that Community legislation
provided no basis on which it "could hold that an intermediary is
acting on behalf of one or other of the parties to an insurance
45contract". On any view, it felt, an insurance contract
represented a service by the insurer to the policyholder. 
Regrettably, the Court did not deal separately with the
restriction of brokers activities, preferring to treat it as a 
corollary of the establishment requirement imposed upon insurers.
The Court formulated a distinction between establishment and
cross-border provision of services. It held that an insurance 
undertaking of another member state, which maintains a permanent 
presence in a host member state, comes within the Treaty
provisions on establishment, "even if that presence does not take
the form of a branch or agency, but consists merely of an office
managed by the undertaking's own staff or by a person who is 45
45. Paragraph 16 of the judgement, supra note 39.
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independent but authorised to act on a permanent basis for the
. 46undertaking as would be the case with an agency”, A narrow
interpretation of this definition of establishment could reduce
freedom of services to a dead letter. Is the Court suggesting that
any permanent presence in a host member state is an establishment
? Taken at face value, this could prevent an operator in the
services sector from providing services into any member state in
which it had an agent whose functions were extremely
circumscribed. The establishment criterion could even extend to a
representative office with no authority to do business on its own,
but existing solely for the purpose of referring business to head
47office, to be provided by way of services. The existence of a 
permanent presence might even preclude the writing of other 
classes or sizes of risk or even the same class of risk by way of 
services by the parent undertaking from another member state. Such 
an interpretation would reduce freedom of services to a very small 
role, not only in insurance, but also in banking and other areas, 
where it could seriously undermine existing commercial practices. 
This paragraph should, perhaps, therefore, be placed in its wider 
context and read in connection with the operative part of the 
judgement. It would then appear to mean no more than that the 
rules of establishment must be taken to apply fully to all 
operations carried out by or through such a ’permanent presence’. 
Thus, freedom of services could be relied upon where the 
’permanent presence’ was not actively involved in the provision of 
the service in question. 467
46. Paragraph 21 of the judgement, supra note 39.
47. See J.Flynn "Right of establishment & freedom to provide 
services - caselaw of the Court of Justice relevant to 
financial services" (1988) JISEL 71-85. See also CJ.Everling 
"Sur la jurisprudence récente de la Cour de Justice en 
matière de libre prestation des services" (1984) 20 CDE 3-15.
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The Court then confirmed its judgement in Van Binsbergen, where
it held, inter alia, that a supplier cannot avail of the freedom
of services, if its activity is entirely or principally directed
towards the territory of one other member state and if it provides
services under Article 59 from outside, for the purpose of
avoiding the professional rules of conduct of that state. In this
instance, it held, a member state is justified in taking measures
to prevent such abuse. However, having thus quoted Van Binsbergen,
the Court proceeded to omit the subjective test contained therein,
in applying the case to insurance. In its concluding paragraph on
this aspect, it referred to the provision of insurance services to
a resident in a member state by an insurer who does not maintain
any permanent presence in that state, or "direct his business
activities entirely or principally towards the territory of that 
49state". The Court made no reference to the element of intention 
to avoid regulation prompting the decision to offer services from 
elsewhere in the Community, which was the key to the Van 
Binsbergen dictum. The test was solely whether the provider 
directs all or most of his business activities towards the 
destination state. An undertaking may have all sorts of commercial 
reasons for concentrating on a particular export market, and if 
this case lays down a presumption that such activity is carried 
out to avoid host state regulation, it is regrettable.48 950 It may be 
proven that the Court simply declined to repeat the full Van 
Binsbergen formula in its summing up on this point. In this light, 
the dictum could be narrowly interpreted, limiting its effect to 
those instances where abuse may arise.
48
48. Supra note 42.
49. Paragraph 24 of the judgement, supra note 39.
50. See J.Flynn "Insurance : recent judgements of the European 
Court of Justice (1988) 37 ICLQ p.154-172 .
-53-
The Court noted that Community law, as it had accepted in its Van
51Wesemael decision, tolerated the regulation of services
depending on their particular characteristics. However, it
stressed that the freedom to provide services is a fundamental
principle of the Treaty and restrictions on it must be justifiable
by the general good and be embodied in rules applying to everyone
operating within the state concerned. Such restrictions cannot be
applied if the relevant interests are safeguarded by the rules
applying to the provider of services in his home state. Such
requirements also have to be objectively justified by the need to
ensure compliance with professional rules of conduct, and the de
facto protection of the interests which such rules are designed to
safeguard. Lasok argued that this limitation on the scope of the
Treaty provisions does not reflect an inherent limitation on the
freedom to provide services. It is, essentially, an intrinsic
limitation on the direct effect of the prohibitions in Articles 59
and 60, which will be progressively removed by the adaptation of
secondary legislation by the Community institutions which will
52deprive the national rules of their justification. It is also 
arguable that the direct effect of Article 59 can be seen to 
depend on policy considerations in each individual case, and the 
question remains whether these policy arguments will still be able 
to be relied upon when the Community has enacted measures of 
approximation or coordination.
Not altogether surprisingly, the Court then found that the German 
requirements of establishment and authorisation constituted 512
51. Joined cases 110 and 111/78 Ministère public and another v 
Van Wesemael (1979) ECR 35 .
52. See K.Lasok "Freedom to provide insurance services in the 
light of the 'coinsurance* cases" (1988) 51 MLR 706-734 at 
p.726 •
-54-
restrictions on the freedom to provide services, inasmuch as they
increased the cost of such services in the state in which they
were provided, in particular where the insurer conducts business
53in that state only occasionally. Stemdorff argues that, by
referring to the costs imposed on the foreign provider, the Court
has opened the door for the inclusion of all state measures
influencing the costs of the provider, into the restrictions to be
54abolished under Article 59. He points out that the Van
Binsbergen case had been decided before Cassis de Dijon and that, 
in its pleadings in the insurance cases, the Commission had 
invited the Court to adapt the criteria of Article 59 to those
used for Article 30, which relates to the free movement of goods.
. . 55The Commission, in this respect, cited Rau v de Smedt where the
Court had confirmed its previous jurisprudence in relation to
Article 30. Community law, that case suggested, is violated if
there is no discrimination against foreign goods and if interstate
trade is not excluded or barred, but merely rendered more
expensive or difficult. It thus seems that the Court would now be
prepared to evaluate under Article 59, all state measures that
create costs for the provider of services as well as those that
discriminate against the said provider.
The Court next held that the insurance sector was, nonetheless, 
one area in which restrictions might well be justified by 
imperative reasons relating to the public interest. This was 
because the size and sensitivity of the sector had led all member 
states to lay down a web of regulations to protect the consumer, 
in particular, both as a policyholder and as an insured person. 534
53. Paragraph 28 of the judgement, supra note 39.
54. E.Steindorff "Freedom of services in the EEC" (1988) 11 
Ford.Int. LJ 347-408 .
55. Case 261/81 Rau v de Smedt (1982) ECR 3961 .
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The judgement might then be expected to have examined whether the 
restrictions complained of were justifiable, whether the public 
interest was already protected by the rules of the home state or 
whether the same result could have been obtained by less 
restrictive rules. That it did not quite follow that pattern was 
due mainly to the way in which the Commission pleaded its case, 
and to the content of the Community directives already in place 
which dealt with direct life and non-life insurance. These 
directives did not regulate the cross border provision of 
insurance services.
The Court found that the extent of this prior Community 
harmonisation was insufficient, in two respects, to obviate the 
need for host state supervision. Firstly, the host state should 
still be responsible for laying down rules concerning the 
sufficiency and valuation of technical reserves. Secondly, as no 
attempt had yet been made to harmonise the conditions of insurance 
contracts ie. their contractual terms, this should also remain the 
responsibility of the host state supervisor. These significant 
powers for the host state would continue in the absence of 
Community legislation (both of these matters were to be covered by 
the proposed second non life insurance directive), provided that 
it did not exceed what was necessary to ensure the protection of 
policyholders and insured persons.
The Court concluded that prior authorisation was an appropriate 
means of supervising compliance with these rules. The Commission 
had to some extent conceded this point, in recognising that a 
measure of supervision by the host state was justified. Although 
objecting to an authorisation requirement, it had not proposed 
how, short of authorisation, such a system might work. The Court 
held that such authorisation must be granted on request to an 
insurer complying with the rules, which must not duplicate
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conditions already satisfied in the home state or repeat 
verification exercises carried out there. The German government 
asserted that its authorisation procedure satisfied that test and 
the Commission did not contradict it on that point. No reference 
was made to the length of time or the expense involved in
obtaining a German authorisation.
The Court stressed that authorisation was only justified to the
extent necessary to protect the consumer. It stated that the
protection argument did not apply equally to every sector of
insurance, "There may be cases", it said, " where, because of the
nature of the risk insured and of the party seeking insurance,
there is no need to protect the latter by the application of the
56mandatory rules of his national law." The Court was not willing 
to effectively legislate by laying down criteria for deciding when 
a policyholder was big enough to look after himself. This
distinction between different classes of consumer requiring 
different levels of protection has been incorporated in the
Investment Services directive, which draws a distinction between 
professional and other investors.
The Court went on to hold that, in particular, in the field of co- 
insurance, there was no justification for the German requirement 
that the leading insurer should be authorised by the German 
authorities. Here the arguments for consumer protection did not 
have the same force as in connection with other forms of 
insurance, since co-insurance arises in the context of insurance 
taken out by "large undertakings or groups of undertakings which 
are in a position to assess and negotiate insurance policies 56
56. Paragraph 49 of the judgement, supra note 39.
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presented to them". In any event, Council directive 78/473 
already provided for sufficient coordination and cooperation 
between supervisory authorities in the member states in this 
particular branch of the sector.
As regards the establishment requirement, the Court found that 
this was the very negation of the freedom to provide services. 
However, it did not completely prohibit the possibility of 
maintaining in force such a requirement, saying that it would have 
to be shown to be indispensable to the attainment of the 
objectives pursued by the authorities in question.
Comment :
1
I It is a pity that the unfortunate Herr Schleicher's position was
I not clarified by the judgement. It was suggested after the
I decision that it would still be unsafe to advise German brokers
■ that they could, with impunity, place business with foreignj e g
I insurers having no permanent presence in Germany. The issue of
I how Articles 59 and 50 apply to restrictions placed neither on the
I provider, nor on the recipient of the service but on the
intermediary, is no clearer. Indeed the question can be asked
whether this would be a restriction on the broker's freedom to
provide services, either to his client or to the foreign insurer
or is it a restriction on the freedom of the resident to receive
services either from his broker or from the foreign insurer via
the broker ? Support for the claims of the recipient of services
59can be gleaned from the decision in Luisi and Carbone, where the 5789
57
57. Paragraph 64 of the judgement, supra note 39.
58. See Flynn supra note 50 at p.165 .
59. Cases 286/82 & 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministère del Tesoro 
(1984) ECR 377 .
i
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Court held that the freedom to provide services included, as a 
necessary corollary, the freedom for the recipients of services to 
go to another member state to receive a service there. The Court 
added that persons travelling for the purpose of business should, 
in this context, be regarded as recipients of services.
The Court was also able to avoid the difficult task of judging
whether regulatory control in other countries is equivalent to
that under German law, because the Commission produced no evidence
on this point. Had it been raised, the Court may have been forced
to assess not only the legal and administrative rules of different
member states, but also the effectiveness of their enforcement.
Thus it could have discovered that Danish authorisation and
supervision requirements, for example, were sufficiently thorough
and were merely duplicated by the German requirements. It has been
pointed out that the Commission may have hesitated to raise that6 0point for a particular reason. If one follows the Court in not 
permitting additional control in the host state, when there is 
sufficient control in the home state, the result would be a 
situation where equivalent control exists in some member states 
and is lacking in others. Therefore, providers of services from 
some countries would have to suffer control in the host state, 
while others would not. This would only complicate matters for 
firms attempting to offer their services outside of their home 
state.
It follows, from the law as to the free movement of goods, that in 
principle this power of member states to protect general interests 
comes to an end when Community measures have 'occupied the field'. 
Once directives for the approximation or coordination of laws have
60. See Steindorff supra note 54 at p.384 .
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been enacted, the states should not be able to deviate from these 
for the purpose of protecting the general interest. However, both 
the second Banking and the Investment Services directives contain 
exclusion clauses allowing member states to impose their own 
legislation for the protection of the public good on suppliers 
from other states. As the legislative programme for the completion 
of the internal market progresses, the focus will shift from 
existing national regulatory rules to the implementation of 
Community rules by member states, and this will raise different 
legal issues in due course. Regulation cannot just be suppressed 
if the Community does not wish to sacrifice consumer protection 
and other aims for the freedom to provide services. Indeed the 
thrust of the Single European Act is towards a high level of 
consumer protection, as was noted in Article 18 of the Act 
(Article 100a (3) of the amended Treaty). The difficulty is in the 
balancing of the legal protection of consumers and the furthering 
of interstate trade. The attempts made to strike this balance in 
the financial services sector will be analysed in the next 
chapter.
-60-
CHAPTER 3 : The Community approach to financial services
legislation.
The challenge : <
The White Paper declared that the liberalisation of financial 
services, linked to that of capital movements, would represent a 
major step towards Community financial integration and the 
widening of the internal market.1 That the potential of the 
Community financial market is huge is evident from the Cecchini 
report, but it is arguable that the current barriers to such 
integration are no longer the product of national boundaries, 
restrictions and cartel arrangements. As already illustrated, the 
combination of technology and economic and political circumstances 
has globalised financial markets and the exploitation of financial 
technique has overcome barriers previously maintained by the 
multi-currency structure of the market. However, there are still 
two fundamental difficulties which will delay and possibly 
jeopardise the establishment of a single integrated market for 
financial services in Europe. Firstly, the problem of reconciling 
vastly different institutional structures and traditions in order 
to achieve a truly harmonised regulatory regime. Secondly, despite 
the sweeping away of restrictive practices in the main European 
financial centres, fragmentation of the market is likely to
1. Supra chapter 2 note 14. The gallop towards economic and 
monetary union, the subject of the inter-governmental 
conference scheduled for Rome in late 1990, is obviously of 
great import to Community financial integration. I have 
chosen, however, to concentrate on the specific measures 
tabled for the financial services industry itself.
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persist due to deeply entrenched investor habits and customs.
At the heart of this problem is a basic difference in traditions 
of capitalism within Europe. The first is the Anglo-Saxon 
preference for financial markets as sources of corporate finance 
and outlets for investment. This tradition relies on equity 
capital, strong shareholders, relatively open capital markets, a 
range of different sorts of institutions active in them and arm's 
length relations between banks and industry. Banks in London were 
only finally admitted to Stock Exchange membership as part of the 
Big Bang deregulation. The second tradition is exemplified by that 
of West Germany, which is dominated by its universal banks. West 
German finance, as already noted in Chapter one, relies on strong 
links between banks and industry which, itself, favours loan 
finance. German banks are members of the comparatively 
underdeveloped stock markets. Investors and savers prefer fixed 
income assets and generally invest and save through their banks. 
Financial products are more restricted and so are the methods by 
which they are sold.
Inevitably this conflict has created a difference in approach to 
financial regulation. In the former tradition, there is a 
functional approach to financial regulation which tends to 23
2
2. See S.Yassukovich "The Euro-Financial Services industry after
1992 : Regulation and the competitive challenge" (1989)
Butterworths Journal of Int. Banking and Financial Law 201- 
203 .
3. See however S.Holberton "Envy of West German financing
unfounded" Financial Times 22/6/1990 at p.10 , a comment on a 
report by C.Mayer & I.Alexander "Banks and Securities Markets 
: corporate finance in Germany and the UK" , which suggested
that, in fact, the aggregate of sources of finance in both 
countries is remarkably similar (report published by the 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, London).
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encourage the pursuit of securities activities through a 
separately capitalised entity. Distinct regulatory authorities 
supervise the performance of different functions. When an 
institution seeks to carry out securities activity within an 
entity operating under a banking licence, for example, the Bank of 
England (in its capacity as banking supervisor), acts as lead 
regulator and applies the principles of The Securities Association 
(the securities trading supervisor), in regulating the securities 
side of the business. In the latter tradition, a consolidated 
approach is adopted. Universal banks carry out commercial banking 
and investment banking activities within a single corporate
structure which is subject to a single regime of financial
regulation, applied by a central bank or another banking 
supervisory authority.
It would be foolish to attempt to make a choice between the two
systems. Each has its drawbacks - grey areas and borderline
problems are a consequence of the functional approach, and
divergences in public policy objectives are likely when applied to
different intermediary activities. A functional approach does not
assist in developing ways in which self-regulatory and official
bodies can be welded into an effective global system of 
. . 4supervision. In the universal banking system, it is generally
understood that the central banks stand behind the deposit taking
function of commercial banks in their capacity as lenders of last 
resort. Where securities activities are carried on by these same 
commercial banks under a single regulatory regime, applied by a 
single supervisor, the implication might be that the central bank 4
4. For an account of some of these difficulties in the English 
system, see "Changing boundaries in financial services" 
(1984) 24 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 40-45 .
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will ’guarantee' commitments of the commercial banks in their 
securities activities as well. This is known as the "moral hazard" 
problem and can encourage greater risk taking by institutions in 
their investment activities. In this situation, investment 
services clients of these institutions are likely to feel secure 
regardless of the conduct of business standards applied by the 
institutions, and these standards are likely to suffer as a 
result.
The securing of a convergence of these different styles of 
capitalism, or, at least, a mutually beneficial co-habitation, was 
always going to be a difficult task for the Community and one it 
could not relish. It has been stressed that the Commission has no 
desire to do away with the rich traditions and characteristics of 
national markets in its attainment of the single financial market 
goal.5 The White Paper bears witness to a concerted attempt to 
integrate the financial markets which clearly had not been a 
priority objective up till then. Indeed, the Community initiatives 
with respect to securities and markets prior to 1985, have been 
described as at best timid and partial.6 The existence of 
exchange controls in most member states, together with the close 
association of financial markets with economic and monetary 
policy, had discouraged any attempts to open up these markets.
An example of the ineffectiveness of the Commission's efforts in 
this sector could be seen when, in 1977, it published in the form 
of a recommendation, its European code of conduct relating to
5. J-M.Fombellida , head of the division "Stock Exchanges and 
Securities" - DG 15 of the Commission, in an interview with 
the author on the 18/4/1990 .
6. See E.Wymeersch "Aspects de l'action communautaire dans le 
domaine des valeurs mobilières" (1989) No. 5-6 CDE 593-607 .
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securities transactions. The Commission desired that the code be 
seen as separate from its other harmonisation work in the sector, 
because it gave an ethical approach priority over a legal 
approach. It declared that it was anxious to take full account of 
the dynamics of the financial market and of business life. It was 
seeking to improve the machinery of the market and the 
effectiveness of those operating on it. The Commission's specific 
aim in promulgating the recommendation was to create a unitary 
formulation of a number of principles already recognised by member 
states, which it hoped would lead to common professional business 
ethics on these issues. The code received a lukewarm reception and 
it is still relatively unknown to this day. In West Germany, the 
text was published by the Ministry of Finance without two of its 
recommendations on transferring or acquiring holdings conferring 
control of a company ie. strategic holdings. It seemed that these 
particular provisions were difficult to reconcile with German law 
and practice.7 8
Thereafter, Community measures tentatively sought to facilitate 
the access of securities to different Community stock exchanges, 
through harmonising the minimum conditions for their admission and 
coordinating the requirements regarding the contents of listing 
particulars. Wymeersch observed that the Community measures in 
this period were more concerned with the companies which used the
7
7. Commission Recommendation of 25/7/1977 : COMM 77/534 EEC , OJ 
L212/37 . Article 155 of the Treaty provides that the 
Commission shall formulate recommendations on matters dealt 
with in the Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the 
Commission considers it is necessary. It is apparent from 
Article 189, however, that recommendations have no binding 
legal force.
8. See R.Buxbaum and K.Hopt "Legal harmonisation and the 
business enterprise" (Volume 4 in the Integration through Law 
series) (1988) Walter de Gruyter & Co at p.23.
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stock markets, than with the markets themselves. He opined that 
these securities related measures were a specialised extension of
the Community's better and longer established legislative efforts
. 9
m  the field of company law. The policy seemed to be to 
encourage and facilitate multiple quotations of company securities 
which would aid the growth and capacity to raise finance of their 
issuers.
The Commission in more recent times supported, both financially 
and vocally, the efforts of the Committee of Stock Exchanges in 
the EC to establish an inter-bourse data information system 
(IDIS). This was intended to electronically link different
European exchanges and thus create an international share price 
information system. The aim of the scheme was to break down 
barriers between Community stock exchanges, and ultimately to 
create a Community wide trading system for securities of 
international interest. Such an interlinking, the Commission 
suggested in the White Paper, would substantially increase the 
depth and liquidity of Community stock exchange markets, and would 
permit them to compete more effectively not only with stock 
exchanges outside the Community, but also with unofficial and 
unsupervised markets within it.*0 So much for the Community 
rhetoric : the idea never really caught on, in part because few
stock markets at the time carried prices electronically and partly 
because it was cumbersome, effectively necessitating a web of 
bilateral agreements between national markets.** Thus the 
enthusiasm and impetus for the plan was not as great as the 
Commission might have hoped, and it subsequently focused its 910
9. Supra note 6 at p.600.
10. Supra chapter 2 note 14 at paragraph 107 .
11. See R.Waters "Pipe brings dream of Euro-Bourse closer to 
reality" Financial Times 19/4/1990 .
attentions on its legislative programme, entrusting such technical 
matters to the markets themselves.
The methodology :
The Commission was clearly still optimistic about the prospects of
the IDIS project in 1985. That European stock markets are
currently negotiating on forming a new collective price
information system which could ultimately lead to a full blown 
12trading system, is in no small measure attributable to the
approach adopted by the Commission in its White Paper. The
Commission therein put the emphasis on the free circulation of
financial products, which was being made ever easier by
developments in technology. It drew a comparison between its
approach after the Cassis de Dijon decision regarding industrial
and agricultural products, and what had to be done for consumer
13credit, participation in collective investment schemes etc. 
Thus, the Commission considered it would be possible to facilitate 
the exchange of such financial products at a Community level, 
using a minimal coordination of rules on such matters as financial 
supervision, as the basis for mutual recognition by member states 
of what each did to safeguard the interests of the public. Such 
harmonisation, it felt, could be guided by the principle of "home 
country control". This entailed attributing the primary task of 
supervising the financial institution to the competent authority 
of its member state of origin, with the authorities of host member 
states having a complementary role. This would require a minimum 123
12. Ibid.
13. Supra chapter 2 note 14 at paragraph 102. See also the 
Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences 
of the Cassis de Dijon judgement OJ 80/C 256/2.
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harmonisation of surveillance standards, which was subsequently
14clarified to mean essential or key prudential standards.
Before considering the legislative measures themselves, it is
important to note that the application of the Cassis de Dijon
'philosophy' to financial products as opposed to other products,
though a strategic and devious move by the Commission, has
inherent limitations. The nature of a financial product is
fundamentally different to that of a manufactured good, in that
the stability of the producer, the quality of the product and the
long term character of the product imply that supervision of the
financial sector is a necessary guarantee or element of the
product itself. As Louis phrased it, there is a more evident and
permanent tie between the provider of a service and its consumer,
15than between a vendor of a good and its purchaser. It can also 
be seen that in this sector, the pursuit of an activity very often 
does not give rise to a separately identifiable product - it is 
more usual for the product to be the pursuit of the activity 
itself.
Among the measures envisaged by the White Paper was a directive on 
investment advisers. It is not entirely clear what was intended to 
be covered by this directive. In early discussions at the
Community level, there was some concern as to whether investment
advisers should be included in the legislation at all. This was on 
the grounds that, in many member states, investment advice was not 145
14. See G.Fitchew, cited supra in the Introduction note 2 at p.2.
15. J-V.Louis "Conclusions générales" (to a colloquium entitled
"Vers un marché unique des services financiers) (1989) No.5-6 
CDE 608-614. See generally, J.Biancarelli "L'esçace financier 
européen de 1993 et la protection de 1 'épargné, des 
investisseurs et des consommateurs de services" (1988) 14
Droit et Pratique du Commerce Int. 659-683 .
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considered to be a 'stand-alone' activity, it tended to be 
provided in connection with other investment services.^ It has 
now been accepted however that it should be regarded as a separate 
category, and one that is increasing in importance. Subsequent 
events have shown that the legislative framework of the White 
Paper for the sector was a little too simplistic. For example, 
after five previous drafts, the Commission has produced a proposal 
for a capital adequacy directive. The need for such a measure was 
not foreseen by the White Paper. It spoke of the coordination of 
standards of financial stability for credit institutions, 
especially banks, but it did not envisage the need for separate 
coordination measures for non-credit institutions. At the time, 
the variety and diversity of the participants in Community 
securities markets was perhaps not fully appreciated by the 
Commission. Once the distinction between credit institutions and 
firms offering investment services was drawn however, the need for 
different approaches to capital adequacy, to ensure the existence 
of a level playing field between them, became apparent. Thus the 
directive is now regarded as an essential counterpart to what has 
become the Investment Services directive.
In this light, Padoa-Schioppa suggested that the White Paper had 
organised the raw materials but that it should not have been taken 
for granted that these were the right ones for achieving its aims. 
He contended that some of these directives were conceived in a 
period in which the feeling that they had little chance of being 
approved was widely shared in the Commission, and that they were 16
16. See The Securities Association "Investment Services Directive 
: a commentary and analysis" (1989) The Securities
Association Ltd., London.
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sometimes waved like flags to show that something was proposed. 
Nevertheless, the obvious merit in the Commission's approach was 
that it capitalised on the political mood in favour of economic 
integration, harnessed this goal to the 1992 deadline and 
revitalised, by the adoption of its new strategy, the legislative 
process of the Community.
The principal directives :
One directive underpins the entire financial services 
liberalisation process, and that is the directive of the 24th of 
June 1988, which removes all the remaining restrictions to 
capital movements within the Community. This directive
progressively requires the abolition of all remaining exchange 
controls within the Community and liberalises all short term
capital movements. It seeks to ensure that any member state
resident will ultimately be free to carry out any capital 
transaction anywhere in the Community. This measure alone is not 
sufficient to achieve the integrated financial market however, 
because freedom of capital movement is in a sense a one way 
street. It allows the consumer or investor to take the
initiative himself and approach suppliers of financial services in 
other member states, but it does not remove the barriers which 
prevent these suppliers from marketing their services and 
contacting potential clients in other member states. 1789
17
17. T.Padoa-Schioppa "Questions about creating a European 
capital market" in "1992 : one European market ?" cited supra 
chapter 2 note 8, p.283-292 at p.287.
18. Council directive 88/361 for the implementation of Article 67 
of the Treaty OJ L178/5 . See generally P.Oliver & J-P.Bâché 
"Free movement of capital between the member states : recent 
developments" (1989) 26 CMLR 61-81.
19. See Fitchew supra in the Introduction note 2, at p.4 .
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The Investment Services directive cannot be considered in
isolation. It shares its underlying assumptions and rationale with
the second directive on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of20the business of credit institution. This latter directive, which
was adopted by the Council on the 15th of December 1989, has to be
read together with the Solvency Ratio and Own Funds directives for 
, . . 21credit institutions, which ensure a minimum degree of 
harmonisation of prudential solvency and liquidity standards. In 
fact, this assortment of directives, when fully adopted by the
Council, will comprise a veritable "corpus legis" regulating the
. . . 22 activities of financial intermediaries in the widest sense. That
they should be viewed as a package is clear from the fact that
they are all scheduled to come into effect from the 1st of January
1993, the member states having insisted on such contemporaneous
implementation to avoid the possibility of an unfair competitive
advantage being obtained by any one sector due to its earlier
liberalisation.
At the core of the different directives is the idea of a single 
financial services passport, the principle that an individual or 
business licensed to pursue any economic activity in one member 
state must be automatically free to engage in the same activity in 
any other member state. Thus, an entity engaged in any financial 
service, from deposit banking to securities trading to various 
forms of financial advisory work, once having satisfied the 
authorisation requirements in its home country, will be 201
20. Council directive 89/546 EEC OJ L386/1 (heretofore and 
hereinafter called the second banking directive).
21. 89/647 EEC OJ L386/14 and 89/299 EEC OJ L124/16 respectvely.
22. J-M.Fombellida "La proposition de directive sur les services 
d'investissement" (1989) No.5-6 CDE 583-592 .
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automatically authorised to carry out the same business elsewhere
in the Community. This authorisation has to be supported by
harmonised standards of minimum capital adequacy for whatever
business activity is carried on by the authorised institution.
Herein lies the dilemma - the range of activities to be covered by
the directives is vast, stretching from market making in
securities to giving individual professional investment advice.
Hence the number and diversity of persons covered, natural and
legal, are equally large, encompassing high profile international
banks, trading houses of all sizes and small localised investment
advisers. The directives are also seeking to facilitate access to
vastly different financial markets, in terms of tradition, size
and participants : in 1985, the volume of business on the
principal German stock exchanges amounted to some $94 billion
while the Spanish exchanges managed only $4 billion, for 
23instance. It has been stated that there are now only two 
substantially British owned non bank institutions operating in the
A  J|
London markets, after the Big Bang invasion which was led by 
American investment banks and large Japanese securities firms. 
Therefore, the challenge presented by the desire to create a level 
playing field in the financial services sector is an enormous one. 
One sceptic has been quoted as saying :
" Continental Europeans do not believe in level fields. They do 
not play cricket and have no intention of learning it. The 
foreign firms that do best here (in France) will be those that 234
23. Figures furnished by the International Federation of Stock 
Exchanges .
24. R.Lambert "Investment firms at mercy of single market talks" 
Financial Times 9/10/1989 p.6 .
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learn to play their games their way,"
The second banking directive is tailored along the lines of the
universal banking model. It has been described as representing a
consensus between two schools of thought, which reflect national
26philosophies on banking supervision and regulation. There is the 
narrow British approach, which considers that the primary
objective of prudential supervision is the protection of the 
savings of the public, and the broader German view, which 
advocates that nowadays, in addition to the protection of savings, 
the purpose of supervision should also be to safeguard the 
stability of the banking system and ensure equivalent regulatory 
treatment for the institutions operating therein.
The list of activities subject to mutual recognition contained in 
the directive includes all forms of transactions in securities. 
The home member state is responsible for the prudential 
supervision of its duly authorised banks, but the host state has 
residual powers of control relating to matters of liquidity and 
monetary policy. Credit institutions (the generic term used in the 
directive) are required to have a minimum initial capital, their 
ability to participate through investment in non-financial 
institutions is subject to a maximum level (except in relation to 
shareholdings in insurance companies) and significant 
shareholdings in credit institutions are also controlled. The 
objectives of the Own Funds and Solvency Ratio directives are to 256
25. M.Spierenburg, managing director of SG Warburg, a British 
based financial services conglomerate with an operation in 
France. Quoted in The Economist "A survey of Europe's capital 
markets" 16/12/1989 from p.58 .
26. G.Zavos "Towards a European banking act" (1988) 25 CMLR 263- 
289 .
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harmonise the definitions of bank capital and solvency ratios for
credit institutions. They reflect in this regard "a decade of 
27brainstorming" by the Cooke committee (meeting under the 
auspices of the Bank for International Settlements in Basle), a 
forum which is made up of banking supervisors of the group of ten 
leading financial services nations. Not all of the G10 countries 
are member states of the Community, but the adoption of the accord 
into the European banking system should indirectly move the 
European market towards something akin to a global finance market.
The Investment Services directive :
The passing of the banking directives would have given the
universal banking model an unfair advantage over non-bank
securities firms, if the latter did not have an equivalent freedom
to operate within the Community. Therefore, in December 1988, the
Commission finally approved and submitted to the Parliament for a
first reading, its draft proposal for a directive on investment
services in the securities field. In accordance with the
procedure set out in Article 149 of the Treaty, having received
the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee and the
Parliament having completed its first reading of the draft on the
basis of the report prepared by its Legal Affairs and Citizens
Rights Committee,^® the Commission took the opportunity to revise
31the original draft before presenting the amended proposal to the 
Council on the 23rd of January 1990. 2789301
27. See R.Lambert, supra note 24.
28. COM (88) 778 final OJ 89/C 43/7 22/2/1989.
29. CES 1019/89 SÏN 176as 27/9/1989 .
30. Doc. A3 0055/89 of the European Parliament.
31. COM (89) 629 final, OJ 90/C 42/7 22/2/1990. The complete text 
of the proposed directive is annexed hereto at p.168.
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It has been suggested that up to 70% of this proposal takes its
32content from the second banking directive. The Commission has 
admitted to aligning the text more closely on the content of this 
latter directive in its revised version, but the approach taken in 
the former is quite different. This directive takes a functional 
approach to regulation of investment businesses, which is more 
suited to a highly diversified financial centre such as the City 
of London, with its wide variety of types and sizes of financial 
institutions and a vast range of business activities. It is no 
coincidence that Britain, which has more non-bank financial 
institutions than any other European market, has been leading the 
fight to have the measure in place by 1993. v:
1. The preamble and the recitals :
P
The preamble gives Article 57 as the legal basis for the 
directive. The main relevant provision of that Article provides 
that "the Council shall issue directives for the coordination of 
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in member states concerning the taking up and pursuit of 
activities as self-employed persons." The Article is in the Treaty 
provisions relating to the freedom of establishment, but its 
application is extended by Article 66 to matters covered by the 
chapter on services. The draft acknowledges in its recitals that 
it was necessary, for reasons of fair competition, to ensure that 
non-bank investment firms benefited from a similar freedom to 
create branches and provide services across frontiers as that 
provided for credit institutions by the second banking directive. 
Therefore, it seeks to liberalise access to stock markets 
throughout the Community, create a level playing field for 32
32. J-M.Fombellida, supra note 5.
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financial services suppliers in these markets and provide broad 
common standards for the protection of investors.
The recitals to the draft directive include several interesting
measures. The influence of the Community case law on the freedom
to provide services and the right of establishment is apparent.
Indeed the fourth recital adapts the proviso first raised in the
33Van Binsbergen judgement, in relation to "regulatory arbitrage".
It requires that the competent authorities of a member state
should not grant an authorisation or should withdraw one, where it
is clear that an investment firm has opted for the legal system of
that state, for the purpose of evading the stricter standards in
force in another member state in which it intends to carry on or
carries on the greater part of its activities. Thus, the
subjective element of the intention to avoid stricter rules which
34was seemingly omitted from the judgement in the insurance cases, 
has been retained here. The fear was that an investment entity 
might seek to strategically exploit the provisions of the
directive by registering in one member state, where authorisation 
would be easier or quicker to obtain, while locating its head 
office and principal activities in another member state. To ensure 
the prevention of such abuse, the recital then declares that the 
member states "must" require that the head office of an investment 
firm be situated in the same member state as the registered 
office. The original draft directive had contained such a 
requirement but it was removed from the body of the directive by 
the Commission in the face of criticism from the Economic and 
Social Committee. The Committee had said that this requirement 
suggested that the controls in each member state could never be 34
33. Supra chapter 2 note 42 .
34. Supra chapter 2 note 39.
expected to impose the same degree of restrictions or to be of the
35same quality throughout the Community. The Committee felt that
it was up to the Commission and the Council to bring in such a
degree of harmonisation that there would be absolutely nothing to
be gained from using such a 'letter box company'. Whether this
requirement is in any case sufficient to solve the problem is an
open question. A head office implies the central place of
administration of a firm, and consequently a certain amount of
activities would have to be carried on in that home member state.
This could still leave considerable room to manoeuvre to a firm
determined to avoid the professional rules of conduct in the state
3 6where it carries on the majority of its business.
The seventh recital provides that it shall be open to a member 
state to establish rules stricter than those laid down in the 
directive in the key areas, such as the requirements for 
authorisation and the prudential rules to be applied to investment 
firms authorised by its competent authority. However, the member 
state clearly could not impose such rules on 'foreign* member 
state institutions operating there, on the basis of the mutual 
recognition of national supervisory standards. This situation 
raises the possibility of a reverse discrimination against 
national institutions. It is difficult to envisage the situation 
where a member state would consciously opt for such 
discrimination, but it may occur if a member state's existing 
regulatory structure is not altered to take account of the 
contents of the directive, prior to the latter becoming fully 
effective. 356
35. See their report, supra note 29 .
36. See M.Dassesse "The single banking market of 1993" (1989) 4 
European Trends 68-77, for comments on a similar clause in 
the second banking directive.
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For example/ the Financial Services Act in Britain is considered
to be 'state of the art* in terms of investment services
regulation, and it provides for a very detailed code of conduct of
business rules which go beyond those envisaged by the directive.
Many firms complain about the cost of compliance with this
legislation and would undoubtedly complain even more loudly, if
foreign member state institutions did not have to comply with it
in full, thus reducing the costs they had to incur in operating in
the UK market. However, it would be open to the British
supervisory authorities to require compliance with these rules by
all firms, on the basis that they were adopted in the interest of
the general good, in accordance with the terms of the directive.
The issue then would be whether these rules were excessive to
achieve their purpose, whether they duplicated existing rules in
other member states or whether they were objectively necessary to
achieve their purpose. On the other hand, the forces of
competition may oblige the British authorities to deregulate, in
the sense of relaxing these rules so as to allow its authorised
37firms to compete on more equal terms.
Such reverse discrimination would not seem to be contrary to
Community law, notwithstanding the potential distortions of
competition that may be involved. This is apparent from the
38
opinion given by Advocate General Rozes in the Waterkeyn case, 378
37. In this respect, Lord Rippon, in a debate in the House of 
Lords on amendments to the British regulatory system, pointed 
out that "the Single European Market in financial services 
would bring no benefit...unless the regulatory corset of the 
Financial Services Act could be made more compatible with the 
looser girdles employed in the rest of Europe". Reported in 
the New Law Journal 17/3/1989 p.369 •
38. Cases 314-316/81 and 83/82 Procureur de la République 
v Waterkeyn (1982) ECR 4337 .
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which suggested that it would be a matter for the courts of the 
member state involved to address.
The eighth recital provides that the carrying on of activities not 
listed in the Annex to the directive should be governed by the 
provisions of the Treaty concerning the right of establishment and 
the freedom to provide services. In that context, the following 
recital states that host member states may require compliance with 
specific national regulations by firms not authorised as 
investment firms in their home member states and with regard to 
activities not listed in the Annex. This exceptional power is 
granted on condition that such provisions are compatible with 
Community law, are intended to protect the general good and that 
such firms or such activities are not subject to equivalent rules 
under the legislation of their home member state. This confirms 
the decision in the insurance cases as it relates to the 
justification of the application of national measures. However, 
the insurance judgement went somewhat further in holding that such 
rules must also take into account any supervision or verification 
carried out in the home state, and they must go no further than is 
necessary to achieve their purpose.
The extent of this recital's application is unclear. Presumably it 
applies to firms established in another member state, without any 
formal authorisation therein to provide services which are not 
listed in the Annex, and which it wishes to provide in the host 
state. Does it also apply to the provision of services by a firm, 
not authorised in its home state to carry out activities contained 
in the Annex, but authorised therein to carry out other 
activities, such as commodities broking, and wishing to establish 
itself in, or provide these services to, the host member state ? 
Much of such confusion stems from the fact that the recital does 
not follow the distinction drawn in the annex to the directive
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between investment activities and the instruments to which they 
relate. No assistance in this matter can be found in the text of 
the earlier draft of the directive because its wording was equally 
ambivalent in this regard, so it remains to be seen how the 
Council will interpret it. This provision is not without 
significance because, to take the example of dealing in
commodities, this is subject in Britain to the financial services 
regulatory regime, but commodities are not one of the instruments 
specified in the directive. Therefore, this activity will not 
benefit from the Community passport and firms dealing in 
commodities will have to seek separate authorisations throughout 
the Community.
The eleventh recital provides that host member states must ensure
that there are no obstacles therein to carrying on activities
receiving mutual recognition in the same manner as in the home
member state, as long as the latter do not conflict with legal
provisions protecting the general good in the host member state. A
comparable provision is included in the text of the directive :
Article 16(5) recognises the power of host member states to punish
irregularities committed by a * foreign* firm contrary to legal
rules adopted in the interests of the general good. However, the
wording of the recital leaves it open to a wider interpretation.
The recital refers to carrying on activities in the same manner as
in the home member state s in the earlier draft of the directive,
the equivalent recital referred to the activities being undertaken
39"using the financial techniques" of the home member state. A 
similar recital is contained in the second banking directive, and 
in this regard, Davis cited the example of mortgage lending, which 
is one of the designated banking activities under the provisions 39
39. Supra note 28 .
of that directive.40 41He noted that under Belgian law, variable 
rate house lending is prohibited, whereas British building 
societies (who qualify as credit institutions), can and do lend 
such funds at variable rates. Does the mutual recognition of 
mortgage lending activity under the directive extend to the 
techniques used in Britain in this example ? If so, can the 
Belgian authorities justify their restrictive legislation on the 
grounds of the general good in order to prevent the use of such 
techniques ?
This raises the question whether a member state is still able to
rely on its general good legislation in relation to the way the
activities benefiting from mutual recognition are carried out, as
distinct from its application to the activities per se.
Alternatively, one can ask whether the inclusion, in this instance
of mortgage lending, within the list of banking activities which
benefit from mutual recognition, imports the requirement to
recognise all the financial techniques applied thereto within the
Community markets. Davis concluded that to make clear the
intention of the second banking directive in this context, either
the powers of the host authorities to legislate in the general
good should be laid out far more precisely, or the rights of
companies to enter different markets should be protected by a much
41more detailed list of designated activities. The same conclusion 
can be reached in relation to the equivalent provision in the 
Investment Services directive.
40. E.Davis "The single market in financial services" (1989) an 
essay in "Whose Europe..." supra chapter 2 note 4 p.69-88 .
41. Ibid at p.73 .
♦ •  ♦
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2. The text of the directive :
The draft directive applies to all investment firms. It defines an 
investment firm as any natural or legal person whose business it 
is to provide any investment service, which itself is defined as 
any of the services relating to any of the instruments listed in 
the annex to the directive. These include, inter alia, brokerage, 
market making, dealing as principal or the giving of professional 
investment advice in relation to transferable securities, money 
market instruments and financial futures and options among others. 
The home member state is defined as being where the the principal 
place of business is for a natural person, and where the 
registered office or head office, in the absence of a registered 
office, is situated for a legal person. The authorities 
responsible for authorisation and supervision of firms ("competent 
authorities"), are those designated as such by the member states. 
They must be public authorities, or bodies officially recognised 
by national law or by public authorities to be part of the 
supervisory system prevailing in the member state in question. 
This somewhat unwieldy definition was necessary to incorporate the 
self-regulatory systems in operation in some member states. Only 
certain of the provisions of the directive are applicable to 
credit institutions which are already authorised by their banking 
licences to engage in securities business.
As regards the authorisation of an investment firm, the competent 
authorities of a member state, without prejudice to other 
generally applicable conditions of national law, are required not 
to grant an authorisation unless the investment firm has 
sufficient initial capital, and unless the persons who effectively 
direct the business of the firm are of sufficiently good repute 
and experience. The capital adequacy directive, which has yet to 
be agreed by the Council, will lay down the rules for initial
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capital for investment firms. In addition, the authorities are to 
refuse authorisation unless satisfied as to the suitability of the 
major shareholders or members of the firm, taking into account the 
need to ensure its sound and prudent management. This 
consideration must also be taken into account in relation to 
natural or legal persons who wish to increase or acquire a major 
holding in an investment firm. The competent authorities must be 
informed of such proposals and be given an opportunity to object 
to them.
Authorised investment firms must continue to be in compliance with 
these principal conditions and, in addition, must make sufficient 
provision against market risk in accordance with rules which are 
also to be prescribed by the capital adequacy directive. Member 
states are obliged by the proposal to draw up prudential rules to 
be observed on an ongoing basis by firms authorised by their 
competent authorities. Among such rules are the requirements that 
the investment firm has made arrangements in relation to 
compensation for investors who suffer due to the bankruptcy or 
default of the firm, and that the firm is organised in such a way 
that conflicts of interest between it and its clients, or between 
its clients, do not result in the interests of the clients being 
prejudiced. Supervision of these conditions and rules is within 
the exclusive competence of the home member state's competent 
authorities at all times. The draft proposal states, however, 
that member states may provide that certain of these prudential 
rules shall not apply where the service is provided to 
professional or business investors.
Under the terms of the proposal, host member states may not 
require an additional authorisation or establishment from 
providers of services who are authorised to offer those services 
by their home competent authorities. Where necessary for the
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provision of certain services, host member states must ensure that 
authorised investment firms can have access to membership of their 
stock exchanges and organised securities markets (including 
financial futures and options exchanges), whether by direct or 
indirect means and also to membership of clearing and settlement 
systems which are available to domestic members of such exchanges 
and markets. A significant amendment to the directive at the 
revision stage provides that where the stock exchange or organised 
market of the host state operates without any requirement for a 
physical presence, such investment firms may become members 
without having any establishment in the host member state. Home 
member states are requested to allow host stock exchanges or 
markets to provide appropriate facilities within the home member 
state territory to facilitate such membership. This takes account 
of the growing number of screen based market systems in the 
Community and acknowledges the increasing drift away from the 
traditional dealing floor.
The directive allows for the retention by host member states of 
the power to take measures to prevent or punish irregularities 
committed within their territories, which are contrary to the 
legal rules they have adopted in the interests of the general 
good. In addition, the freedom of authorised firms to advertise 
their services in host member states is subject to any rules 
governing the form and content of such advertising adopted in the 
interest of the general good in the host member state. Thus, the 
permissible restrictions recognised by the Court in the insurance 
cases to the Treaty freedoms in question here, have been imported 
into the text of this proposal.
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Comment :
At the risk of pre-empting the Council, it is worth reviewing some 
of the features of the Investment Services directive, with a 
critical eye towards its impact on the financial services 
industry.
The legal status of the recitals is unclear. In theory, their 
role is simply to relate the directive to other Community 
initiatives and legislation, while briefly summarising what the 
directive seeks to achieve. To this extent, they are not intended 
to add to the substance of the detailed text. However, each of the 
recitals discussed above deals with matters which have not, in 
fact, been explicitly provided for in the body of the proposal. 
For example, the fourth recital states that member states must 
require that the head office of an investment firm be situated in 
the same member state as the registered office. This obligation is 
not repeated in the text. This could prove confusing and 
problematical when the directive comes to be implemented by the 
member states. Are the recitals to be given legal force or are 
national legislators entitled to ignore them, referring to them 
only for guidance as to the legislative intent of the Community 
institutions ? What weight might a court give to the recitals when 
considering a case where a plaintiff has cited them in support of 
his claim ? It would be desirable for this issue to be clarified 
to avoid future uncertainty.
The requirement in the directive that the persons who effectively 
direct the business of an investment firm be of sufficiently good 
repute and experience, and that the ultimate owners of significant 
shareholdings in such firms be suitable persons, having regard to 
the need to ensure the sound and prudent management of such firms, 
essentially requires a value judgement from the competent
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authorities. This is self evident and eminently reasonable on its 
face but even this can cause differences in a European context.
A simple example can illustrate the possible variations in
interpretation of terms among the different member states. At a
European conference on financial conglomerates, Geoffrey Fitchew
the Director General of DG 15 (Financial Institutions and Company
Law), was explaining how difficult it actually was to lay down
detailed criteria for fitness and properness. He said that because
it seemed so widely accepted that anyone who has been convicted of
a criminal offence could not be regarded as fit and proper, a
clause to that effect had been left out of the second banking
directive. At this point, Christen Boye-Jacobsen, a Danish
government official, interjected, saying that under their penal
code, once a person has been punished and released he is a free
man and he can be integrated once again into society. The
implication was that a conviction should not disbar him from being
a fit and proper person in this context, and he was sure that
. 42Denmark was not the only European country with such a principle.
In this way, even seemingly straightforward principles can be
interpreted quite differently amongst the European countries, and
this shows the difficulty of the task of the Commission in trying
to formulate an objective common standard. Critics have also
43argued that concepts such as suitability are ephemeral at best. 
They can be employed not only to preclude patently undesirable 
raids on investment firms, but also to preserve local ownership 
and control and thus to protect domestic markets.
42. See the text of the Conference proceedings, cited supra in 
the Introduction note 7, at p.148 .
43. P.McBride Johnson and I.Finkle, "The 1992 European investment
community : an exclusive club ?" (1989) Int. Financial Law
Review (March) p.35-38 .
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Among the prudential rules to be drawn up by member states under 
the proposal, is the requirement that an investment firm be a 
member of a general compensation scheme or that it make individual 
arrangements which would provide equivalent protection. The 
directive acknowledges the need for further harmonisation in this 
area, which threatens to be a major source of controversy in the 
discussion of the directive.^ In the meantime, the directive 
provides that branches of investment firms shall be subject to the 
compensation scheme in force in the host member state, provided 
that their contributions to such scheme are calculated by 
reference to their income in respect of investment activity 
carried out in that state. One has to acknowledge that home 
country control of compensation provisions would be dependent on 
Community agreement on a minimum level of compensation to be paid 
out by the home member state to investors, anywhere in the 
Community, doing business with firms authorised by that state. No 
member state is going to countenance its investors doing business 
with foreign member state firms, if they cannot be guaranteed an 
acceptable level of compensation in the event of a failure, when 
investors doing business with domestic firms are assured just 
that. Nevertheless, it seems unfair to base a branch's 
contribution to the host compensation scheme on its income from 
investment activity in that state. It would seem more equitable to 
include a mechanism for assessing the risk level of a firm's 
operations in that state when fixing its contribution to the 
scheme.
44. See L.Kellaway "EEC Investment directive behind schedule" 
Financial Times 11/6/1990 p.18 and also, for an earlier
expression of concern, B.Riley "City wants uniform EC market 
controls" Financial Times 28/6/1989 p.8 .
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There is a glaring need for Community legislation in this field, 
but reaching agreement on Community compensation for investment 
business failures is likely to be extraordinarily difficult, 
because of the variety of investment businesses to be covered. 
Such agreement would also have to accomodate the differing legal 
attitudes of member states to such compensation. This would raise 
questions such as where should caveat emptor stop and compensation 
begin, or should compensation be available for claims of negligent 
advice or solely for loss of money or security due to bankruptcy 
or default ?
Another of the essential prudential rules requires the
organisation of the firm in such a way that conflicts of interest
between the firm and its clients, or between one of its clients
and another, do not result in the interests of the clients being
prejudiced. This exhortation leaves the control and management of
such conflicts of interest to the complete discretion of the
member states. Conflict problems are particularly prevalent in the
universal banking model of financial institution and also in the
rapidly emerging financial conglomerates, which offer virtually
every kind of financial service to their customers. In fact, one
study which examined this problem, identified no less than
fourteen conflict situations which might arise in relation to a
45single transaction undertaken by such a conglomerate.
As far as investor protection is concerned, a client's interests 
may be prejudiced by a conflict because of the poor quality of the 
service he receives. A professional may unduly weigh his own 
interests against those of his client in these situations.
45. See R.Goode (ed) "Conflicts of interest in the changing 
financial world (1986) Institute of Bankers, London.
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Different methods of control and management are available to
member states, such as 'Chinese Wall' arrangements, disclosure
46requirements and formal rules of practice. Unfortunately, in the 
absence of firmer Community guidelines, member states are likely 
to take very different attitudes towards the fulfilment of this 
prudential requirement and are thus likely to vary greatly in 
their legislative responses thereto.
The draft directive also permits member states to suspend 
application of certain of the prudential rules in relation to 
business or professional investors. The rules in question relate 
to the separation of investors' securities and investors' funds 
from those of the investment firm, by such firms, and to the 
compensation scheme requirement. This option is also available to 
the member states where the investment service concerned does not 
involve the investment firm in handling any money or securities on 
behalf of clients. Thus, the Commission can be seen to have taken 
the hint dropped by the Court in the insurance cases, to the 
effect that it felt certain investors were capable of looking 
after themselves. The Commission, however, has done little more 
than to acknowledge this distinction. It confines itself to the 
bald statement that member states *'may provide that the rules set 
out...shall not apply where the service is provided to business or 
professional investors". It has refrained from fixing any monetary 
thresholds or suggesting other criteria for deciding whether an 
investor is a professional or not. The desire here is obviously to 
avoid a too detailed and extensive harmonisation measure. It was
46* For a detailed study of the conflicts problem, see "Conflicts 
of interest in banking and finance and their control and 
management" (1987) Financial Trends No.38 OECD, Paris .
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suggested that to try and be more specific in this particular
» 47regard would be to open a Pandora s box of complications.
Nonetheless, in my opinion, this represents another tactic by the 
Commission to avoid taking the responsibility for developing 
regulatory policy at a Community level. Investor and consumer 
protection is one of the prime aims of any investment services 
regulation by member states, particularly in regard to the 
individual consumer who often lacks the ability, in terms of both 
knowledge and bargaining power, to protect himself. The lack of a 
definition of a professional investor could lead to divergences in 
the implementation of the directive, competitive distortions and 
confusion among investors as to the obligations of the firm with 
which they are dealing.
This merely serves to illustrate the complexity of the financial 
services market and highlights the differences between what can be 
called the retail and wholesale financial services sectors. In 
simplistic terms, at the former level, the consumers avail of the 
services offered by the institutions while at the latter level, 
the institutions operate amongst themselves. This does not prevent 
the institutions and the consumers from sharing concerns and 
having similar interests. For example# a consumer may be just as 
frustrated by regulations in his member state as an institution 
therein, because he may wish to take more risk than those rules 
allow or because the cost of purchasing financial products is 
excessively high, due to the extra overheads imposed by protective 
regulations. Indeed, it should be stressed that both consumers and 
institutions would be opposed to overregulation, because it
47. J-M.Fombellida, supra note 5 .
increases costs all round, restricts competition and may 
discourage the development and use of financial techniques.
Despite these common concerns, institutions and consumers clearly
have different needs and member state legislation should recognise
this. The London Stock Exchange has come under increasing
criticism for disregarding the interests of the • individual
. . , 48
customer in its wooing of the powerful institutional investors. 
The former's difficulties have been augmented by the dearth of 
brokers making markets in smaller stocks, which have traditionally 
been favoured by the smaller investor. Those brokers have had 
their fingers burned in the inevitable fallout due to the excess 
capacity in the market subsequent to Big Bang. A comparable 
acknowledgement has taken place in America. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission has relaxed its notoriously demanding 
registration requirements in relation to private equity placements 
among large institutional investors. Thus, although the need for 
a discerning system of investor protection has been signalled, the 
Commission has made no attempt to frame such a system in this 
directive. The ultimate development of a two speed system of 
investor protection will depend on the willingness of member 
states to interpret the provisions of the proposal imaginatively 
and constructively.
48. See, for example, C.Dobie "Dissatisfaction fuels demand for 
rival exchange" The Independent 9/7/1990 .
49. For an account of the collapse of one such firm, see D.Green
"Kitcat & Aitken to close after 90 years" Financial Times
30/5/1990 . See also B.Riley "A time of turmoil for the
private stockbroker" Financial Times 28-29/7/1990 .
50. See J.Bush "New rule will clear a path" Financial Times
supplement 2/7/1990 .
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If it can be seen as any consolation, José-Maria Fombellida,
having noted that the European Court had never had a case before
it requiring a judgement relating to the rights of investors or
intermediaries, suggested that it was probable that, in the near
future, the Commission would commence work on a new directive
which would seek to harmonise standards of conduct of all
. . 51intermediaries active m  securities markets. Such a measure is, 
unfortunately, most unlikely to see the harsh light of day before 
the end of 1992, when the current Commission's term of office will 
expire.
The exclusion clauses already noted, which allow member states to 
impose their own legislation for the protection of the general 
good, create a dilemma. There will always be a risk of
restrictions being introduced under the guise of the public good 
which will interfere with the freedom to provide financial 
services. The opening up of financial markets, not just by the 
abolition of entry restrictions but also by allowing the free 
movement of modern sophisticated financial techniques, is one of 
the aims of the Commission. In this context. Fitchew admitted that 
there is no precise doctrine governing what is justified by the 
public interest.^ The view held by the Commission, he said, was 
that it did not want to get into excessively detailed
harmonisation, because it would get sucked back into the highly 
comprehensive harmonisation programme of the 1970s if it tried to 
do that. The best strategy, in its view, was to leave the question 
to be sorted out in the first instance by market forces and in the 512
51. Supra note 5 .
52. See G.Fitchew "The progress to date - an EC perspective " a 
contribution to The Economist Conference Unit's 
"Restructuring Europe's financial services : 1992 and beyond” 
(1989) Rooster Books Ltd. p.23-31 at p.32 .
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second instance by recourse to the European Court of Justice. This 
"wait and see" attitude may seem a little hapless, but it may be 
that the Commission is just biding its time until a suitable case 
comes along to raise the question directly before the Court.
It is necessary to mention one other aspect of the proposed 
directive. This is the provision contained therein relating to 
reciprocity. By virtue of Article 58 of the Treaty, subsidiaries 
established by third country financial institutions in any member 
state, are considered to be Community companies as of that moment, 
and can therefore enjoy the right of establishment and the free 
provision of services within its territory, together with all the 
benefits of the new financial services passport which Community 
firms will enjoy. However, in contrast, the branches of third 
country institutions do not benefit from these entitlements. The 
provisions of Article 7 of the draft directive will regulate the 
procedure where a third country undertaking seeks the 
authorisation of a subsidiary in a member state, or acquires a 
holding in a Community investment firm such that the latter 
becomes its subsidiary. The provisions exactly mirror those 
contained in the second banking directive, which were amended at 
each stage of the legislative process of that directive. Indeed, 
this clause was one of the most hotly debated issues raised by 
that directive and the eventual consensus reached produced a 
rather watered down set of provisions.
The measure provides for a two tier approach to reciprocity which 
differentiates with respect to the response of the Community 
between, on the one hand, a lack of comparable market access for 
Community institutions in third countries and, on the other hand, 
a failure to provide national treatment thereto by third country 
authorities. The Commission will be able to negotiate for such 
entitlements itself and will have power, in certain cases, to
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limit or suspend future requests for authorisation or 
participation in Community financial institutions by third country 
firms. The Vice-President of the Commission has stated that the 
Community's banking market will be the most open, as well as the 
most unified major banking market in the world. On this basis, 
the Commission believes that in a financially highly
interdependent world, its banks and other financial intermediaries 
should enjoy fair access to and equivalent treatment in, other 
world markets. The Community has been negotiating, with this 
objective in mind, with its EFTA partners and general financial 
services negotiations are also underway in the GATT Uruguay round 
of discussions. In this regard, an express provision of both the 
banking and investment services directives requires any action 
taken by the Community to be in conformity with its international 
obligations.
The fear expressed amongst the international business community,
both within and outside the Community, was that these measures
could create a "Fortress Europe" or erect, to use Professor
54Gower's delightful phrase, a "cordon sanitaire" around it, 
handicapping European investors and institutions in the use of the 
thriving global market and its advantages. The Deputy Governor of 
the Bank of England expressed similar reservations when saying 
that such unilateral reciprocity tests were symptomatic of 
introversion rather than a commitment to free trade. He was of the 
opinion that reciprocity rules needed to be discretionary and to 534
53. Leon Brittan at p,3 of a speech delivered to the Electra 
launch dinner on the 19/1/1990 .
54. Used in Gower's introductory speech to the Conference cited 
supra in the Introduction note 7, p.5-10 at p.7 .
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• 5 5be operated locally by experienced professional supervisors. The
reciprocity provisions finally adopted in the second banking
directive differ considerably from earlier drafts of the measures.
They show a significant shift in the institutional power balance
with regard to their ultimate management, away from the Commission
and towards the Council. Thus the member states seem intent on
keeping a tight control over their application. But their fears
seem unjustified - Leon Brittan has stated that "there will be no
question of even considering closing our markets in any way to
outside competition unless there is proven discrimination in their
c g
markets against European institutions." The Commission has made
it clear that these provisions will not have retroactive effect
and will not, therefore, affect the subsidiaries of third country
institutions authorised or participations acquired in firms in the
57Community, prior to the first of January 1993. In any case, such
provisions, in principle, are by no means new. Reciprocity 
requirements exist already in virtually all of the member states. 
It is the Community dimension to this politically useful 
bargaining tool which the member states, at the prompting of their 
powerful business lobbies, have found difficult to accept. This 
begs the question of whether the member states see the single 
market in financial services as a truly integrated market or as a 
network of integrated national markets.
The Capital Adequacy directive : nt 567
55. Sir G.Blunden "Target 1992" a contribution to Eurofi's "1992 
- Planning for financial services and the insurance sector" 
(1989) Butterworths.
56. Supra note 53 at p.4 .
57. See the text of an information bulletin from the Commission 
"Europe 1992 : Europe world partner" Brussels 19/10/1988 .
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C D
The proposed Capital Adequacy directive for investment firms, 
which is an essential counterpart to the Investment Services 
directive, has proven very difficult to negotiate. The fifth draft 
was finally approved by the Commission in April 1990. Its purpose 
is, firstly, to coordinate the levels of initial capital to be 
provided by investment firms other than credit institutions as a 
condition of their being authorised. Secondly, the proposal 
specifies, by means of ratios, the capital such firms must 
maintain in relation to the assortment of risks they run in 
operating their business. These are classified as follows :
(a) position risk - this reflects the risk of loss from adverse 
price movements in securities held for trading purposes, whatever 
their cause; (b) foreign exchange risk - this relates to a firm's 
vulnerability to losses arising purely from adverse exchange rate 
movements; (c) unsettled transactions risk - this concerns 
transactions where one or other party has not paid for the 
securities it has contracted to buy, or has not delivered the 
securities it has contracted to sell and (d) 'base' risk - this 
is intended to cover all other risks faced by investment firms, 
such as a collapse in market turnover. The latter requirement 
takes account of the wide variation in size of investment firms in 
the Community, by requiring the holding of funds equivalent to one 
quarter of the previous year's overheads. The scope of the 
directive extends to all credit institutions, including those 
which are not investment firms. However, in consideration of the 
requirements imposed on them by the solvency ratio and own funds 
directives, the directive offers a choice to national supervisory 
authorities as to which system to apply to the credit institutions 
authorised by them. The requirements will to some extent 
inevitably apply to credit institutions with securities activities 58
58. COM (90) 141 final, OJ 90/C 152/6 21/6/1990 .
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anyway, because the ratios agreed by the G10 countries in Basle 
and adopted in the banking legislation, only cover credit risk and 
not position risk.
In drafting this proposal, the Commission has had to consider the 
very different interests and concerns of the whole range of 
investment businesses, and to try to create a level playing field 
between them and credit institutions relating to capital 
requirements. This balance is significant because the cost and 
deployment of capital will be a big element of firms' 
competitiveness after 1992. Unfortunately for the Commission, the 
overlap in business interests between banks and securities houses 
and the integration of financial market activities has not been 
matched by developments in the international coordination of the 
regulation of securities houses. While the Commission has been 
formulating its own views on capital adequacy, the Barnes 
committee, a sub-committee of the Bank for International 
Settlements, has been investigating equity position risks in 
banks, although non-bank investment firms fall outside its ambit. 
It has the advantage of having a worldwide perspective and the 
capital adequacy debate is now likely to bounce between the two 
forums like a tennis ball.
The drafting of this directive has been another battle, in the 
ongoing conflict between (for the sake of polarisation) the 
British and German attitudes in this field. The British view is 
that initial capital requirements should be held to a minimum, but 
under a close scrutiny which would allow sophisticated adjustments 59
59. See R.Waters "Drexel’s fall may spur the talking-shop" 
Financial Times supplement 2/7/1990, for a discussion of the 
proliferation of talking-shops among European and worldwide 
securities regulators.
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to be made to cater for different types of risk.60 The British 
lobbyists also wanted the rules to recognise that portfolio risk 
could be reduced by diversification and hedging. The West German 
practice, applicable only to universal banks, requires substantial 
initial capital, thus creating an entry barrier, but thereafter 
the firms are able to do business relatively freely.61 No separate 
capital is required for position risk in securities dealing, but 
there are limits on foreign exchange risks and in relation to 
other instruments, including futures.
In addition to reconciling these divergent approaches, the
Commission's objective has been to establish a regime which gives62neither type of investment institution a comparative advantage.
It is anxious that its requirements do not lead to changes in the 
organisational structure of investment firms, such as giving 
universal banks an irresistible incentive to subsidiarise their 
securities operations. The danger here is that the Investment 
Services directive cannot be adopted without the Capital Adequacy 
directive and thus delay in one will necessarily delay the other. 
As the countdown to 1992 gathers increasing momentum, a lot of 
discussion still has to take place in this respect. The danger of 
negotiating against a time limit where national interests are so 
divergent is that content is compromised for the sake of
60. R.Lambert supra note 24, see also "Adequacies inadequate" The 
Economist 30/9/1989 p.80 .
61. See The Economist supra note 25 and also T.Dickson "Anglo- 
German boost for single insurance market" Financial Times 
31/3/1990, which noted a significant softening of Bonn's 
earlier insistence on the toughest possible capital 
requirements during negotiations on the directive.
62. R.Lambert "World leadership in financial services within the 
grasp of the EC" Financial Times 17/10/1989 at p.2 .
63. See the text of a speech given by Leon Brittan to the 
Overseas Bankers Club on the 5/2/1990 .
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agreement. The price for agreeing these directives should not be
64the bringing forward of technically flawed measures.
This highlights one of my principal concerns about the
legislative progress towards 1992. There is no doubt that
deadlines concentrate the mind but there are dangers in this
radical investment services programme being driven by a timetable
rather than the need to get things right. The harmonisation or
coordination of the laws relating to the authorisation,
supervision and capital adequacy of investment firms is at the
core of this programme. The overriding need is to get the
foundations right, because of the pivotal role of financial
markets and of the financial services industry generally, in the
economy - in Lord Cockfield's words : "Financial services oil the
65wheels of the competitive market economy" - and because of the 
potential for transmission of shocks between national economies if 
the supervisory framework is not effective. As Bradley puts it: 
"Though it has proved a useful lubricant for the legislative 
process, the technique of mutual recognition, a 'second best' 
compared to coordination of national provisions, gives rise to 
the danger that the interests of the consumer and/or investor 
protection may be subordinated to the policy of speedy completion 
of the internal market and encourages the member states to accept 
the lowest common denominator in fixing the Community
64. See R.Nowinski & R.Brooks "Financial services must take 
account of new European rules" Financial Times 12/4/1990 at 
p.9 •
65. See the proceedings of the symposium cited supra chapter one 
note 1, at p.5 .
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standard."
These measures of financial services legislation have been forced
to distinguish between banking and investment firm activities, in
order to accomodate the divergent traditions in these fields among
the member states. However, it is arguable that this creates a
false institutional distinction between the two, mirrored in the
different, although hopefully complementary, supervisory
structures. It is clear that securities and banking markets are
becoming increasingly integrated. It was reported in December
1989, that British banks now act as agents in just under half (by
value) of individuals* domestic equity trading, compared with one
67third just a year previously. The fragmentation of regulatory
responsibilities, both geographically between national authorities
and functionally between bank and securities regulators, is
becoming outdated in the global financial marketplace, and failure
to recognise this could have serious implications for the68Community financial sector. Similarly, a legislative process 
where one measure is continually seeking to catch up with another 
in timetable terms, and where specific provisions fiercely 
negotiated in one context are imported wholesale into another 
context without distinction, cannot be desirable. Legislation in 
this field will not stop after 1992. Indeed, the Community policy 
and approach will be further refined by Commission proposals, the 
impact of market forces and European Court decisions, but it would 
be preferable for a suitable framework to be in place beforehand.
66. K.Bradley "The Common Market in financial services" JUS 
letter bulletin 7/89 JUSB22 :see also R.Kinsella "The Second 
Banking directive and the Investment Services directive"
(1988) JISEL p.37-43 .
67. The Economist supra note 25.
68. See Dale supra chapter one note 36 .
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Implementation by the Member States :
The approach of the member states to implementation of the
directives will have an important role to play in this context.
The willingness of ministers to agree directives at the Community
level has not always been matched by their readiness to translate
them into national law. The Commission is becoming increasingly
69aware of the seriousness of this problem. Although 60% of the 
proposals for the internal market contained in the White Paper 
have made it through the Community legislative process, in 
February 1990 the rate of implementation by member states stood at 
70% of this total. The rate had increased by three percentage 
points since December 1989, as the Commission stepped up its 
policing role. The Commission, however, remains optimistic about 
the issue of transposition of financial services measures into 
national law. In this regard, it was pointed out to me, that the 
wave of deregulatory measures (discussed in chapter 1) which 
commenced in Britain with Big Bang and has seen similar 
developments in, for instance, French, Spanish and Dutch 
securities markets, was at least to some extent prompted by the 
knowledge that discussions were underway and proposals inevitable
69. See the Sixth Annual Report by the Commission to the European 
Parliament on monitoring of the application of Community law 
COM (89) 411 21/12/1989 .
70. L.Kellaway "Progress on European single market gathers pace" 
Financial Times 2/4/1990 .
71. See L.Raun "Moves to recoup business" Financial Times 
12/6/1990, a special supplement on The Netherlands which 
highlighted the climaxing 'explosion of reforms' on the 
Amsterdam stock exchange.
i l
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. 72at the European level m  the financial sector. The outcome of 
such legislative foresight would be a Community financial system 
which would be quite prepared for the impact of the 1992 
legislation. Somehow, I fear this will not be the case.
The 1992 approach will also bring into play the principle of
competing jurisdictions. Curzon-Price believes that free trade on
the basis of different regulatory systems puts the regulatory
73systems into direct competition with each other. This process of 
competition will soon establish a ranking from the most preferred 
to the least preferred of the regulatory norms. A member state 
faced with the presence of the latter in its regulatory system can 
either do nothing, thus burdening its industry with an unpopular 
norm or it can adopt its legislation spontaneously. In a properly 
informed market, she felt, the consumer would be allowed to 
determine the appropriate balance between cost and quality, and 
once the market has selected the optimal norm, countries could be 
expected to converge on that norm. However, in the securities 
field, the market is not properly informed (see chapter 4), and 
therefore member states will be obliged to retain disclosure 
requirements and conduct of business rules to protect the 
inadequately informed consumer. This illustrates the danger of 
assimilating financial products with other products in an attempt 
to facilitate their freedom of supply. Nevertheless, though the 
principle of competing jurisdictions will not be a panacea for the 
problem of effective implementation of Community financial
72. J-M.Fombellida supra note 5 : see also D.Lascelles "Bank of 
England drops plans to equalise banks' liquid assets" 
Financial Times 19/4/1990 at p.l - an account of unilateral 
action by banking authorities in Britain being shelved due 
to, inter alia, the likelihood of EC measures on the same 
issues.
73. V.Curzon-Price cited supra chapter 2 note 4 at p.33 .
i
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services legislation by member states, it is likely to be a 
consideration in the minds of member state legislators, who might 
fear an exodus of business and firms from their excessively 
regulated markets in the aftermath of 1992.
In recent times, financial market regulation in member states has
tended to be used as a means of correcting a perceived market
failure or as a response to scandals which threatened to undermine
the public confidence in the markets. When the Financial Services
Act was enacted in 1986 in Britain, its legislative genesis came
firstly from the need to re-regulate the rapidly changing
organised securities markets which were revelling at the time in
their post Big Bang freedom. Secondly, and more immediately, it
came as a result of a comprehensive review of the system of
74investor protection in Britain, commissioned by the Department
of Trade and Industry in the wake of a number of financial
scandals in the City of London markets, which had left numerous
investors stranded and caused considerable disquiet amongst
critics of the financial system. Thus the Act, whatever its
merits, was a reasoned response to a recognised need for
legislation. Until the 1980s, French financial markets were
fragmented, heavily regulated and dominated by government debt.
Their liberalisation was a Socialist initiative encouraged by
volatile and high interest rates, the decline in household savings
and the wide interest rate margins of the corseted and
. . 75 .uncompetitive banks. As one participant put it : ’When logic
suggested that free markets work best, the French liberalised
74. L.Gower "Review of Investor Protection" (1984) HMSO CMND 
9125 .
75. See The Economist supra note 25.
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76
theirs very rationally." Exchange controls were relaxed, a new
banking act in 1984 removed some restrictions on what different
banks could do, tax breaks spurred the growth of collective
investment and privatisations helped double stock exchange
turnover. As for the market itself, computerised trading was
introduced, existing markets reorganised and a new market in
77derivatives (MATIF) was started. Several of these measures can 
be linked to developments at the Community level, but it is clear 
that they were progressively adopted in pursuit of explicit 
government policies.
Implementing measures taken on foot of the Community directives 
heretofore mentioned will have a somewhat different impetus, 
namely the completion of the single financial market envisaged by 
the 1992 programme. This different impetus may indeed affect the 
approach of member state governments to their adoption. The 
problem of delay in implementation has already been noted. Whether 
the opportunity will be exploited to introduce protectionist 
measures in the guise of general good requirements remains to be 
seen. What is certain is that the willingness to embrace the ideal 
of an internal market in financial services will depend largely on 
the perceived strength of the domestic markets, their indigenous 
participants and their ability to compete in such an enlarged 
market. Member states will be faced with an option of taking 
advantage of the opportunity to critically examine the workings 
and operation of their financial markets, or, of implementing the 
directives in a piecemeal fashion in order merely to fulfil their 
obligations of Community membership. Unfortunately, the timetable
76. G.Lejoindre, an associate director of Banque Indosuez, 
reported in The Economist ibid.
77. See Banque Indosuez, supra chapter one note 26.
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aspect suggests that the latter approach may be more frequently 
adopted.
Financial Markets :
Almost sixteen years after starting to work together informally,
the Community stock exchanges are belatedly trying to present a
more unified front towards the Commission, in the light of the
stream of 1992 legislation which could seriously affect the way
many conduct their business. European bourses have hitherto taken
comfort from the Brussels view that market supervision is a matter
for the markets themselves, and the Commission has made it clear
throughout that it has no intention of developing into a European
Securities and Exchange Commission. In 1984, the bourses revived
the European Capital Market Group (ECMG), a sub-group of the EC
Stock Exchange Committee, with the aim of developing it as the
78single interlocutor with the Commission for the bourses. Such a 
unified approach is untypical of the exchanges and it is clear 
that, in spite of the efforts of Community legislation in related 
fields, their diversity will remain a stumbling block in relation 
to the integration of the markets.
The Community currently has forty different stock exchanges, many 
of them already linked by common members, companies listed and 
active investors. They operate in different ways, some by open 
outcry, some on screens, with competing market makers, specialists 
or order matching. There are numerous different types of shares 
and debentures : bearer, registered and non-voting, for example. 
Settlement takes from two days to one month on the various
78. See H.Simonian "European stock exchanges close ranks" 
Financial Times 13/4/1989 •
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exchanges. There is also the matter of twelve different national
currencies. All of these reduce the attractiveness of European
markets both for third country investors, and for member state
issuers who find their domestic stock markets too small to raise
money there. "The costs of a fragmented European equities market
are bankrupting the industry", according to one participant 
79therein.
Scale is especially necessary for efficient financial markets and 
liquidity is essential. In theory, a central market would be more 
liquid, transparent and easily regulated than a host of competing 
ones. Liquidity is the main concern of large institutions who want 
to do big deals. Transparency is important to the retail customer 
who does not want to be cheated and wants to get the best price 
available. Price accuracy is one of the main tests of the 
efficiency of a stock market and the greater the volume of 
business through a market, the less erratic its prices will be as 
a fair indicator of value. These principles have supported much 
regulatory legislation in the past and will continue to do so. 
Applied to the mass of European markets, the potential for 
improvement is obvious.
This reasoning prompted the chairman of London's International 
Stock Exchange (ISE) to propose a single equity market for 
Europe's leading companies, open to securities houses in all the 
financial centres of Europe. He even suggested that if Community 
exchanges could not cooperate on such a scheme, the ISE would seek 
to carry it out on its own. In this context, it already has at its
79. H-J.Rudloff, deputy chairman of Credit Suisse First Boston, 
quoted in The Economist supra note 25 .
80. See R.Waters "Towards Europe's super league" Financial Times 
11/9/1989 at p. 22 .
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disposal a powerful prototype in SEAQ International, which is a
market in the shares of most of Europe's largest companies and
81already handles more business than London's domestic market.
Other markets oppose the plan however on nationalistic grounds,
which is not surprising, given the competition to be Europe's
82principal financial centre, and also because they believe SEAQ 
International is too lightly regulated and that it uses an alien 
trading mechanism.
Wymeersch suggested that such a centralisation of operations on a 
single exchange would favour the major stock exchanges of
Northern Europe, and would result in the depopulation, in a 
financial sense, of peripheral and Southern areas. This, he felt, 
would ultimately reflect an uneven redistribution of the fruits of 
European integration, whereas a more deliberate policy of
decentralisation of operations would be more in the interests of
European integration. A French proposal in response to the ISE's
initiative, was for the establishment of a 'Eurolist' involving 
the trading of shares in Europe's largest companies through each 
national exchange, trading to be governed by the rules and 
regulations of the market where it was carried out. The 
predictable response of the ISE was that European markets would 
remain as fragmented as ever, and that such a list would not offer 
sufficient depth and liquidity to attract global investors, 
issuers and institutions alike. The different approaches reflect 
different objectives for the market. The French system would be
81. R.Waters "Bourses battle for pride of place in Europe" 
Financial Times 17/5/1990 at p.19 .
82. See D.Lascelles "A potential financial capital for the EC" 
Financial Times 25/9/1989 at p.5 (supplement).
83. Supra note 6 at p.602 •
84. See R.Waters "Stock exchanges fail to bury the hatchet" 
Financial Times 22/5/1990 at p.30 .
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better suited to retail investors who need the protection of a
tightly regulated market, whereas the British one would be
suitable only as a market for professional investors. Another
opinion on this debate, that of Rudiger von Rosen, the vice
chairman of the Federation of German Stock Exchanges, was that the
Community would end up without any one central exchange but with
different centres. He contended that private investors who are
used to a home market, need facilities at home and he pointed out
85that they were the ones who made the business profitable.
Whatever the outcome, a European equity market along the lines of 
the one proposed could not exist without an appropriate 
infrastructure. As mentioned previously, the Federation of Stock 
Exchanges in the European Community (FSEEC) has taken the first 
steps in such a direction and has agreed to create an electronic 
network to disseminate price and other information fed from all
D C
the national exchanges. In May 1990, a joint venture agreement
to build the first phase of this information network, to be known
as the Pipe, was signed at a meeting of European stock exchanges
in Copenhagen. However, the agreement was only signed after
serious reservations had been expressed, and commentators have
suggested that the chances of Pipe collapsing, even at this early
stage, seem to be high. Rather than a visionary proposal, such
action was precipitated by the threat posed to the stock exchanges
by informal screen based networks, such as that operated by
88Reuters, and also by the plans of NASDAQ to establish a presence 
in Europe. It had been reported that the London ISE and NASDAQ
85. Ibid.
86. Waters supra note 11 .
87. For example, see Waters supra note 84 •
88. An American over the counter screen based system - National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation .
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were at one stage secretly negotiating a possible joint venture
89until the former pulled out and "turned instead towards Europe".
Thus it was the spur of competition rather than an urge to develop
a European system which prompted the Pipe plans. There is also the
inevitable conflict as to what model any such trading system
should follow, whether the market should be order driven, as in
Paris, or operated by market makers, as in London. Both have their
advantages, the former being better for the retail customer, the
90latter offering advantages to the institutions.
A market cannot function properly unless the participants have
confidence in their deals being settled promptly and efficiently.
The hodgepodge of paper-based and electronic systems in operation
around Europe makes this ideal somewhat illusory. It also
illustrates the likelihood of settlement arbitrage ie.the
migration of trading to the exchange that settles most quickly. It
is suspected that the market in Frankfurt suffered so badly in the
"mini-crash" of October 1989, because foreign traders sold heavily
there in preference to other exchanges in the knowledge that they
91could get their cash within two days! It has also been argued
that the cheaper it is to settle trades, the more incentive 
investors have to turn over their portfolios and this is likely to 
stimulate the volume of trade. This has prompted the London 
exchange to develop its Taurus project, a programme which 
eliminates paper share certificates and introduces electronic book
89. Supra note 80 •
90. See J.Krier "L'integration des marchés des valeurs mobilières 
en Europe" in M-J.Castello-Branco & J.Pelkmans (eds) "The 
Internai Market for Financial Services" (1987) European 
Institute of Public Administration p.163-173.
91. See The Economist supra note 25 .
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entry and a delivery versus payment system. This would reduce 
settlement costs considerably and suggests that the days of the 
humble share certificate may be numbered.
The Commission's approach to these issues is that they should be
left to the national markets to decide. Fombellida remarked that
it is not the Commission's role to decide whether a quote driven
or a market making system should prevail, this should be a
decision for the marketplace. In his view, the Commission's role
was to ensure that the same facilities and freedoms were open to
everyone, thereafter market forces and competition could take
over. In the absence of greater European integration embracing a
formal Community economic policy, these matters will be left to
member state stock exchanges and competent authorities to 
94resolve. It is difficult to see the Investment Services
directive having as great an impact as the Commission might hope, 
without the concurrent manifestation of a greater European spirit 
among national bourses. Any agreement they might reach on a real 
single European equities market is a long way off and the markets 
are likely to remain fragmented. The strength and depth of these 
markets will be important to European industry, if it is to be 
able to take full advantage of the opportunities presented to it 
by the dynamics of the 1992 programme. In this climate, the blind 
faith of the Commission in the wisdom of the marketplace may be 
somewhat misplaced.
92. See A.Freeman "Many will struggle to meet the improvement 
timetable” Financial Times supplement 2/7/1990 .
93. Supra note 5 .
94. It is interesting in this context to note the attitude 
towards change on the principal Italian stock exchange in 
Milan - see H.Simonian "Reform stalks the Milan panther” 
Financial Times 16/5/1990 at p.31 .
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CHAPTER 4 : The regulation of financial markets.
The share of economic life under the control of government has 
undergone an enormous expansion in the past century. The share of 
a country's income that has been spent by government has risen 
perhaps three to five fold in the Western world during this 
period. No simple satisfactory measure can be assigned to 
government regulation of economic life at any time, but the 
inundation of the economy by present day regulations must in 
comparison to the past, be as Noah's flood was to a normal 
spring.* Economic regulation in this context is merely one of 
several forms of government intervention in day to day life. 
Political power is used to regulate private conduct whenever any 
law is made establishing civil or criminal liability, or when 
taxes are levied with inevitable side effects even when revenue 
raising is the sole goal. Thus, there is a tendency to identify 
regulation with the whole realm of legislation, governance and 
social control. But such interventions are not considered as 
'regulation' in the sense to be discussed. Regulation here, in 
broad terms, may be used to describe activity of the State which 
determines, controls or alters the operation of markets. In 
addition, it may connote the legal rules and other measures 
adopted by the State to control private behaviour in furtherance 1
1. See Professor G.Stigler "The regularities of regulation" an 
essay in "Financial deregulation.." cited supra chapter 1 
note 19 p.1-11 .
IJ
-111-
. 2of specific policy objectives. Within the framework of American
public policy and administration, regulation has acquired a more
specific meaning. It refers to sustained and focused control
exercised by a public agency over activities that are generally
3
regarded as desirable to society.
The current popularity of studies in and about regulation, with 
their particular vocabulary and conceptual apparatus, has been 
identified as spreading from America where it has spawned a huge 
literature.2 34 Its expansion in Europe has been fuelled by the 
increasing interest shown by public lawyers in the activity, as 
distinct from the control, of government itself : the functions it 
is performing, the nature and source of the powers it is 
exercising and the characteristics of the populations in relation 
to which such powers are being exercised. The long tradition of 
regulation in the United States stems from the American ideology 
in relation to the political control of market processes. This 
declares that the market works well under normal circumstances,
2. See T.Daintith "A regulatory space agency ?" (1989) Vol.9 
No.4 Oxford Journal of legal studies 534-546 .
I have chosen not to consider the various theories which seek 
to explain why regulation comes into existence. For an 
elaboration, see R.Posner "Theories of economic regulation" 
(1974) Bell Journal of Economics 335-358 . I have also 
refrained from entering the regulation by government, by 
public agency or by self-regulation, debate. A good starting 
point here, is R.Baldwin & C.McCrudden's "Regulation and 
public law" (1987) Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
3. See G.Majone in the Introduction to G.Majone (ed)
"Deregulation or re-regulation ? (1990) Pinter Publishers
Ltd. p.1-6 at p.l.
4. The constitutionality of economic regulation in America has 
been established since the decision in Munn v Illinois 94 U.S 
113, 126 (1887), where the Court stated : "When...one devotes 
his property to a use in which the public has an 
interest,...he must submit to be controlled by the public for 
the common good...".
and should be interfered with only in specific cases of 'market 
failure', such as monopoly power. In contrast, popular acceptance 
of market ideology is a more recent phenomenon in Europe, where 
the market economy and its ability to withstand pressures has 
traditionally been mistrusted by political opinion. This helps 
explain why the study of public regulation is still a relatively 
new area of scholarship in Europe.
My particular concern is with economic regulation as it is applied 
to financial markets which, in its own right, is a sprawling 
subject which can only be selectively discussed. In the previous 
chapter, I analysed some of the initiatives being taken at the 
Community level to regulate these markets. It is worthwhile to 
examine the theoretical underpinnings of these and other 
regulatory efforts. Financial markets are different from other 
markets but not so different that the analysis of markets is still 
not central to determining the optimal scope and form of 
regulation.
Market economies exist in a state of perpetual tension between the 
freedoms conferred by the private ownership of productive property 
and the need to impose communal limits on the exercise of those 
freedoms. The study of economic regulation is largely concerned 
with exploring and understanding that tension. That tension is 
heightened in financial markets, in particular in those in Britain 
and America, which are among the most highly developed 
institutions of market capitalism. Their capacity for innovation; 
their experience of revolutionary structural change; the ferocity 5
5. L.Hancher & M.Moran in the Introduction to L.Rancher & 
M.Moran (eds) "Culture, capitalism and economic regulation"
(1989) Clarendon Press p.1-7 .
with which they practice competition; their increasingly global 
organisation; the extent to which they apply rational calculation 
and high technology; all these show them to be in the social 
vanguard of the market order.® In theory, this sector has the 
potential to be an outstanding example of the efficiency which can 
result from classical competitive capitalism. This presents its 
own dilemma : how to reconcile the competitive urge and desire for 
gain with preservation of an effectively regulated moral order. 
The sector, therefore, presents regulators, who must continually 
assess, reassess and reformulate governing rules, with a task of 
enormous complexity. The consequences of their actions reverberate 
throughout the economy and across national boundaries.
Despite the internationalisation of the industry, it is apparent 
that the economic setting and the legal and political culture of a 
country will have a profound effect on its style and quality of 
economic regulation. There will always be the need to appreciate 
the difference between the universal features of the culture of 
capitalism and the particular features of individual national 
capitalism. For this reason, I shall concentrate on the Anglo- 
American experiences of economic regulation. Differences exist 
between them, but they tend to result in variations on common 
themes. The systems of regulation in these countries have already 
been exposed to critical analysis and they may provide a 
constructive guide to the evolution of regulation in less 
developed markets. 6
6. See M.Moran "Investor protection and the 
capitalism” an essay in "Capitalism, culture 
regulation” ibid p.49-75 at p.51 .
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Why regulate financial markets ? :
"Financial markets worldwide are regulated for two reasons. First,
because the stability of the financial system is a public good,
which market forces on their own are not guaranteed to produce ;
second, in order to protect the investor, depositor and policy
holder against the wide and imaginative variety of scams, frauds
and scandal, to which financial markets have been exposed ever
since the tulip bulb speculations of the seventeenth century, if 
7
not before."
The overall aim of most financial market regulation therefore, is 
to ensure the safety, stability and integrity of the system. The 
working of the system depends completely on public confidence in 
the ability and willingness of institutions to carry out the 
contracts into which they have entered. So most economic systems 
adopt a policy designed to prevent the occurrence, and lessen the 
macroeconomic consequences, of severe financial shocks caused by 
the failure of a financial institution to meet its payment
g
obligations or by a sudden collapse in that public confidence. 
Regulation concerned with the stability of the system is known as 
prudential regulation.
The other side of the regulation coin is investor protection. A 
degree of protection is essential if members of the public are to 
have the justified confidence to participate in financial markets. 
Professor Gower suggested that one has to make a value judgement 
on the relative weight to be attached to market freedom and to 
investor protection. His view was that regulation in the interests
7. G.Fitchew, cited supra chapter three note 52 at p.24 .
8. See Padoa-Schioppa, cited supra in the Introduction note 7 at 
p. 25 •
of the latter should be no greater than is necessary to protect
9reasonable people from being made fools of. This view is more 
appropriate to participants in the retail financial services 
market, and regulation here can be justified to protect them from 
their own greed and from exploitation of their ignorance. The 
corresponding arguments for protection in the wholesale market are 
weaker but by no means non-existent. Confidence is a public good 
in wholesale markets just as it is in retail markets and that is 
why the markets themselves will seek a degree of regulation. An 
account of the collapse, in 1981, of the Norton Warburg group, a 
London firm of investment advisers and fund managers, indicates 
that even the large institutions are not immune from investing 
unwisely or making serious misjudgements.*0 Regulation here is 
thus concerned with the transparency of the market, and often 
takes the form of ’rules of conduct' regarding the behaviour of 
the market participants and preventing excessive speculation ie. 
conduct regulation. Nevertheless, regulation cannot eliminate the 
inherent element of riskiness in securities investment. It can, 
though, reduce some risks by making more information efficiently 
available to investors and by increasing public confidence in the 
integrity of the markets and of the participants therein.11 910
9. L.Gower "Review of investor protection" HMSO CMND 9125 at 
para. 1.16. In the 1930s, an English court declared that "the 
main object...is to secure that persons who carry on the 
business of dealing in securities shall be honest and of 
good repute, and in this way to protect the public from 
being defrauded" - Lymburn v Mayland (1932) AC 318 .
10. See M.Clarke "Regulating the City : competition, scandal and 
reform" (1986) Open University Press at p.102 .
11. See R.Schotland "An overview : new myths and old realities" 
an essay in L.Goldberg & L.White (eds) "The deregulation of 
the banking and securities industries" (1979) Lexington Books 
p.9-30 .
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Scandal ! :
Despite the accepted logic behind regulation, when enacted it is
often a defensive response to a perceived public outcry rather
than a planned form of social engineering. Scandal or the exposure
of fraud often performs a catalytic function, providing the
political impulse for new measures of investor protection or
market regulation, in order to restore the confidence of the . 12public in the market system. Thus regulation only becomes 
newsworthy when something goes wrong in the system. It is 
intrinsic to financial markets and to a financial centre, like the 
City of London, that they are prone to scandals. Their business is 
money, very large sums of it, much of it other people's, and some 
of it the State's money. Although some of its institutions perform 
financial functions that are simple and stable, the work of most 
is to perform complex and ever-evolving manipulations with money, 
so as to make it available to others on attractive terms, with a 
view to a profit or a fee. Such business inevitably gives rise 
both to fraudsters, whose object is to manipulate money for 
private ends, and to innovators who invent new manipulations, 
which may constitute a more efficient or otherwise desirable 
service, or no more than a sleight of hand and a quick profit. 
People do not really know what goes on in a financial centre like 
the City. There is a suspicion that there is less correlation 
between value added and profits and salaries there than there is 
in most other sectors of the economy. Thus, people doubt if 
activity there is very valuable, but so long as it does not 12
12. R.Ferguson & A.Page "The development of investor protection 
in Britain" (1984) 12 Int. Journal of the Sociology of law
287-305 at p.293 .
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interfere too much with what is going on in the rest of the
13economy, they are content to let it go on happening.
That is, until something goes wrong in the City. Then the basic 
mistrust of the financial community emerges and there are calls 
for reform, vociferous public debates, committees of inquiry and, 
frequently, scapegoats. The apparent victims of 'crime and
immorality' in financial services are identifiable and usually 
vocal. Ministers are obliged to appear concerned about them, if 
not, the politicians who oppose them will make political capital 
from their indifference.13 4 15The incentive, then, for regulators is 
to impose such comprehensive regulations that they will not 
personally be likely to be held responsible for future failures 
and failings during their own term of office. Since the eventual 
costs of regulation are borne by unidentifiable consumers,
taxpayers or voters in general, regulation will tend to be 
inflated into overregulation. This leads to the dilemma that too 
much law (ie.regulation) impairs the development and the
innovativeness of the markets, whereas too little law leads to 
further abuses and ultimately the perversion of the markets 
themselves.1  ^The problem is that public and political attention 
soon moves on elsewhere, and the responsible authorities and the 
regulated businesses are left to operate as efficiently as they 
can with the system presented to them.
13. See J.Kay "The forms of regulation" in C.Veljanovski (ed)
"Financial regulation - or over-regulation ?" (1988)
Institute of Economic Affairs, London p.33-42 .
14. See A.Seldon, in the Preface to "Financial regulation - or 
over-regulation ?" ibid p.vii-viii .
15. See Buxbaum & Hopt, supra chapter 3 note 8 at p.263.
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A series of scandals in the City of London in the late 1970s and
early 1980s was one of the reasons for the great changes in
regulation which have taken place there. They also led to the
passage of the first comprehensive law governing financial
regulation in Britain, the Financial Services Act. The current
structure of regulation in Britain derives very largely from the
contents of the Gower report. The terms of reference of the report
asked Professor Gower to consider what statutory protection might
be necessary for investors, without any suggestion that he review
the costs as well as the benefits of the exercise. In his
assessment. Professor Gower was conscious that it would be self-
defeating to impose regulations so severe that the costs grossly
outweighed any perceived benefits, or that were so strict that
they forced business to go overseas. But he rejected any cost-
benefit analysis of regulation on the grounds that "I am not
competent to undertake it and partly because I am sceptical about
its practicability".16 178Commentators point out that the complete
dismissal of any wider principled approach to regulation which
17incorporated fundamental economic understanding is unacceptable.
Regulation always has an opportunity cost and excessive or heavy-
handed regulation by whomsoever administered, can be distorting
and destructive in its effects. It is accepted that costing the
law is often an imperfect and controversial exercise but this does
18not justify ignoring it.
16. For this and the immediately following references, see Gower 
supra note 9 at paras. 1.15 & 1.16 .
17. See C.Veljanovski in the Introduction to "Financial 
regulation - or over-regulation ?" supra note 13 p.1-15 .
18. For a detailed discussion of this process, including its 
limitations, see G.Baldwin & C.Veljanovski "Regulation by 
cost-benefit analysis" (1984) 62 Public Admin. 51-69 .
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In addition, the Gower report contains several misconceptions
about the economics of financial markets. It claims that "there is
a tension between market efficiency and investor protection which
often pull in different directions" and that an efficient market
which is free from regulation "would not afford protection to
investors which anyone today would regard as adequate".It also
states that American studies of regulation generally reach the
conclusion that increased regulation has made no discernible
• • 19difference, one way or the other, to market efficiency.
Veljanovski contends that efficient markets by definition afford
. 20investors adequate protection, given the costs of protection. 
Indeed, Stigler claimed that "..efficient capital markets are the 
major protection of investors". The evidence from American 
studies of regulation, though still disputed, is generally quite 
the opposite to that stated by Gower. In his classic 1964 study, 
Stigler asked whether the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
(SEC) disclosure rules governing new issues of shares had led to 
any benefits to investors. Using statistical analysis, he was 
forced to conclude that the rules had no important effect on the 
quality of new securities sold to the public. In the light of the 
costs of these rules, the investor was worse off with investor 
protection legislation than without ! The details of the study 
are still controversial, some have even called it "a triumph of 1920
19. Supra note 9, at p.7 note 14 .
20. Supra note 17 at p.10 .
21. G.Stigler "Public regulation of the securities markets" 
(1964) Vol.37 no.2 The Journal of Business 117-142 at p.124 .
22. Ibid.
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23ideology over scholarship", but it is not an isolated
assessment. The balance of the American evidence, based on 
assessments of several industries and not just financial services, 
tends to show that regulation does not achieve its desired effects 
in protecting consumers and investors, but does impose significant 
costs on industry.
Gower was not entirely at fault for the approach he took, given 
his terms of reference, limited resources and professional company 
lawyer background. Moreover, while he presented his report as a 
blueprint for the reorganisation and improvement of investor 
protection, it has been contended that it was, in fact, used 
simply as a political exercise by the Thatcher government, its 
design being to manoeuvre City institutions into recognising the
O  A
need for formal public accountability. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the framework set down in the report provided the conceptual 
foundations for the Financial Services Act.
A role for economic analysis ? :
It is a pity then that those foundations show a total disregard 
for the economic realities of financial markets. Surely this is 
one area where economics has a direct and immediately relevant 
role ? It would seem logical that, in order to devise an efficient 
system of regulation, one should first obtain a thorough knowledge 234
23. I.Friend & E.Herman "The SEC through a glass darkly" (1964) 
37 The Journal of Business 382-405. For an overview of 
several of the studies in this area, see I.Friend "Economic 
and equity aspects of securities regulation", an essay in 
R.Lanzillotti & Y.Peles (eds) "Management under government 
intervention : a view from Mount Scopus" (1984) JAI Press 
Inc. p.31-58 •
24. See Clarke supra note 10 at p.118 .
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of these markets and their economic purpose and effects. There is 
a perennial conflict between the legal and economic approaches to 
investor protection and to regulation in general. The lawyer's 
acceptance or rejection of a practice will reflect his or her 
notion of the mutual fairness of a transaction between parties. 
The approach has overtones of fairness and morality and its 
substantial concern for justice may make him or her attend too 
little to what may be the costs of correcting perceived 
injustice. On the other hand, an economist's approach is 
characterised by its concern with social planning for the whole. 
Economists regard individuals as "a fungible commodity, each 
substitutable for another" and fairness concerns "the propriety of 
allocation of resources or income among large distinguishable 
bodies or groups of individuals". The economist's great ability 
in measurement may tend also to cause him or her to attend too 
little to the immeasurable. While lawyers may have too little 
scepticism about the efficacy of law, economists may have too 
little about the efficiency of markets.
It is my belief that an understanding of the functions of 
financial markets is a prerequisite to analysis of the regulation 
thereof. I shall concentrate on the theory relating to capital or 
securities markets and must acknowledge that the approach taken 
has been somewhat simplistic ! In addition, despite the 
theoretical progress that has been made in recent years, much of 
the details hereunder are still disputed. 256
25. H.Manne "Insider trading and the stock market" (1966) Free 
Press at p.3 . Manne, here, sets out his argument in favour 
of the legalisation of insider trading, which he contends has 
beneficial effects for the securities markets and their 
participants.
26. Ibid.
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Generally, the primary function of a capital market is to 
transform the savings of private individuals into the investment 
capital required by business enterprise. This process requires 
mediation between the interests of the investor and those of the 
company seeking long term capital. This capital market is known as 
the primary market and is where new issues of securities are 
traded. It should be distinguished from the secondary market, 
where existing securities are traded. Buxbaum & Hopt have
identified three ideal preconditions which are necessary for an
. 27optimally structured and efficient capital market. These are :
1. Institutional efficiency : the institutional efficiency of the
capital market requires that unhindered access to the market be 
guaranteed for capital providers and demanders, and that
flexibility in the various forms of capital investment is ensured. 
The market should also have the ability to absorb different 
investments and participants, flexibility of supply and demand 
and, of course, stability.
2. Operational efficiency : this addresses the costs of investment 
mediation and capital acquisition. It requires the minimisation of 
obstacles to transactions on secondary markets, where it is 
essential that turnover be rapid, cheap, free of fluctuations and 
transparent. The liquidity of the secondary market is important to 
primary market investors, because it enables them to dispose of 
their investments readily.
3. Allocational efficiency : a market is allocationally efficient 
when scarce resources are channelled to their most productive 
uses. Hence the market should efficiently transfer funds between 27
27. See Buxbaum & Hopt, supra chapter 3 note 8 at p.219 .
lenders and producers, by generating prices that continuously 
equate marginal rates of return for all lenders and borrowers.
These are the theoretical economic conditions for an efficient 
capital market system which should provide the framework for any 
evaluation of regulatory measures.
For economists, the primary rationale for regulation, along with
other elements of public policy towards industry, is to remedy
28various kinds of market failure. A market failure is a situation
in which the characteristics of transactions in a market differ
from like characteristics that are judged to be desirable from the
point of view of achieving certain objectives. As regards
financial markets, traditional analysis identifies two types of
market failure : externalities and information problems, notably
asymmetric information, A classical definition of externalities
predicts that they arise where one person, in the course of
rendering some service, for which payment is made, to a second
person, incidentally also renders services or disservices to other
persons, of such a sort that payment cannot be extracted from the
benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the
29injured parties. Externalities are therefore concerned with the 
social and private costs or benefits of the actions of economic 
agents (consumers or companies). Capital adequacy requirements are 
a response to one kind of externality in financial services. To 
elaborate, if a large number of depositors simultaneously 
attempted to withdraw their funds from a bank, there would be a 
risk that there would be insufficient funds to honour their 289
28. See J.Kay & J.Vickers "Regulatory reform in Britain" (1988) 7 
Economic Policy - a European forum 285-353 at p,301 .
29. See A.Pigou "The economics of welfare" (1932) Macmillan at 
p.183.
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claims. The resulting negative externality between depositors is 
clear, as each would end up scrambling for a slice of the 
available assets. Similarly, when an institution deals in 
contracts for future delivery, such as options, the market will 
suffer if doubts arise as to the institution's ability to honour 
the contracts if prices or circumstances move against it. Thus, 
capital adequacy requirements seek to ensure that there will be 
liquid funds available to cover every reasonable eventuality - for 
example, the different risk-related reserve requirements proposed 
by the draft Capital Adequacy directive (see chapter 3). Such 
measures, themselves, give confidence to depositors and options 
traders, which minimise the chance of a bank run or failure to 
honour a contract in the first place.
The second market failure is in the market for information. 
Mandatory disclosure of specified information is the usual 
regulatory response to this failure. Investment information is a 
public good - once published, its use does not diminish the total 
supply and individual users cannot exclude others from using it. 
The incentive to find out information is the ability to trade 
profitably on that information. Once acquired, a piece of 
information can be resold at very little cost, but incentives for 
discovery require that the originator of the information be 
rewarded at a higher level than the marginal cost of 
dissemination. As monopolistic exploitation of material 
information provides better returns than a free market sale, there 
is insufficient incentive for disssemination and so the well- 
informed participants may prefer to trade for their own account. 
The argument against disclosure regulation is that an unregulated 
market would provide an optimal amount of investment information. 
Potential buyers, such as private placees, would use their 
bargaining power to negotiate the disclosure of material 
information. Similarly, on the trading market, companies would
supply sufficient information to attract investor interest and 
satisfy the needs of recommending brokers and analysts. However, 
this argument overlooks the inefficiencies in the market for 
information, which interfere with the dissemination of information 
and thus justify a minimum disclosure requirement.
Asymmetric information problems are particularly prevalent in
financial services. It is very hard for many consumers to tell
directly whether their broker is offering honest, impartial advice
or favouring his own interests. It is equally difficult for them
to know whether their transactions have been executed on the best
available terms, or whether an institution with which they are
contemplating doing business maintains adequate margins of
solvency. For large institutions regularly engaging in substantial
transactions, the costs of establishing the quality of services
provided are probably of relatively little significance. However,
for smaller investors and companies, obtaining reliable
. 30assessments will frequently be impractical or costly. This 
explains why one of the economic rationale offered for investment 
institutions, such as unit trusts and pension funds, is the 
economies of scale in gathering and handling information offered 
by their large diversified portfolios.
Reputation is the market's own device for establishing quality of
services. It is a reliable guarantor of good behaviour where
conditions are such that the seller intends and wishes to be
involved in many repeated contracts with each individual 
31purchaser. This will be the case in wholesale markets where all 301
30. See Mayer, cited supra Introduction note 6 at p.xiv .
31. See C.Goodhart "The costs of regulation” in "Financial 
regulation - or over-regulation ?" supra note 13 at p.17-31 .
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involved are professionals and usually relatively well-informed. 
This contrasts with the small investor who often deals with the 
smaller intermediaries and is likely to be more inexperienced and 
less knowledgeable. The intermediary will have not have so much to 
risk from losing its reputation, and, in cases of fraudulent 
behaviour, may be consciously aiming to take the client's money 
and disappear with it. The sums invested by the smaller client, 
though small in value, may be a sizeable proportion of his total 
wealth, so a single case of bad behaviour by an intermediary could 
spell disaster for the client. Thus, a greater need for effective 
adequate disclosure may be identified at the retail market level, 
as opposed to the wholesale markets, where reputation has its own 
controlling effect. -
The obvious response to these information problems has been to
improve information flows by requiring more extensive disclosure
and the maximum transparency of market dealings. Disclosure is
most appropriate where the customer and others involved are
capable of assessing what is disclosed and of relating their
decisions to it, and where those responsible for the business in
question conduct their affairs in the knowledge that information
32relating thereto will be disclosed. The capacity of the customer 
to absorb information differs greatly according to his background 
and previous knowledge and this constitutes a decisive limit on 
disclosure's effectiveness. Not surprisingly, given the nature of 
the industry, disclosure is often only a formal procedure. Full 
disclosure disappears very rapidly when there actually is 32
32. See D.Walker "Regulation in financial markets" (1983) 23 Bank 
of England Quarterly Bulletin 499-501 . On disclosure 
generally, see B.Mercadal "Some thoughts on the disclosure 
approach to securities regulation" (1978) Journal of 
Comparative Corporate law & Securities Regulation 139-144 .
something interesting to be disclosed. It is only bodies which
have nothing adverse to disclose that actually comply quickly and
efficiently with the requirement. Disclosure documents are also
often written in a forbidding legal and accounting jargon and in
33the form of legally impeccable insurance policies. These are 
only comprehensible to experts and emphasise positive rather than 
negative information about the company. Mandatory disclosure may, 
however, create substantial savings for informed traders by 
collectivising some of the costs of acquiring, processing and 
verifying information that those traders would otherwise have 
expended.
Economists argue that the mere fact that market failure exists in 
a particular area, does not imply that the costs of remedying it 
by means of intervention are necessarily less than the costs of 
intervention. The fact that markets often fail in adequately 
supplying collective goods does not justify the presumption that 
government action can remedy the market failures, according to one 
observer.3 4 Thus, it is argued that a balance should be struck 
between the gains from intervention and regulation, and the costs 
of intervention.35 This is especially so in financial services, 
where increasing competition has squeezed margins and placed a 
premium on low cost methods of trading. The evidence suggests that
33. See R.Posner "Economic analysis of law" (1972) Little Brown & 
Co. at p.199 .
34. R.Bryant "International financial intermediation" (1987) The 
Brookings Institution at p.126 .
35. See Kay supra note 13 at p.40 .
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the price elasticity of demand for financial services is high.36 
Therefore, any increase in the financial burden created by 
regulatory costs is likely to have a greater influence on the 
volume of financial transactions than if such elasticities were 
low. A reduction in volume entails reduced liquidity in the 
marketplace and lessens its attractiveness to customers. In this 
light, one can appreciate the concern of economists in relation to 
the current regulatory system in Britain, namely that there was 
little economic analysis of the economic benefits to be obtained 
from the regulation, and even less of the costs of achieving its 
objectives.
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) :
This is in marked contrast to American analysis of securities law 
and financial regulation, to which I shall now turn. There, the 
economic consequences of laws are a prominent concern in the 
executive and judicial branches of government, and among those 
analysing the law. However, of all the recent developments in 
financial economics, one particular theory has captured the 
attention of the securities culture and achieved the widest 
acceptance by the legal culture. This is the ECMH. It now commonly 
informs the academic literature on a variety of topics. It 
structures debate over the future of securities regulation, both 
within and outside the SEC and has served as the intellectual 
premise for a major revision of the disclosure system administered
36. For example, see P.Jackson & G.O'Donnell "The effects of 
stamp duty on equity transactions and prices in the UK Stock 
Exchange" (1985) Bank of England Discussion Paper No.25 . See 
also H.Stoll "Regulation of securities markets : an
examination of the effects of increased competition" (1979) 
New York University, Monograph 2 .
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by the SEC, It has even begun to influence judicial decisions and
the actual practice of law. As Gilson & Kraakman put it, the ECMH
is now "the context in which serious discussion of the regulation
37of financial markets takes place". The ECMH merits investigation 
because the challenges posed to regulators,lawyers and economists 
by the regulation of European financial markets are no different 
from those encountered by their American contemporaries in 
relation to their markets.
The ECMH is the offspring of a series of studies made during the 
1950s and the 1960s, by economists and statisticians who examined 
the pattern of stock prices, hoping to predict future movements in 
price. They concluded that prices were random, in the sense that 
their correlations with past histories were too weak to be 
exploited profitably. This was contrary to the prevailing view 
that prices tended to follow certain waves or patterns, and that 
the investor who accurately identified these could profit from the 
certain knowledge that a price would rise or fall at a particular 
time.37 8 The ECMH answers the riddle of random price changes. It 
asserts that a securities market is efficient when prices fully 
reflect all available information relevant to their value. This 
implies that prices will adjust virtually instantaneously, and in 
an unbiased manner, to any new information released to an 
efficient market. Because no-one can predict new information, no- 
one can successfully forecast the direction or magnitude of future 
changes in prices. Thus the body of empirical evidence had found 
its causative theory.
37. R.Gilson & R.Kraakman "The mechanisms of market efficiency" 
(1984) 70 No.4 Virginia Law Review 549-644 at p.550 .
38. See L.Stout "The unimportance of being efficient" (1988) 87 
Michigan Law Review 613-709 - an excellent and informative 
appraisal of the topic, which I have relied on considerably.
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Markets are therefore described as efficiently reflecting a 
particular class of information, if it is so quickly incorporated 
into price that no-one can expect to make consistent profits 
trading on the basis of that piece of information. Efficiency can 
be expressed in three forms, which relate to different classes of 
information and facilitate the classification of empirical tests 
of price behaviour. Random walk price movement findings support 
the view that a market is efficient in the weak form, in the sense 
that prices fully reflect all information concerning past price 
movements and therefore the latter do not present trading 
opportunities. Semi-strong efficiency requires that prices 
incorporate other publicly available information as well, such as 
newspaper reports, required disclosures and dividend 
announcements. Studies here indicate that market prices react so 
quickly to this type of information that no investor can regularly 
profit by trading on it. Strong form efficiency exists if prices 
incorporate all relevant information, including non-public 
information. Tests here are restricted to identifying investors 
who are likely to possess such information and determining whether 
these traders consistently outperform the market. Results have 
been mixed, but corporate insiders, such as company directors, 
systematically do earn net returns higher than the market average. 
Mutual funds, however, appear to outperform the market only well 39
39. E.Fama is credited with first proposing this division of the 
ECMH in his review article "Efficient capital markets : a
review of theory and empirical work" (1970) 25 Journal of
Finance 383 .
[M
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. . . 40 enough to cover their administration and trading costs.
Of course, if the market was perfectly efficient, no stock would 
ever be mispriced and there would be no incentive for analysts to 
seek out new information. However, 100% efficiency is not to be 
expected. It would only be possible if there were no transaction 
costs in trading securities, costless access by all market 
participants to all available information and agreement by them as 
to the implications of such information for the current price and 
distributions of future prices of each security ie. homogenous 
expectations.^1 The significance of the ECMH lies in its 
prediction that, even though information is not immediately and 
costlessly available to all participants, the market will act as 
if it were. This produces the paradox that the market will only 
remain efficient if most participants believe it is not, and 
accordingly engage in the securities research necessary to create 
efficiency 1 Markets that are substantially efficient afford 
investors the opportunity to earn competitive positive returns 
from such securities research.
Evidence of the judicial acceptance of the fundamentals of the 
ECMH can be found in the American Supreme Court's decision in 
Basic Inc. v Levinson.^ Here the Court held that a plaintiff in a 4012
40. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37 at p.556 footnote 27 . The 
ECMH has indirectly led to a series of cases in America, 
where members of pension funds and similar institutions have 
sued the management for engaging in wasteful and unnecessary 
investment research. The reasoning behind the claims was that 
any information which the research might uncover would 
already have been incorporated in the market price.
41. See J.Gordon & L.Kornhauser "Efficient markets, costly 
information and securities research" (1985) Vol.60 No.5 New 
York Oniv.Law Review 761-849 .
42. Basic Inc. v Levinson 108 S.Ct 978 (1988).
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private securities fraud action need not have read the prospectus
in which a misstatement or omission occurred. For the plaintiff to
establish a presumption of reliance, all that is required is that
he establish that the misleading statement or omission affected
the market price of the security. This is known as the 'fraud on
the market' theory and it relies on the ECMH's assertion that the
price of a security will reflect all the information available to
the market. Thus, the fraud theory was considered by the Court to
be a desirable doctrine, because it expanded liability in a
fashion that promoted pricing efficiency and served the
congressional policy that markets operate "as indices of real 
43value". In this climate, American policymakers are no longer 
content to debate whether securities markets are informationally 
efficient to any particular degree, they now debate how they might 
be made more so. Improving efficiency has become a goal of
American securities policy, "on a par with more traditional goals
, 44
such as investor protection or fair and honest markets".
A critique of the ECMH :
A critical evaluation of the ECMH suggests that its importance may
be overestimated. Indeed, more recent economic research and
controversy about the hypothesis casts doubts on its empirical
45claims and theoretical underpinnings. Nevertheless, it still 
continues to influence legal decision making. Two key assumptions 
are necessary to the view that improving market efficiency should 
be an important goal of securities regulation. The first is that 
share prices in an efficient market accurately reflect the best 435
43. Ibid at p.989-991 .
44. Stout, supra note 38 at p.621 .
45. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 41 at p.764-765 .
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estimates of the financial prospects of the issuing company. The 
fundamental basis for valuation of a share is its expected future 
earnings. An efficient market price is therefore thought to 
measure rationally the worth of the share in terms of the present 
value of those earnings, discounted for nondiversifiable risk. In 
theory, this should facilitate investors in making optimal savings 
decisions. To make a good savings decision, an investor must know 
how much consumption he will get tomorrow for the consumption he 
gives up today. That is, he must know the financial returns of any 
security he purchases, namely the payout of dividends or interest 
and any capital gain or loss.4** The pricing mechanism should give 
the best indication of those future financial returns for an 
investor.
However, casual observation suggests that the stock market moves
up and down much more than can be justified by changes in
rationally formed expectations, or in the rates at which they are
discounted. This is supported by empirical research which has
shown that the valuation of companies has often drifted away from
estimated valuations based on the replacement costs of the firm's
actual capital assets and the present values of the future returns
47those assets could be expected to earn. This implies that market 
speculation multiplies the underlying variability of dividends and 
earnings. In effect, the price investors are willing to pay is 467
46. It is questionable whether individuals who put money into 
shares are, in fact, making a savings decision at all. The 
vast majority of household savings is concentrated not in the 
stock market, but in assets of reasonably reliable value, 
such as property, pension plans and interest bearing 
accounts.
47. See, for example, W.Brainard, J.Shoven & L.Weiss "The 
financial valuation of the return to capital" (1980) 2 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 453-502 .
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determined not by financial fundamentals but by their perception 
of how other investors value the stock ie. expected price changes 
in the near future. The point was perhaps best illustrated by 
Keynes in his 'beauty contest' analogy :
"Professional investment may be likened to those newspaper
competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six
prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to
the average preferences of the competitors as a whole ; so that
each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself
finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the
fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the
48problem from the same point of view."
Evidence for the claim that stock markets are irrational is found
in speculative 'bubbles', among the most notable of which were the
1929 American, and 1987 global, market crashes. In such a bubble,
prices rise to levels unsupported by potential earnings and then
drop in a short time to a fraction of their former value. Keynes
was thus forced to despair of investment based on genuine long
term expectation, and he concluded that there was no evidence that
the investment policy which is socially advantageous coincides
49with that which is most profitable. It seems that it is possible 
to have a market that is substantially informationally efficient, 
yet reflects share prices that are unrelated to their value as 
financial instruments. Therefore, measures aimed at increasing the 
market's speed in adjusting to information would appear to be 489
48. J.Keynes "The general theory of employment, interest and 
money" (1936) Harcourt Brace, New York. See pp.156-160 .
49. Ibid.
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unlikely to produce optimal savings decisions by individuals.
Firstly, because the rational investor will not rely completely on
the vagaries of the stock market to defer income to his later
years. Secondly, because it appears that investors do not make
investment decisions solely on the basis of the expected future
earnings of shares. Thirdly, financial theory predicts that
rational investors will diversify anyhow, and mispricing of
securities will only distort savings decisions of the portfolio
holding investor if all other securities are similarly 
50mispriced. Inefficient markets would be more likely to pose 
problems to investors if they increased the volatility of share 
prices or reduced their average returns. Inefficiency, if 
anything, is likely to reduce volatility because it implies that 
share prices will take longer to reflect new information. Market 
prices do not affect the returns on shares either. It is more 
likely to be fraud or mismanagement, for example, which reduce 
share returns.
The second assumption underlying the significance of efficiency to 
securities regulation relates to the allocative function of 
capital markets, and is known as the 'capital allocation theory'. 
It is argued that efficient stock prices serve allocational 
efficiency - the proper allocation of scarce resources among 
competing alternate uses. A market economy relies on its pricing 
mechanism to channel goods and services to their most highly 
valued use. Thus, mispriced securities would misallocate 
resources, because stock prices influence the production, 
distribution and consumption of goods and services. This is, 
perhaps, the most compelling justification raised in support of 
the pursuit of informationally efficient markets. However, unlike 50
50. See Stout, supra note 38 at pp.669-671 and p.684 .
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most goods and services distributed by the economy, stocks have no 
intrinsic value. They are only instruments representing other, 
possibly valuable, rights. The connection between stock prices and 
the allocation of real resources is therefore inherently 
uncertain. The capital allocation theory was developed in response 
to this uncertainty, to explain the economic effects of stock 
prices.51 523
The first flaw in the capital allocation theory, is that an
appraisal of the realities of corporate financing behaviour
illustrates that equity issues play a negligible role in corporate
financing. Companies relatively rarely rely on equity issues for
funding. In the 1970s, for instance, new equity accounted for only
526% of corporate funding in America, and less than 4% in Britain.
These figures may have increased somewhat in the 1980s, but a
recent study of the financing patterns of British and German
companies between 1982 and 1988 indicated a continuance in this 
53trend. The vast majority of funding, in both countries, came 
from internal resources and bank borrowing. The insignificant role 
of funding in stock markets is most likely due to tax measures 
favouring debt borrowing and to the high costs of raising equity 
capital. Stock prices also have little influence in relation to 
the availability and cost of the other, more commonly used sources 
of capital for companies. A company which is highly valued by the 
stock market may find it easier to borrow money than if its share 
price was depressed. This will be because the same optimistic 
information that led the market to view the firm's prospects 
favourably will also make the firm an attractive lending
51. See Stout, supra note 38 at p.642 .
52. See Mayer, cited supra in the Introduction note 6 at p.xi .
53. C.Mayer & I.Alexander, supra chapter 3 note 3 .
-137-
proposition. In assessing a company’s creditworthiness, a banker 
will prefer to measure the risk by comparing the outstanding debt 
of the company to the value of its underlying assets, rather than 
to the 'value’ represented by the stock market price of its 
shares.
A further flaw in the capital allocation theory is that the funds 
that companies receive when they do sell equity are not determined 
by prices in the trading market. They are set in negotiations 
between the issuers and institutions with whom the equity is being 
placed, or between the issuers and the underwriters of the issue. 
There are two forms of new public equity issue. The more frequent 
is a flotation, when a privately held company ’goes public’ for 
the first time. The other method is used when a company, which has 
already issued shares to the public which are traded on the 
market, decides to raise additional capital by making a further 
issue. Commonly, when either such issue is made, the new equity is 
first sold on a private market, the underwriting market, where 
underwriters purchase the entire issue at a negotiated price and 
then sell it directly to the public. In a flotation, there is 
obviously no existing stockmarket price to assist in deciding the 
issue price. Underwriters may consider the prices of shares of 
comparable companies trading in the same sector, but they can only 
be of minimal guidance, because the factors relevant to share 
pricing are numerous and vary from company to company. When a 
public company seeks additional capital, the underwriters may 
refer to the current trading price. This is likely to function 
purely as a ceiling above which the offer price to the public 
should not rise. This is because issuing large amounts of stock 
usually increases the supply available on the market and, in the 
absence of a corresponding increase in demand, will depress the 
price below prior trading levels. To this extent, efficient 
trading prices help underwriters accurately price this type of
issue. To the extent that such issues affect the allocation of 
capital among the firms that use them, an informationally 
efficient market will therefore help to properly allocate 
capital.54 5 However, if the logic concerning the contribution of 
informationally efficient markets to capital allocation was to 
prevail, then regulatory measures would be aimed at making prices 
in the underwriting market for new issues more efficient, rather 
than those in the trading market.
The goal of efficient trading markets has also been supported (or 
defended) on the grounds that market prices can determine who owns 
a company. The so called ‘market for corporate control theory' 
asserts that in an efficient market, hostile takeover offers can 
direct control of the company from unprofitable management to more 
effective owners. The theory focuses on the impact of 
management's competence on stock price which 'should’ reflect the 
expected earnings of the company. Good management should be able 
to extract optimum profits from a company and this will support 
the share price. When a bidder offers to buy a company at a price 
higher than the market price, the bidder must believe that under 
its control the company will have higher earnings than at present. 
Inefficient share prices would distort the functioning of this 
market for control. A bidder might offer to pay a premium over 
market price for an inefficiently priced firm, even if it did not 
think it could run the business better itself - the undervaluation 
by the market would be sufficient to make the target a bargain. 
Thus, a takeover bid will often mobilise enough investment to 
raise the price of the target's shares to levels much closer to
54. See Stout, supra note 38 pp.650-656 .
55. See generally, F.Easterbrook & D.Fischel "The proper role of 
a target's management in responding to a takeover offer" 
(1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 1161-1204 .
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the fundamental valuation of the underlying assets. This is itself 
an indictment of the efficiency of markets in accurately pricing 
shares.
A bidder may act for reasons unrelated to efficiency# but stemming 
instead from internal power or prestige reasons, or from the easy 
availability of credit.56 57 The theory also overlooks the fact that 
the marginal price of shares in the trading market rarely 
determines whether a takeover will occur. In practice# the 
successful bidder must pay a substantial premium over the 
prevailing market price, this being the average price necessary to 
induce all, or the majority, of the shareholders to part with 
their shares. At most, the market price will perform a signalling 
function by suggesting a 'floor' for the final offer price, but it 
cannot dictate what the successful offer price will be. That will 
be set in the market for corporate control and, in this instance, 
it is the price mechanism in this market which has the important 
allocative role.5^ It is difficult to imagine a more significant 
allocative decision than who owns and controls a company. If 
efficiency of pricing is to be pursued, it would be be better to 
consider it in the context of this particular market.
Therefore, it can be argued that stock markets have far less 
allocative importance than has been assumed. If efficient share 
pricing contributes only marginally to allocation of resources, 
and share prices cannot be considered to be good indicators of the 
intrinsic value of the shares themselves, then the value of
56. R.Buxbaum "Federal aspects of corporate law and economic 
theory" an essay in T.Daintith & G.Teubner (eds) "Contract 
and organisation : legal analysis in the light of economic 
and social theory" (1986) Walter de Gruyter p.274-292 .
57. See Stout, supra note 38 at p.692 .
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pursuing informational efficiency as a goal of securities markets 
is questionable. Efficient stock markets require effective 
distribution of large amounts of information and a trading system 
which can incorporate that information into stock prices. Neither 
comes cheaply. Arguably, the costs of improved efficiency have not 
been balanced by proportionate benefits, and thus the "legal rush 
to embrace and apply" the ECMH, may have been overly precipitous
c o
and unwise. This is not intended to belittle the role of 
economics in questions of securities policy. The theory emphasises 
the significance of information to securities markets and presents 
a forum for critical analysis of disclosure policies and other 
information related measures. This American experience is useful 
as an example of the interplay between economic analysis and legal 
policy making. It illustrates the need for regulators to 
thoroughly analyse the objectives of their regulatory measures and 
the means of carrying them out, both from a legal and an economic 
perspective.
Are the stock markets for gamblers or for investors ? :
In the light of the questionable importance of their evaluative 
and allocative roles, the social value of secondary trading in
58. Gordon & Kornhauser supra note 41 at p.764 .
59. Information matters have been the source of recent heated 
discussions at the London Stock Exchange, in relation to the 
rule that delayed for 24 hours the compulsory disclosure of 
the prices at which large share transactions were completed. 
The Office of Fair Trading claimed that this rule deprived 
the market of information and that the resulting loss of 
transparency diminished pricing efficiency. In addition, it 
felt that the rule increased uncertainty and led to higher 
dealing costs for investors and the loss of liquidity in the 
stock market. See R.Waters "LSE rule criticised as anti­
competitive" Financial Times 1/5/1990 p.20 .
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financial markets may be doubted. Since the earnings prospects of 
the company whose assets are being traded, and indeed the 
fundamental value of the assets themselves, are unaffected by such 
secondary trading, such trading cannot create wealth, it can only 
redistribute it.®^ The resources used in this exercise are 
therefore largely wasted, which is a net loss to society. The 
argument has been extended to the financial system as a whole. 
Fears have been expressed that it is absorbing scarce resources, 
specifically in the form of intelligent, managerial-quality 
labour, and that the apparent rewards available in the system have 
diverted energy and resources from other sectors. These resources, 
it is contended, are being thrown into financial activities that 
are remote from the production of goods and services and generate 
high private rewards, disproportionate to their social 
productivity. They favour short term position taking in contrast 
to long term wealth creation. This is why it seems plausible to 
say that the majority of transactions on the trading markets 
involve simply a reshuffling of existing assets between the 
portfolios of professional dealers. In addition, Tobin argues that 
computer technology is being harnessed not to carry out 
transactions more economically, but to balloon the quantity and 
variety of financial exchanges.^1
In its defence, it is wrong to denigrate stock market trading as 
pure gambling. The financial system, as a whole, allows 
individuals and households considerable facilities to shift the 
time pattern of their spending and consumption. It facilitates 
them in achieving their needs and preferences, rather than having
60. See C.Goodhart, supra chapter 1 note 15 at p.11-13 .
61. See J.Tobin "On the efficiency of the financial system" 
(1984) 153 Lloyds Bank Review 1-15 .
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to slavishly conform to the time profile of their earnings. It 
enables individuals to trade earnings in their productive years 
for consumption in retirement. Futures markets allow businesses to 
hedge against events that might alter the prices of commodities 
they will be buying or selling. Capital markets enable fundamental 
risks of business enterprise to be taken by the adventurous, while 
risk averters content with lower average returns, are protected 
from many possible sources of loss. The negotiability of 
securities traded in financial markets provides liquidity to the 
individual investor, who can therefore alter and structure his 
investment portfolio as he sees fit. The secondary markets are an 
integral part of the system itself, of which each component part 
is essential to and compliments the other. A market system which 
enables people to satisfy their revealed wants, which clearly 
include trading in financial assets (even if it is only mere 
speculation), as efficiently and cheaply as possible, should add 
to general welfare. Even if secondary trading was no more than 
pure gambling, there would still be a case for having it provided 
competitively and efficiently rather than by a high cost 
oligopoly.62
Summary :
Regulation of financial markets is clearly a melting pot in which 
different disciplines, varying versions of capitalism and 
alternate legislative strategies constantly simmer. I have 
attempted to analyse the subject with an economic perspective in 
mind. Economists have always maintained that it is possible to 
study the effects of public policies and not merely to assume that 
they exist and are beneficial. Under this scrutiny, regulation has
62. See Goodhart, supra chapter 1 note IS at p.12
!f
f
?
i
-143-
often been seen to be sorely lacking. The normal pattern is that 
market failure provides the rationale for the introduction of 
regulation, but the scope of the regulation is then extended to a 
wide range of matters which are the subject of general interest, 
regardless of whether there is any element of market failure or 
not.®"* The economists' concern is that the process of regulatory 
legislation all too often fails to be informed by much economic 
analysis or input. The legislation has often seemed to flow from a 
public revulsion from some kind of practice, with little 
assessment of its actual social costs, which is then enacted 
against in a quite general way. Even if a regulatory measure is an 
appropriate response when first implemented, a solution to today's 
problem is an admission ticket to new problems, particularly on 
the ever changing stage of financial services. Therefore, a 
balanced analysis of any regulation must evaluate its costs and 
side effects, not merely its intended benefits, and must subject 
it to periodic re-evaluation. As Stigler said : "Public policy 
should serve proper goals, and do so efficiently - this is a 
statement of the problem. To solve the problem by definition is 
impossible. The only defensible solution is to use our general 
economic theory, which, for all its deficiencies is our most 
tested and reliable instrument for relating policy to 
effects...".
A new wave of regulation, modifying existing measures or 
introducing new ones, will be required as a result of the efforts 
at the European Community level to regulate activities on stock 
markets and the provision of financial services in general, 
throughout Europe, Hopefully, some of the foregoing thoughts will
63. See J.Kay & J.Vickers "Regulatory reform : an appraisal" a 
contribution to "Deregulation or re-regulation ?", supra note 
3 at p.223-251.
64. G.Stigler supra note 21 .
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be reflected in the approach taken to the regulatory legislation 
to be adopted by the member states. If not, the danger exists that 
excessive regulation and intervention will distort competition and 
raise costs in the markets, thus reducing their attractiveness and 
discouraging participation therein.
J
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CONCLÜSION :
The European financial services industry is in a state of flux. It 
can no longer afford to remain protected and fragmented, shackled 
by internal bickering and obsessed with nationalistic concerns. It 
has the opportunity to emerge from behind the shadows of America 
and Japan, and assert itself as an independent financial power, 
speaking with one authoritative voice. To do this, it will be 
necessary to build on the strengths of the industry while 
acknowledging its weaknesses, to respect the diversity of its 
markets and to exploit the expertise of its participants.
While healthy competition between and within the financial markets 
can only be a positive development for all concerned, the 
attractiveness of those markets to non-European businesses must 
not be ignored. It is possible that competition in the future will 
lead to a concentration of trading on one or a few markets, 
gradually turning the rest into peripheral regional exchanges, 
specialised in small-sized domestic companies. Alternatively, 
intensive competition could continue between the principal 
markets, to the detriment of smaller exchanges and outside 
businesses. As yet, individual stock exchanges have not resorted 
to specialisation, but their future might well lie in the 
exploitation, by each market, of its comparative advantages, and 
the concentration of its efforts on particular segments of its 
clientele.1 Such an approach would be completely reliant on the
1. See M.Pagano & A.Roell "Trading systems in European stock 
exchanges : current performance and policy options (1990) 10
Economic Policy - a European forum 63-115.
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ability of both service providers and consumers to move themselves 
and their money freely within the Community.
The securing of such mobility is the goal of the institutions of 
the European Community, who, in preparing legislation for this 
sector, have sought to establish the necessary conditions of a 
free market in financial services, while relying on the financial 
industry to create the sufficient conditions. To legislate for 
the industry is, indeed, a difficult task, and one which has been 
complicated by the blurring of the traditional demarcation lines 
between the once separate and distinct businesses and institutions 
involved therein. National authorities no longer preside over 
basically segregated financial markets, with supervision carried 
out along institutional lines. The changes in the pattern of 
financial intermediation require that regulation, not to mention 
the regulators, be more sophisticated and sensitive to the 
competing interests within the market. For example, the second 
Banking directive, by implication, imposed the 'universal* banking 
model on the Community, but the Investment Services directive is 
perceived as its essential counterpart, being necessary to redress 
the balance and ensure that the mythical level playing field is 
accessible by all enterprises competing in the provision of 
investment services.
The Commission and the Council have been seen to be in favour of 
deregulation, in the sense of the liberalisation of financial 
markets, but they simultaneously advocate their immediate re­
regulation, to ensure that investors are protected and to preserve 
the stability of the financial system in general. This is entirely
2. See F.Maude in the Foreword to "1992 - The Single European 
Market (1988) IFR Publishing Ltd. p.9-10.
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praiseworthy in the current climate, which features among its 
characteristics, fierce competition, share price volatility and 
the ever present threat of another big, fraud, insider trading or 
share support scandal. My concern is that the Community 
institutions, in concentrating on the minimum harmonisation of 
essential prudential standards, and favouring the mutual 
recognition of national regulatory controls and supervision, may 
not have gone far enough. To ensure that mutual recognition works, 
a greater degree of harmonisation which can ensure a more stable, 
competitive and equitable market, may be necessary. The demands of 
the 1992 timetable, while accelerating the Community efforts in 
this field, may ultimately jeopardise their prospects of success.
Much will depend on the approach of the member states to the 
implementation of the Community directives. The onus will be on 
them to implement and apply the directives in a manner which opens 
up their national markets, without enacting disguised 
protectionist measures in the guise of compliance legislation. In 
an ideal world, a reasoned approach to the legislation, which opts 
for the most economically effective means of implementation, would 
be selected. The simple axiom, suggested by Breyer for creating 
and implementing any regulatory programme, would be utilised. This 
states that first the objectives of the regulation are determined, 
then the alternative methods of achieving them are examined and 
finally, the best method for doing so is chosen. If only it were 
so straightforward 1 Nonetheless, in framing implementing 
measures, account should be taken of the costs of such legislation 
to ensure that they are at least proportionate to the benefits 
which it seeks to achieve. Although the impetus for this
3. See S.Breyer "Regulation and its reform" (1982) Harvard 
University Press at p.5.
I[
1
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legislation will have come from the Community 1992 programme, it 
should not prevent the adoption of a transparent, costed approach 
by the member states.
After 1992, the Commission will need to be ruthless in its 
detection of instances of non-compliance or disregard of the 
Community legislation, and should not hesitate to resort to the 
Court of Justice to seek redress in the form of legal remedies 
against the offending member state or organisation. The deterrent 
effect of such surveillance, if well-publicised and sufficiently 
absorbed by the financial community, could help develop a greater 
degree of Euro-consciousness therein. When acting in this 
capacity, the Commission will often encounter national regulatory 
authorities, who traditionally have resented such interference. Of 
late however, the Community stock exchanges for instance, have 
attempted to present a more unified front to the Commission, but 
their tendency to pursue their own expansionist plans while 
disregarding the benefits of increased integration and cooperation 
will not disappear overnight. This emphasises the need for greater 
international coordination between regulatory and supervisory 
authorities, in particular in the securities sector, where 
international venues for communication and the exchange of 
information are in no way as established and productive as they 
are in the field of banking. So much financial services business 
is now done internationally, in different currencies and across 
national and regulatory frontiers, that cooperation among national 
authorities is almost a pre-condition to effective supervision at 
a domestic level.
What will be the implications of all these developments for 
customers for financial services ? It is generally accepted that 
most change will be seen in the retail services market. The 
wholesale markets, due to the international and mobile nature of
J
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their participants, have developed their own momentum towards 
integration, and most of the economies of scope and scale offered 
by an integrated European market have already been exploited 
therein. Retail markets present a different scenario. Much has 
been said and many figures quoted, about the opportunities that 
will be presented to the retail customer by the opening up of the 
markets, and about the important role to be played throughout by 
consumer protection. These benefits should not be exaggerated 
however, because local tastes and customs are likely to remain for 
a long time to come. The reason why demand for many financial 
products varies across the Community is mainly because of 
differences in preferences, habits, language, culture and incomes 
which will be wholly unaffected by 1992. It is possible that there 
are as many customary barriers to pull down as there are legal or 
structural ones. In this context, Kay argues that economic 
integration is about the creation of greater product diversity
within national markets, not about the elimination of product
, 4
diversity in international markets.
For these reasons, firms would be unwise to dismiss the benefits 
of geographical specialisation and local knowledge. An Italian 
insurer will know Italy and its insurance market better than a 
Danish one - he can make better estimates of local risks. 
Similarly a Greek banker might be a better judge of a Greek 
citizen's creditworthiness than a French banker. Established firms 
have the benefit of consumer recognition and familiarity, a form 
of goodwill which has to be developed over time. In addition, 
there will always be the problem of tradition to be overcome. Will 
Germans, for instance, want to entrust their hard earned savings
4. See J.Kay "Myths and realities" in "1992 Myths and Realities" 
(1989) London Business School pp.1-28 .
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to "foreign" businesses, or will they be prepared to shop around 
for the best value or the best terms available, irrespective of 
the product origin ? Arguably, there would be greater scope for 
national loyalty when an Italian buys a car than when a Spaniard 
takes out a bank loan, but that Spaniard might feel more secure 
knowing his money is in the hands of a local, familiar bank than 
with a strange sounding, newly arrived foreign bank. It is 
difficult to predict just how the 'European' retail consumer will 
react to the possibilities that may be opened up to him by the 
single market.
If financial products were assimilable to goods or merchandise, 
then their retailers could justifiably hope to change consumer 
behaviour through a combination of market research and extensive 
advertising campaigns in target host countries, in the belief that 
tastes and habits would be amenable to alteration by successful 
marketing. In theory this may be possible for the retailing of 
financial services : the Investment Services directive facilitates 
the advertising of services by authorised firms in host member 
states through all available means of communication, but makes 
this freedom subject to any rules governing the form and content 
of such advertising adopted in the general good therein. In 
practice, barriers erected by traditional habits and experience 
will continue to obstruct efforts by potential new participants to 
enter markets. As an example, British firms usually sell unit 
trusts through competitive newspaper advertisements, whereas West 
German law does not permit advertising that compares the 
performance of various unit trusts, and banks are the most 
frequent sales points. To what extent will the advent of the 
internal market in financial services change this ? Rather than
5. See The Economist, cited supra in the Introduction note 3.
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attempting to change established practices in Germany, a British 
firm, determined to secure a foothold in the market, is more 
likely to seek to form a link with a German bank, thus securing an 
outlet through which it can offer its services and its products 
can be distributed#
Davis provides a very good example of how financial services firms
0
can and have circumvented such customary and practical barriers. 
He refers to the relationship between Gouda, a Dutch insurance 
company, and Endsleigh, a British insurance retailer, whose 
principal market lies in insuring student possessions and travel. 
Endsleigh sells insurance to students in Britain, but covers them 
with policies that are taken out in The Netherlands. It is obvious 
that Gouda would face a much harder marketing task, if it
attempted to sell direct to the British market from the 
Netherlands. The value which Endsleigh creates is in vouching or 
warranting the quality of a Dutch company to British individuals
who have probably never heard of it, and are most unlikely to
bother to try to find out about it.
This experience suggests that direct exporting of services is 
unlikely to be attractive to market participants in retail 
services. It is more likely that small scale acquisition of, or 
close cooperation with, existing enterprises in host member
states, may be the way forward for those firms with a stake in the 
retail market. A concrete example of such a manoeuvre was the link 
up between the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Spanish bank Banco 
Santander. Under this arrangement, Santander took a 10%
6. Supra chapter three note 40 at p.80 .
7. See D.Lascelles "Resources pooled to tackle Europe" Financial 
Times 25/9/1989 .
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shareholding in the Royal Bank and the latter took a 2.5% interest 
in Santander. Santander also intended to make a long term loan to 
its new partner of $200m. Since the deal was finalised, the two 
partners have set up branch sharing arrangements, exchanged 
personnel and launched a number of joint ventures in areas like 
franchising and venture capital. Their aim is to pool the 
resources of two medium sized European banks, to tackle the EC 
single market more forcefully than they could on their own. It 
will be interesting to see if this was just the first in a long 
line of similar collaborations, aimed at seducing the post 1992 
European consumer of financial services.
These are clearly exciting times for the European financial 
services industry and all involved therein. It is difficult to 
predict with any conviction the shape the marketplace will take in 
the near future. Indeed, it is misleading to speak of a 
marketplace, which until recently meant exactly the physical 
entity that the name suggests. A modern securities market is 
defined by aspects such as the set of agents to whom information 
is disseminated, the trading and settlement mechanisms, the 
regulatory structure and the range of instruments traded. This 
difficulty is exacerbated by the capacity which the markets have 
shown for adopting to changing trading conditions and to 
innovative developments. The former are generally the product of a 
combination of external circumstances, and the latter will only be 
limited by the extent of man's own guile and ingenuity.
:i
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COMMISSION
Amended proposal for a council directive on investment services in the securities Held 
(Submitted by the Commwion on 8 February 1990)
(9 0 /C  42/C6)
I THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,I
j Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
| Economic Community, and in particular Article 57 
| thereof,
I
| Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
j In cooperation with the European Parliament,
Ij Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and I
I Social Committee,
Whereas this Directive is to constitute an instrument 
which is essential for achieving the internal market, a 
course determined by the Single European Act and set 
out in timetable form in the Commission's White Paper, 
from the point of view of both freedom of establishment 
and freedom to provide financial services, in the field of 
investment firms;
Whereas the approach which has been adopted is to 
achieve only the essential harmonization necessary and 
sufficient to secure the mutual recognition of authori­
zation and of prudential supervision systems, making 
possible the granting of a single authorization 
recognized throughout the Community and the 
application of the principle of home Member State 
prudential supervision;
Whereas it is necessary for reasons of fair competition, 
to ensure that non-bank investment firms benefit from 
similar freedom to create branches and provide services 
across frontiers as that provided for by the second 
Council Directive on the coordination of laws, regu­
lations and administrative provisions relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions;
Whereas the principles of mutual recognition and of 
home Member State control require the competent autho­
rities of each Member State not to grant authorization 
or to withdraw it where factors such as the activities 
programme, the geographical distribution or the acti­
vities actually ^carried on make it quite d ear that an 
investment firm has opted for the legal system of one 
Member State for the purpose of evading the stricter 
standards in force in another Member State in which it 
intends to carry on or carries on the greater part of its 
activities; whereas, for the purposes of this Directive, an 
investment firm which is a legal person shall be autho­
rized in the Member State in which it has its registered 
office; whereas the Member States must require that the 
head office be situated in the same Member State as the 
registered office;
Whereas it is also necessary and appropriate to liberalize 
access to membership of stock exchange and financial 
futures and options markets in host Member States for 
investment firms authorized to carry out the relevant 
services in their home Member States;
Whereas responsibility for supervising the financial 
soundness of an investment firm will, rest with the 
competent authorities of its home Member State and 
whereas to permit this responsibility to be assumed fully 
by such competent authorities a further Directive will be 
necessary to coordinate rules in the area of market risk;
Whereas the home Member State may also establish 
rules stricter than those laid down in Articles 3, *, 10, 11 
and 20 for investment firms authorized by its competent 
authorities;
Whereas, by virtue of mutual recognition, the approach 
chosen permits investment firms authorized in their 
home Member States to carry on, throughout the 
Community, any or all of the activities listed in the 
Annex by establishing branches or by providing services;.
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Whereas the carrying-on of activities not listed in the 
Annex shall be governed by the general provisions of the 
Treaty concerning the right of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services;
W hereas, the host Member State may, in connection 
with the exercise of the right of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services, require compliance with 
specific provisions of ¡is own national laws or regulations 
on the part of firms not authorized as investment firms 
in their home Member States and with regard to acti­
vities not listed in the Annex provided that, on the one 
hand, such provisions are compatible with Community 
law and are intended to protect the general good and 
that, on the other hand, such firms or such activities are 
not subject to equivalent rules under the legislation or 
regulations of their home Member States;
W hereas the Member States must ensure that there are 
no obstacles to carrying on activities receiving mutual 
recognition in the same manner as in the home Member 
State, as long as the latter do not conflict with legal 
provisions protecting the general good in the host 
Member State;
W hereas the procedures for the authorization of 
branches of investment firms authorized in third 
countries wilt continue to apply to such firms; whereas 
those branches will not enjoy the freedom to provide 
services under the second paragraph of Article 59 of the 
Treaty or the freedom of establishment in Member Sûtes 
other than those ¡n which they are esublished; whereas, 
however, requests for the authorization of subsidiaries or 
of the acquisition of holdings made by undertakings 
governed by the laws of third countries are subject to a 
procedure intended to ensure that Community 
investment firms receive reciprocal treatment in the third 
countries in question;
W hereas, the authorizations granted to investment firms 
by the competent national authorities pursuant to this 
Directive will have Community-wide, and no longer 
merely nation-wide, application, and whereas existing 
reciprocity clauses will henceforth have no effect; 
whereas a flexible procedure is therefore needed to make 
it possible to assess reciprocity on a Community basis; 
whereas the aim of this procedure is not to close the 
Community’s financial markets but rather, as the 
Communie) intends to keep its financial markets open to 
the rest o f the world, to improve the liberalization of the 
global financial markets in third countries; whereas, to 
that end, this Directive provides for procedures for nego­
tiating with third countries and, as a last resort, for the 
possibility o f taking measures involving the suspension of 
new applications for authorization or the restriction of 
new authorizations;
Whereas the smooth operation of the internal market in 
investment services will require not only legal rules but 
also close and regular cooperation between the
competent authorities of the Member States; whereas for 
the consideration of problems concerning individual 
investment firms the Contact Committee constituted 
under this Directive is the most appropriate forum; 
whereas that committee is a suitable body for the mutual 
exchange of information provided for in this Directive;
Whereas that mutual information procedure will not in 
any case replace the bilateral collaboration established by 
this Directive; whereas the competent host Member State 
authorities can, without prejudice to their powers of 
control proper, continue, either in an emergency, on 
their own initiative or following the initiative of the 
competent home Member State authorities, to verify that 
the activities of an investment firm established within 
their territories comply with the relevant laws and with 
the principles of sound administrative and accounting 
procedures and adequate internal control;
/
Whereas technical modifications to the detailed rules laid 
down in this Directive may from time to time be 
necessary to take account of new developments in the 
investment services sector; whereas the Commission shall 
accordingly make such modifications as are necessary, 
after consulting the committee constituted under this 
Directive.
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
TITLE I
Definitions and scope
Article I
For the purpose of this Directive:
1. credit institution shall mean a credit institution as 
defined with the first indent of Article 1 of Council 
Directive 7 7 /7 8 0 /E E C  (') other than the institutions 
referred to in Article 2 (2) thereof;
2. investment service shall mean any of the services 
relating to any of the instruments set out in the list 
in the Annex;
3. investment firm  shall mean any natural or legal 
person whose business it is to provide any investment 
service;
4. home Member State shall mean:
(a) where the investment firm is a natural person, 
the Member State where that person has his 
principal place of business;
(l) OJ No L 322, 17. 12. 1977, p. 30.
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<b) »here the investment firm is a legal person, the TITLE II
Member State where ns registered office is
situated or if it has no registered office then the Harmonization of authorization conditions
Member State where its head office is situated;
Article 3
5. host Member State shall mean the Member State 
where an investment firm has a branch or in which it 
supplies services;
6. branch shall mean a place of business which forms a 
legally dependent part of an investment firm and 
which provides an investment service for which the 
investment firm has been authorized;
7. qualifying holding shall mean a direct or indirect 
holding in an investment firm which represents 10 °/o 
or more of the capital or of the voting rights or 
which makes it possible to exercise a significant 
influence over the management of the investment 
firm in which a holding subsists.
For the purpose of this definition, in the context of 
Articles 4 and 10 and of the other levels of holding 
referred to in Article 10, the voting rights referred to 
in Article 7 of Council Directive 8 8 /6 2 7 /E E C  ( l) 
shall be taken into consideration;
8. parent undertaking shall mean a parent undertaking 
as defined in Articles 1 and 2 of Council Directive 
8 3 /3 4 9 /E E C  (* );
9. subsidiary shall mean a subsidiary undertaking as 
defined in Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 
8 3 /3 4 9 /E E C ; any subsidiary of a subsidiary under­
taking shall also be regarded as a subsidiary of the 
parent undertaking which is at the head of those 
undertakings;
10. members o f  a stock exchange or organized market shall 
mean any natural or legal person recognized by the 
relevant authorities of each organized market o f the 
said country and placed under their supervision.
Article 2
This Directive shall apply to all investment firms. 
However, only Articles 9 (2 ), 11 and 13 shall apply to  
investment firms that are credit institutions authorized by 
their banking licence to engage in securities business.
{') OJ No L 348, 17. 12. 1988, p. 62.
(*) OJ No L 193, 18. 7. 1983, p. |.
1. Investment firms sha.il obtain authorization in their 
home Member State before commencing to provide 
investment services. Such authorization shall be granted 
by the home Member State’s competent authorities 
designated in accordance with Article 17. Following the 
granting of authorization the investment service in 
question may be engaged in forthwith by the investment 
firm, together with any activities that are ancillary 
thereto.
2. Without prejudice to other conditions of general 
application laid down by national law, the competent
authorities shall not grant authorization unless: 
t
—  the investment firm has sufficient initial capital in 
accordance with the rules prescribed in Directive . . .  
having regard to the nature of the investment service 
in question,
—  the persons who effectively direct the business of the 
' investment firm are of sufficiently good repute and
experience.
3. Member States shall also require applications for 
authorization to be accompanied by a programme of 
operations setting out inter alia the types of business 
envisaged and die' structural organization of the 
investment firm.
4. The applicant shall be notified within three months 
of submission of a complete application whether or not 
authorization is granted. Reasons shall be given 
whenever an authorization is refused. If no decision is 
notified within six months of submission of the complete 
application this shall be deemed to be a refusal.
5. The competent authorities may withdraw the autho­
rization issued to an investment firm subject to this 
Directive only where the investment firm:
(a) does not make use of the authorization within 12 
months, expressly renounces the authorization or has 
ceased to engage in investment business for mor than 
six months, if the Member State concerned has made 
no provision for the authorization to lapse in such 
cases:
(b) has obtained the authorizauon through false 
statements or any other irregular means;
(c) no longer fulfils the conditions under which 
authorization was granted;
(d) no longer possesses sufficient financial resources or 
can no longer be relied upon to fulfil its obligations 
towards its creditors, and in particular no longer 
provides security for the assets entrusted to it;
lij
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■ e) falls wuhin one of the other cases where national law 
provides for withdrawal of authorization.
A rticle 4
The competent authorities shall not grant authorization 
for the taking-up of the business of investment firms 
before they have been informed of the identities of the 
shareholders or members, whether direct or indirect, 
natural or legal persons, that have qualifying holdings, 
and of the amounts of those holdings.
The competent authorities shall refuse authorization if, 
taking into account the need to ensure the sound and 
prudent management of an investment firm, they are not 
satisfied as to the suitability of the abovementtoned 
shareholders or members. ¿e
Article 5
Member States shall not apply to branches of investment 
firms having their registered office outside the 
Community, when commencing or carrying on their 
business, provisions that result in more favourable 
treatment than that accorded to branches of investment 
firms having their registered office in a Member State.
Article 6
There must be prior consultation with the competent 
authorities of the other Member State involved on the 
authorization of an investment firm which is:
—  a subsidiary of an investment firm authorized in 
another Member State, or'
—  a subsidiary of the parent undertaking of an 
investment firm authorized in another Member State, 
or
—  controlled by the same persons, whether natural or 
legal, as control an investment firm authorized in 
another Member State.
TITLE IU
Relations with third countries
Article 7
1. The competent authorities of the Member Sûtes 
shall inform the Commission:
(a) of any authorization of a direct or indirect subsidiary 
one or more parent undertakings of which are 
governed by the laws of a third country. The 
Commission shall inform the committee constituted 
under Article 23 accordingly;
(b) whenever such a parent undertaking acquires a 
holding in a Community investment firm such that 
the latter would become its subsidiary. The 
Commission shall inform the committee constituted 
under Article 23 accordingly.
When authorization is granted to the direct or indirect 
subsidiary of one or more parent untertakings governed 
by the law of third countries, the structure of the group 
shall be specified in the notification which the competent 
authorities shall address to the Commission.
2. The Member States shall inform the Commission of 
any general difficulties encountered by their investment 
firms ip establishing themselves or carrying on activities 
in a third country.
/
3. Initially no later than six months before the 
application of this Directive and thereafter periodically, 
the Commission shall draw up a report examining the 
treatment accorded to Community investment firms in 
third countries, in the terms referred to in paragraphs 4 
and 5, as regards establishment and the carrying on of 
investment activities, and the acquisition of holdings in 
third-country investment firms. The Commission shall 
submit those reports to the Council, together with any 
appropriate proposals.
4. Whenever it appears to the Commission, either on 
the basis of the reports referred to in paragraph 3 or on 
the basis of other information, that a third country :$ not 
granting Community investment firms effective market 
access comparable to that granted by the Community to 
investment firms from that third country, the 
Commission may submit proposals to the Council for the 
appropriate mandate for negotiation with a view to 
obtaining comparable competitive opportunities for 
Community investment firms. The Council shall decide 
by a qualified majority.
5. Whenever it appears to the Commission, either on 
the basis of the reports referred to in paragraph 3 or on 
the basis of other information, that Community 
investment firms in a third country do not receive 
national treatment offering the same competitive oppor­
tunities as are available to domestic investment firms and 
that the conditions of effective market access are not 
fulfilled, the Commission may initiate negotiations in 
order to remedy the situation.
In the circumstances described in the first subparagraph, 
it may also be decided at any time, and in addition to 
initiating negotiations, in accordance with the procedure 
laid down in Article 23 , that the competent authorities of 
the Member States must limit or suspend their decisions 
regarding requests pending at the moment of the 
decision or future requests for authorizations and the
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acquisition of holdings by direct or indirect parent 
undertakings governed by the laws of the third country 
in question. The duration of the measures referred to 
may not exceed six months.
3efore the end of that six-month period, and in the light 
of the results of the negotiations, the Council may, 
acting on a proposal from the Commission, decide by a 
qualified majority whether the measures shall be 
continued.
Such limitations or suspension may not apply to the 
setting up of subsidiaries by investment firms duly autho­
rized in the Community or by their subsidiaries, or to the 
acquisition of holdings in Community investment firms 
by such firms or subsidiaries.
6. Whenever it appears to the Commission that one of 
the situations described in paragraphs 4 and 5 obtains, 
the Member States shall inform it at its request:
(a) of any request for the authorization of a direct or 
indirect subsidiary one or more parent undertakings 
of which are governed by the laws of the third 
country in question;,
(b) whenever they are informed in accordance with 
Article 10 that such an undertaking proposes to 
acquire a holding in a Community investment firm 
such that the latter would become its subsidiary.
This obligation to provide information shall lapse 
whenever an agreement ¡s reached with the third country 
referred to in paragraph 4 or 5 or when the measures 
referred to in the second and third subparagraphs of 
paragraph 5 cease to apply.
7. Measures taken under this Article shall comply with 
the Community's obligations under any international 
agreements, bilateral or multilateral, governing the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of investment firms.
TITLE IV
Harmonization of the conditions governing pursuit of the 
business of investment firms
Article 8
I. An investment firm’s own funds may not fall below 
the amount of initial capital required pursuant to Article 
3 at the time of its authorization.
2. The Member States may decide that investment 
firms already in existence when the Directive is 
implemented, the own funds of which do not attain the 
levels for initial capital referred to in Article 3, may 
continue to carry on their activities. In that event, their 
own funds may not fall below the highest level reached 
after the date of the notification of this Directive.
3, If control of an investment firm falling within the 
category referred to in paragraph 2 is taken by a natural 
or legal person other than the person who controlled it 
previously, its own funds must attain at least the level for 
initial capital referred to in Article 3.
/
4. However,/where there ¡s a merger of two or more 
investment firms falling within the category referred to in 
paragraph 2, in certain specific circumstances and with 
the consent of the competent authorities, the own funds 
of the new investment firm resulting from the merger 
need not attain the level of initial capital referred to in 
Article 3. However, the own funds of the new investment 
firm may not fall below the total own funds of the 
merged firms at the time of the merger, as long as the 
appropriate levels referred to in Article 3 have not been 
obtained.
5. However, if, in the cases referred to in paragraphs 
I, 2 and 4, the own funds should be reduced, the 
competent authorities may, where the circumstances 
justify it, allow an investment firm a limited period in 
which to rectify its situation or cease its activities.
Article 9
1. The competent authorities of the home Member 
State shall require continuing compliance by an 
investment firm authorized by them with the conditions 
referred to in Article 3 (2).
2. The competent authorities of the home Member 
State shall require that investment firms authorized by 
them make sufficient provision against market risk in 
accordance with the rules prescribed in Directive . . .
3. The supervision of compliance with the conditions 
referred to in Articles 3 (2) and 4 shall be within the 
exclusive regulatory competence of the home Member 
State’s competent authorities irrespective of whether or 
not the investment firm establishes a branch o r  provides 
services in another Member State.
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Article tO
1. The Member Scales shall require any natural or 
legal person who proposes co acquire, directly or indi­
rectly, a qualifying holding in an investment firm first to 
inform the competent authorities, telling them of the size 
of the intended holding. Such a person must likewise 
inform the competent authorities if he proposes to 
increase his qualifying holding so that the proportion of 
the voting rights or of the capital held by him would 
reach or exceed 20, 33 or 50 °/a or so that the investment 
firm would become his subsidiary.
Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2, the 
competent authorities shall have a maximum of three 
months from the date of the notification provided for in 
the first subparagraph to oppose such a plan if, in view ( 
of the need to ensure sound and prudent management of^ 
the investment firm, they are not satisfied as to the suit­
a b ility  of the person referred to in the first 
subparagraph. If they do not oppose the plan, they may 
fix a maximum period for its implementation.
2. If the acquirer of the holdings referred' to ¡n 
paragraph 1 is an investment firm authorized in another 
Member State or the parent undertaking of an 
investment firm authorized in another Member State or 
a natural or legal person controlling an investment firm 
authorized in another Member State and if, as a result of 
that acquisition, the firm in which the acquirer proposes 
to acquire a holding would become a subsidiary or 
subject to the control of the acquirer, the assessment of 
the acquisition must be the subject of the prior consul­
tation referred to in Article 6.
3. The Member States shall require any natural or 
legal person who proposes to dispose, directly o r indi­
rectly, o f a qualifying holding in an investment firm first 
to inform the competent authorities. Such a person must 
likewise inform the competent authorities if he proposes 
to reduce his qualifying holding so that the proportion of 
the voting rights of or the capital held by him would fall 
below 20 , 33 or 50 °/o o r so that the investment firm 
would cease to be his, subsidiary.
4. On becoming aware of them, investment firms shall 
inform the competent authorities of any acquisitions or 
disposals of holdings in their capital that cause holdings 
to exceed or fall below one of the thresholds referred to 
in paragraphs 1 and 3.
They shall also, at least once a year, inform them of the 
names of shareholders and members possessing quali­
fying holdings and the sizes of such holdings as shown,
for example, by the information received at the annual 
general meetings of shareholders and members or as a 
result of compliance with the regulations relating to 
companies listed on stock exchanges.
5. The Member States shall require that, where the 
influence exercised by the persons referred to in 
paragraph I is likely to operate to the detriment of the 
prudent and sound management of the investment firm, 
the competent authorities shall take appropriate measures 
to put an end to that situation. Such measures may 
consist, for example, in injunctions, sanctions against 
directors and managers, or the suspension of the exercise 
of the voting rights attaching to the shares held by the 
shareholders o r  members in question.
Similar measures shall apply to natural or Jegal persons 
failing to coqaply with the obligation to provide prior 
information, as laid down in paragraph 1. If a holding is 
acquired despite the opposition of the competent autho­
rities, the Member States shall, regardless of any other 
sanctions to be adopted, provide either for exercise of 
the corresponding voting rights to be suspended, or for 
the nullity of voces cast or for the possibility of their 
annulment.
Article I I
1. Member States shall draw up prudential rules to be 
observed on a continuing basis by investment firms autho­
rized by their competent authorities. Supervision of such 
prudential rules shall be within the exclusive competence 
of the home Member State’s competent authorities irres­
pective of whether o r not the investment firm establishes 
a branch or provides services in another Member State. 
Such rules shall require that the investment firm:
—  has sound administrative and accounting procedures 
and internal control mechanisms,
—  arranges for securities belonging to investors to be 
kept separately from its own securities,
—  except in the case of investment firms that are credit 
institutions, arranges for money belonging to 
investors to  be placed in an account or in accounts 
which are separate and distinct from the firm’s own 
account,
—  is either a member of a general compensation scheme 
designed to p ro tea  investors who are prevented from 
having claims satisfied because of the bankruptcy or 
default of the investment firm or makes individual 
arrangements which provide investors with equivalent 
protection. Pending further harmonization of 
compensation schemes branches of investment firms 
shall be subject to the compensation scheme in force 
in the host Member State provided that payment or 
contribution to such a compensation scheme shall be
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calculated by reference to their income in respect of 
investment activity carried out in that State,
—  provides the competent authorities of the home 
Member State with such information on request and 
at such intervals as they may determine (but not less 
frequently than quarterly) in order that they may 
assess its financial soundness, including the adequacy 
of its provision in respect of market risk,
—  arranges for adequate records to be kept relating to 
executed transactions which shall be at least sufficient 
to enable the home Member State’s authorities to 
monitor compliance with prudential rules which they 
are responsible for applying, including rules relating 
to market risk. Such records shall be retained for 
periods to be laid down by the competent authorities,
—  is organized in such a way that conflicts of interest 
between the firm and its clients or between one of its 
clients and another do not result in clients* interests 
being prejudiced.
2. Member States may provide that the rules set out in 
the second, third and fourth indents of paragraph 1 shall 
not apply where the service is provided to business or 
professional investors or where the investment service 
does not involve the investment firm in handling any 
money or securities on behalf of clients.
TITLE V
Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
services
Article 12
1. Host Member States shall ensure that any 
investment service and any activities which are ancillary 
thereto may be provided in their territories, in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 14 to 16, 
either by the establishment of a branch or by way of the 
provision of services, by an investment firm authorized 
to provide the relevant service under this Directive by the 
competent authorities of its home Member State.
2. Host Member States may not make the estab­
lishment of a branch or the provision of services under 
paragraph 1 subject to an authorization requirement or 
to a requirement to provide endowment capital or any 
measure having equivalent effect.
Article 13
1. Without prejudice to the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom of services referred to in 
Article 12, host Member Sûtes shall ensure that
investment firms which are authorized to provide 
broking, dealing or market-making services by the 
competent authorities of their home Member State can 
have access, either directly or indirectly, to membership 
of stock exchanges and organized securities markets of 
host Member States where similar services are provided 
and also to membership of clearing and settlement 
systems.there which are available to members of such 
exchanges and markets.
2. In order to meet their obligation set out in 
paragraph 1, host Member States shall ensure that the 
investment firms referred to in that paragraph have the 
option to become either:
—  direct members of host Member States' stock 
exchanges or organized securities markets by setting 
up a branch in the host Member Sure, or
— indirect members by setting up a subsidiary in the 
host Member State or by the acquisition of an 
existing member firm.
In these cases membership shall be on the basis that the 
rules governing the structure and organization of the 
relevant host stock exchange or organized securities 
market and clearing and settlement systems are complied 
with.
3. Where the stock exchange or organized securities- 
market of the host Member State operates without any 
requirement for a physical presence the investment firms 
referred to in paragraph 1 may become members of it on 
a similar basis without having any esublishment in the 
host Member Sute. Home Member Sutes shall allow 
host stock exchanges or markets to provide appropriate 
facilities within the home Member Sutes* territory so as 
to permit their investment firms to become members of 
the host exchange or market in accordance with this 
paragraph.
4. Host Member Sutes shall likewise ensure that 
investment firms which are authorized to deal in 
financial futures and options by the competent autho­
rities of their home Member Sute can have access to 
membership of financial futures and options exchanges 
and membership of clearing houses in the host Member 
Sute under the same conditions as are set out in para­
graphs 1, 2 and 3.
Article 14
1. In addition to meeting the obligations set out in 
Article 3, an investment firm wishing to esublish a 
bunch in the territory of another Member Sute shall 
notify the competent authorities of its home Member 
Sute.
2. The Member Sutes shall require every investment 
firm wishing to esublish a branch in another Member 
State to provide the following information when 
effecting the notification referred to in paragraph l :
LU
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U) the Member State within the territory of which it 
plans to establish a branch;
(b) a programme of operations setting out inter alia the 
types of business envisaged and the structural organ­
ization of the branch;
(c) the address in the host Member State from which 
documents may be obtained;
(d) the names of the managers of the branch.
3. Unless the competent authorities of the home 
Member State have reason to doubt the adequacy of the 
administrative structure or the financial situation of the 
investment firm, taking into account the activities 
envisaged, they shall, within three months of receipt of^ 
the information referred to in paragraph 2, communicate 
that information to the competent authorities of the host 
Member Sate and shall inform the investment firm 
concerned accordingly.
The competent authorities of the home Member State 
shall also communicate the amount of own funds of the 
investment firm.
Where the competent authorities of the home Member 
State refuse to communicate the information referred to 
in paragraph 2 to the competent authorities of the host 
Member State, they shall give reasons for their refusal to 
the investment firm concerned within three months of 
receipt of all the information. That refusal or failure to 
reply shall be subject to a right to apply to the courts in 
the home Member State.
4. Before the branch of an investment firm 
commences its activities the competent authorities of the 
host Member State shall, within two months of receiving 
the information mentioned in paragraph 3, prepare for 
the supervision of the investment firm in accordance with 
Article 16 and, if necessary, indicate the conditions 
under which, in the interest of the general good, those 
activities must be carried on in the host Member State.
5. On receipt of a communication from the competent 
authorities of the host Member State, or in the event of 
the expiry of the period provided for in paragraph 4 
without receipt of any communication from the latter, 
the branch may be established and commence its acti­
vities.
6. In the event of a change in any of the particulars 
communicated pursuant to paragraph 2 (b), (c) or, (d), 
an investment firm shall give written notice of the change 
in question to the competent authorities of the home and 
host Member States at least one month before making 
the change so as to enable the competent authorities of 
the home Member Sute to take a decision under 
paragraph 3 and the competent authorities of the host 
Member Sute to take a decision on the change under 
paragraph 4.
Article 15
l. Any investment firm wishing to exercise the 
freedom to provide services by carrying on its activities 
within the territory of another Member State for the first 
time shall notify the competent authorities of the home 
Member Sute of the investment service or services which 
it intends to carry on.
2. The competent authorities of the home Member 
Sute shall, within one month of receipt of the notifi­
cation mentioned in paragraph 1, send that notification 
to the competent authorities of the host Member Sute.
Article 16
t
1. Host Member Sutes may, for statistical purposes, 
require that all investment firms having branches within 
their territories shall report periodically on their activities 
in those host Member Sutes to the competent authorities 
of those host Member Sutes.
2. Where the competent authorities of a host Member 
Sute ascertain that an investment firm having a branch 
or providing services within its territory is not complying 
with the legal provisions adopted in that S ute pursuant 
to the provisions of this Directive involving powers of 
the host Member Sute competent authorities, those 
authorities shall require the investment firm concerned to 
put an end to the irregular situation.
3. If the investment firm concerned fails to take the 
necessary steps, the competent authorities of the host 
Member Sute shall inform the competent authorities of 
the home Member Sute accordingly. The competent 
authorities of the home Member Sute shall, at the 
earliest opportunity, take all appropriate measures to 
ensure that the investment firm concerned puts an end to 
that irregular situation. The nature of those measures 
shall be communicated to the competent authorities of 
the host Member Sute.
4. If, despite the measures taken by the home Member 
State or because such measures prove inadequate or are 
not available in the Member Sute in question, the 
investment firm persists in violating the legal rules 
referred to in paragraph 2 in force in the host Member 
State, the latter S u te may, after informing the competent 
authorities of the home Member Sute, take appropriate 
measures to prevent or to punish further irregularities 
and, insofar as is necessary, to prevent that investment 
firm from initiating further transactions within its 
territory. The Member Sutes shall ensure that within 
their territories it ¡s possible to serve the legal documents 
necessary for these measures on investment firms.
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5. The foregoing provisions shall not affect the power 
of host Member States to take appropriate measures to 
prevent or to punish irregularities committed within their 
territories which are contrary to the legal rules they have 
adopted in the interest of the general good. This shall 
.nclude the possibility of preventing offending investment 
firms from initiating any further transactions within their 
territories.
6. Any measure adopted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 
and 5 involving penalties or restrictions on the activities 
of an investment firm must be properly justified and 
communicated to the investment firm concerned. Every 
such measure shall be subject to a right of appeal to the 
courts in the Member State the authorities of which 
adopted it.
7. Before following the procedure set out in para* 
graphs 2 to 4 the competent authorities of the host 
Member State may, in emergencies, take any pre­
cautionary measures necessary to protect the interests of 
investors and others to whom services are provided. The 
Commission and the .competent authorities of the other 
Member States must be informed of such measures at the 
earliest opportunity.
T he Commission may, after consulting the competent 
authorities of the Member States concerned, decide that 
the Member State in question must amend or abolish 
those measures.
8. In the event of withdrawal of authorization the 
competent authorities of the host Member State shall be 
informed and shall take appropriate measures to prevent
the investment firm concerned from initiating further 
transactions within its territory and to safeguard the 
interests of investors. Every two yean the Commission 
shall submit a report on such cases to the committee 
constituted under Article 23.
9. The Member Sûtes shall inform the Commission of  
the number and type of cases in which there has been a 
refusal pursuant to Article 14 or measures have been 
taken in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4. 
Every two years, the Commission shall submit a report 
on such cases to the committee constituted under Article 
23.
10. Nothing in this Article shall prevent investment 
firms authorized in other Member Sûtes from adver­
tising their services through all available means of 
communication in the host Member Sute, subject to any 
rules governing the form and the content of such adver­
tising adopted in the interest of the general good.
TITLE Vl
The authorities responsible for authorization and super­
vision
Article 17
1. The Member States shall designate the authorities 
which are to carry out the duties provided for in this 
Directive. They shall inform the Commission thereof, 
indicating any division of duties.
2. The authorities referred to in paragraph 1 must be 
public authorities or bodies officially recognized by 
national law or by public authorities to be part of the 
supervisory system prevailing in the relevant Member 
Sute. ✓
3. The authorities concerned must be granted all the 
powers necessary to carry out their task.
Article 18
1. Where there are several competent authorities in 
the same Member S u te they shall collaborate closely in 
order to supervise the activities of investment firms 
operating there.
2. Member Sûtes shall also permit such collaboration 
to take place between such competent authorities and 
public authorities responsible for the supervision of credit 
and other financial institutions and insurance companies 
as regards the respective entitles supervised by them.
3. Where investment services are provided on a 
services basis across frontiers or by the establishment of 
branches in one o r more Member Sûtes other than the 
home Member S u te  the competent authorities of the 
Member Sûtes concerned shall collaborate closely in 
order to supervise the activities of the investment firms 
concerned. They shall supply one another on request 
with all information concerning the management and 
ownership of such investment firms that is likely to 
faciliute their supervision and the examination of the 
conditions for their authorization and all information 
likely to faciliute the monitoring of such firms.
Article 19
1. Host Member Sutes shall ensure that, where an 
investment firm authorized in another Member Sute 
carries on its activities there through a branch, the 
competent authorities of the home Member Sute may, 
after having first informed the competent authorities of 
the host Member S u te , carry out themselves o r  through 
the intermediary of persons they appoint for that purpose 
on-the-spot verification of the information referred to in 
Article 18 (3).
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2. The competent authorities of the home Member 
States may also ask. the competent authorities of the host 
M ember State for this verification to be carried out. The 
authorities which have received such a request must, 
within the framework of their competence, act upon it 
either by carrying out the verification themselves, or by 
allowing the authorities who made the request to carry it 
out, or by allowing an auditor or expert to carry it out.
3. This Article shall not affect the right of the 
com petent authorities of the host Member State to carry 
out, in the discharge of their responsibilities unier this 
Directive, on-the-spot verifications of branches estab­
lished within their territory.
Article 20
1. T he Member States shall provide that all persons 
working or who have worked for the competent auth­
orities, as well as auditors o r experts acting on behalf of 
the competent authorities, shall be bound by the obli­
gation of professional secrecy. This means that no 
confidential information which they may receive in the 
course of their duties may be divulged to any person or 
authority whatsoever, except in summary or collective 
form such that individual investment firms cannot be 
identified, without prejudice to cases covered by criminal 
law.
Nevertheless, where an investment firm has been 
declared bankrupt or is being compulsorily wound up, 
confidential information which does not concern third 
parties involved in attempts to rescue that investment 
firm may be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the competent auth­
orities of the various Member States and the public auth­
orities responsible for the supervision of credit and other 
financial institutions shall be authorized to exchange 
information in accordance with the provisions of Article 
IS where appropriate for the efficient discharge of their 
respective responsibilities. This information shall be 
subject to the conditions of professional secrecy referred 
to in paragraph 1.
3. M ember States may conclude cooperation 
agreem ents, providing for exchanges of information, 
with the competent authorities of third countries only if 
the information disclosed is subject to guarantees of 
professional secrecy at least equivalent to those referred 
to in this .Article.
4. Competent authorities receiving confidential infor­
mation under paragraphs 1 o r 2 may use it only in the 
course of their duties:
—  to  check that the conditions governing the taking-up 
o f  the business of the entities supervised by them are 
m et and to facilitate the monitoring of the conduct of 
such business, the administrative and accounting 
procedures and the mechanisms of internal control,
or
—  to impose sanctions, 
or
—  in an administrative appeal against a decision of the 
competent authority,
or
—  in court proceedings instituted pursuant to Article 21-
5. Paragraphs 1 and 4 shall not preclude the exchange 
of information within a Member State, or between 
Member States, between competent authorities and:
—  authorities responsible for the supervision of financial 
markets,
—  bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of 
investment firms and in other similar procedures,
—  persons responsible for carrying out statutory audits 
of the accounts of investment firms and other 
financial institutions,
in the discharge o f’ their supervisory functions, and the 
disclosure to bodies which administer compensation 
schemes of information necessary to the exercise of their 
functions. This information shall be subject to the 
conditions of professional secrecy referred to in 
paragraph 1.
6. In addition, notwithstanding the provisions referred 
to in paragraphs 1 and 4, the Member States may, by 
virtue of provisions laid down by law, authorize the 
disclosure of certain information to other departments of 
their central government administrations responsible for 
legislation on the supervision of credit institutions, 
financial institutions, investment firms and insurance 
companies and to inspectors acting on behalf of those 
departments.
However, such disclosures may be made only where 
necessary for reasons of prudential control.
However, the Member Sûtes shall provide that infor­
mation received under paragraphs 2 and 5 and that 
obtained by means of the on-the-spot verification 
referred to in Article 19 may never be disclosed in the 
cases referred to in this paragraph except with the 
express consent of the competent authorities which 
disclosed the information or of the competent authorities 
of the Member State in which on-the-spot verification 
was carried out.
Article 21
Member States shall ensure that decisions taken in 
respect of an investment firm pursuant to laws, regu­
lations and administrative provisions adopted in 
accordance with this Directive may be subject to the 
right to apply to the courts. The same shall apply where 
an application for authorization is deemed to be refused 
in accordance with Article 3 (4).
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Article 22
 ^ THthout prejudice to the procedures for the withdrawal 
| of authorizations and the provisions of criminal law, 
Member States shall provide that their respective 
competent authorities may, as against investment firms, 
or those who effectively control the business of such 
, firms which infringe laws, regulations or administrative 
' provisions concerning the supervision or pursuit of their 
| activities, adopt or impose in respect of them penalties or  
I measures aimed specifically at ending observed breaches 
or the causes of such breaches.
TITLE VII 
Final provisions
Article 23
*  1. T he technical adaptations to be made to this 
"  Directive in the following areas shall be adopted in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph
I 2:I —  expansion of the content of the list in the Annex or 
I adaptation of the terminology used in that list to take j account of developments on financial markets,
j —  alteration of the amount of initial capital referred to 
in Article 3 to take account of developments in the 
j economic and monetary field,
J —  the areas in which the competent authorities must 
exchange information as listed in Article 18,
—  clarification of the definitions in order to ensure 
uniform application of this Directive throughout the 
Community,
—  clarification of the definitions in order to take 
account in the implementation of this Directive of 
developments on financial markets,
—  the alignment of terminology on and the framing of 
definitions in accordance with subsequent measures 
on investment firms and related matters.
2. T h e Commission shall be assisted by a committee 
composed of representatives of the Member Sûtes and 
chaired by a representative of the Commission.
The represenuiive of the Commission shall submit to the 
committee a draft of the measures to be taken. The 
committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a 
time limit which the chairman may lay down according 
to the urgency of the matter. The opinion shall be 
delivered by the majority laid down in Article 148 (2) of 
the T reaty  in the case of decisions which the Council is 
required to adopt on a proposal from the Commission. 
The votes of the representatives of the Member Sûtes
within the committee shall be weighted in the manner set 
out in that Article. The chairman shall not vote.
The Commission shall adopt the measures envisaged if 
they are in accordance with the opinion of the 
committee.
If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the 
opinion of the committee, or if no opinion is delivered, 
the Commission shall, without delay, submit to the 
Council a proposal relating to the measures to be taken. 
The Council shall act by a qualified majority.
If, on the expiry of three months from the date of 
referral to the Council, the Council has not acted, the 
proposed measures shall be adopted by the Commission.
,  Article 24
1. Investment firms already authorized to provide 
investment services in their home Member State before 
the entry into force of the provisions adopted in 
implemenution of this Directive shall be deemed to be 
authorized for the purposes of this Directive provided 
that the authorization was given under equivalent 
conditions to those set out in Articles 3 (2) and 4.
2. Branches which have commenced their activities; in 
accordance with the provisions in force in their host 
Member Sûtes, before the entry into force of the 
provisions adopted in implemenution of this Directive 
shall be presumed to have been subject to the procedures 
envisaged in Article 14(1) ,  (2) and (3). They shall be 
governed, from the date of that entry into force, by the 
provisions of Articles 12, 14 (6), 16 and 19.
3. Article 15 shall not affect rights acquired before the 
entry into force of the provisions adopted in implemen­
ution of this Directive by investment firms providing 
services.
Article 25
1. Member Sûtes shall bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with this Directive by 1 January 1993. They shall 
forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
The provisions adopted pursuant to the first 
subparagraph shall make express reference to this 
Directive.
2. Member Sûtes shall communicate to the 
Commission the texts of the main provisions of national 
law which they adopt in the field covered by this 
Directive.
Article 26
This Directive is addressed to the Member Sûtes.
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AXSEX
INVESTMENT SERVICES COMING MITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS DIRECTTVE
SECTION A
Sem e«
1. Brokerage, i.e. the acceptance of investors' orders relating to any or all of the instruments referred to in 
Section B below and/or the execution of such orders on an exchange or market on an agency basis 
against payment of commission.
2. Dealing as principal, i.e. the purchase and sale of any or all of the instruments referred to in Section B 
below for own account and at own risk with a view to profiting from the margin between bid and offer 
prices.
3. Market making, i.e. maintenance of a market in any or all of the instruments referred to in Section B 
below by dealing in such instruments on the basis of a commitment to make two-way prices.
4. Portfolio management, i.e. the management against payment of portfolios composed of any or all of the 
instruments referred to in Section B below undertaken for investors otherwise than on a collective basis.
5. Arranging or offering underwriting services in respect of issues of the instruments referred to in point t 
of Section B below and distribution of such issues to the public.
6. Professional investment advice given to investors on an individual basis or on the basis of private 
subscription in connection with any or all of the instruments referred to in Section B below.
7. Safekeeping and administration of any of the instruments referred to in Section B below otherwise than 
in connection with the management of a clearing system.
SECTION B
Instruments
1. Transferable securities including units in undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities.
2. Money market instruments (including certificates of deposit and Eurocommercial paper).
3. Financial futures and options.
4. Exchange rate and interest rate instruments.
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